

Aspects of Classical Chinese Syntax

古汉语语法四论

何莫邪著

Christoph Harbsmeier

This book consists of a series of original and detailed studies on basic problems of Classical Chinese grammar. Well over 1000 Classical Chinese sentences are quoted and analysed so that the book may serve as a teaching aid for advanced students of Classical Chinese. The topics discussed include negation, pronouns, words for 'all', 'some', 'only', 'many', 'few', and the contrasts between various kinds of conditional sentences in Classical Chinese. The new results reported in this doctoral dissertation from the University of Copenhagen will be of great practical interest for anyone concerned with Classical Chinese literature or Chinese linguistics. The inclusion of a detailed analytical index increases the value of the work as a practical handbook for sinologists.

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Aspects of Classical Chinese Syntax

Christoph Harbsmeier

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Reading other scholars' work on Chinese grammar, I have often found much to be dissatisfied with. Looking back now, I am afraid my attitude to my *own* work is not so different: I wish I had been able to write a better book. It is my earnest hope that in spite of its shortcomings this book may prove useful to fellow students and lovers of Classical Chinese language and literature.

C.H.

Introduction

Ancient or Classical Chinese (AC) was the literary language current (and evolving) in China around 500–200 B.C.. It is the language of China's first great moralist Confucius and of his successors who laid the foundations for Confucianism which was to dominate China right down to the 20th century. It is the language of the oldest and greatest monuments of Taoist mystical philosophy, the Lao Zi and the Zhuang Zi. It is the language of China's earliest systematic efforts in logic and science, the Mo Zi and the Gongsun Long Zi.¹ It is the language of China's first great lyrical poet who put his name to his works, Qu Yuan. It is the language of China's first work of narrative history, the Zuo Zhuan, worthy ancestor to what was to become the world's most impressive historiographical tradition, the Chinese dynastic histories. It is the language of the political philosophers Shang Yang and Han Fei Zi, whose teachings formed the ideological basis for the unification of China and the establishment of the Chinese empire.

Classical Chinese is the language in which the foundations of Chinese civilisation were first articulated.²

In the Far East, Classical Chinese has played much the same key role as Classical Greek has in Western Europe. Its impact on language and script in countries like Vietnam, Korea, and Japan is obvious.³ In the context of Far Eastern linguistics the study of Classical Chinese grammar is clearly of the very first importance.

1. Cf. the monumental study *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* (1978) by A. C. Graham and my review of this book in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London (forthcoming).
2. The recent political campaign against Confucius demonstrates abundantly how the classical heritage lives on even among the most outrageously anti-traditionalist philistines in the Chinese communist movement. (Cf. my book *Konfuzius und der Räuber Zhi* (1978)). One just has to try to imagine someone trying to launch a political mass campaign against Plato in Europe in order to appreciate the traditionalism that persists in China even at the most iconoclastic of times.
3. For example, the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh was quite as fond of writing Classical Chinese poetry as Mao Ze-dong.

Within the larger field of general linguistics and the typology of language, Classical Chinese is of unique significance because of its extremely isolating grammatical structure.

Anyone who wishes to gain an unparochial understanding of things like the history of ideas, the history of science, historiography, lyrical poetry or the philosophy of language will obviously do well to take serious account of the Classical Chinese evidence precisely because it is so different from what we are used to.

I, for one, began to study Chinese not because of a particular China-enthusiasm but because I hoped that from a sinological point of view I might make an original contribution to general linguistics and to the philosophy of language. I was then a student of analytical philosophy, an admirer of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and of Noam Chomsky. But I found that there was something profoundly unsatisfactory in the way both transformational grammar and analytical philosophy discussed human language: neither of them seemed to take serious notice of the deep structural differences between natural languages. Languages like Classical Chinese seemed to me to raise some rather unsettling questions of the very first importance for any analytical philosopher or transformational grammarian worth his salt: Can the principles of transformational grammar be naturally and plausibly applied to very different languages like Classical Chinese? Are essential parts of analytical philosophy in some way bound up with idiosyncrasies of Indo-European languages? These were *not* essentially sinological questions. They do *not* only concern those who happen to want to know about China. They are fundamental questions that any self-respecting linguist or analytical philosopher ought to take a vital interest in.

In my book *Zur philosophischen Grammatik des Altchinesischen*⁴ I have tried to show how a careful analysis of Classical Chinese does indeed have significant consequences for general linguistics and the philosophy of language. I tried to demonstrate in detail that from the Classical Chinese language we can learn important new things on the relation between pragmatics and semantics in the interpretation of

4. Cf. C. Harbsmeier, *Wilhelm von Humboldts Brief an Abel-Rémusat und die philosophische Grammatik des Altchinesischen* (1979).

sentences, on the distinction between morphology and syntax in natural languages, on the distinction between grammatical particles and lexical items, on the relation between lexical word classes and syntactic parts of speech and also on the connection between subordination of sentences and nominalization in natural languages.

In the present book I will not argue about general issues of this sort. Moreover, I will most emphatically *not* assume that the conclusions of *Zur philosophischen Grammatik des Altchinesischen* are correct. Time will have to show whether my results are found to be acceptable by sinologists and significant by others. However, I do want to insist that as a crucial test case for current basic theories of general linguistics and the philosophy of language Classical Chinese has been shown to be of potentially decisive importance. We have all sorts of very good reasons for studying Classical Chinese as closely as we can. And one of these is to make sure that this very special language does not provide counterevidence to our current notions on what natural languages are like.

Now in the process of trying to give an account of the ‘philosophical grammar’ of Classical Chinese that satisfied basic demands for precision and explicitness it became more and more obvious to me that in spite of many useful efforts by grammarians, there were still plenty of straightforward basic things about Classical Chinese grammar that were simply not understood. And this was certainly not for lack of systematic and comprehensive attempts to describe the grammar of the Classical Chinese language.

There is a flourishing tradition in China of writing books on the uses and functions of grammatical particles, and these works are generally quite useful for the wealth of example sentences they provide, although they are invariably weak on grammatical analysis. I will only mention those handbooks that have been most useful to me: Liu Qi, *Zhuzi bian lue* (1712) and Wang Yin-zhi, *Jing zhuan shi ci* (1885) are the classics in this tradition. Yang Shu-da, *Ci Quan* (1928) and *Gaodeng guowenfa* (1930) provide more disciplined and systematic surveys. Pei Xue-hai, *Gushu xuzi jishi* (1934) is a very comprehensive but rather thoughtless compilation based on the earlier works. W. A. C. H. Dobson’s *A Dictionary of Chinese Particles* (1974) attempts to summarize the traditional Chinese works. It provides little new insight.

The first Chinese grammar of AC is the celebrated *Mashi wentong* (1898) by Ma Jian-zhong. Ma Jian-zhong (1845–1899) had received

his linguistic training in France.⁵ His grammar covers not only what I call Classical Chinese but also the literary language down to the Tang dynasty, and it was intended to show the applicability of Western linguistic methods to the Chinese language.

It serves no useful purpose to line up at this point all the grammars of literary Chinese that have appeared in China since 1898. I shall limit myself to those that I found particularly helpful.

Jin Zhao-zi, *Guowenfa zhi yanjiu* (1922) is a very thoughtful and perceptive short book. Yang Bo-jun, *Wenyan yufa* (1956), Liu Jing-nong, *Hanyu wenyan yufa* (1958), and Huang Lu-ping, *Hanyu wenyan yufa gangyao* (1961, 2nd ed. 1974) are standard surveys of literary Chinese. Their usefulness is limited by the fact that they do not distinguish carefully between Classical Chinese and Literary Chinese and that they operate rather uncritically with the traditional grammatical concepts of Latin grammar. Zhou Fa-gao, *Zhongguo gudai yufa* (1959ff) is the most detailed grammar of literary Chinese available to date. Wang Li, *Gudai Hanyu* (1964) is by far the best student textbook on the language.

Finally, I should like to mention a few general surveys of Chinese grammar that I found useful: Yang Bo-jun, *Zhongwenfa yuwen tongjie* (1936) gives a very systematic historical survey. Lü Shu-xiang, *Zhongguo wenfa yaolüe* (1942ff) is a very thoughtful introduction. Wang Li, *Hanyu shi gao* (1957/8) is the best historical grammar of the Chinese language.

Apart from the indigenous Chinese works substantial efforts have been made in the West to provide adequate grammars of Classical Chinese.⁶ Already by the 1820s a number of pioneering grammars of AC had appeared which can still be read with profit to this day: J. Marshman, *Elements of Chinese Grammar* (1814), R. Morisson, *A Grammar of the Chinese Language* (1815) and P. Abel-Rémusat, *Éléments de la grammaire chinoise* (1826). Since then, J. H. Prémare, *Notitia linguae sinicae* (1831) and notably S. Julien, *Syntaxe nouvelle de*

5. A number of the most prominent Chinese linguists were in fact trained in France, notably Gao Ming-kai and Wang Li. Grammar was introduced into China as a Western discipline, and by and large Chinese grammarians have stuck even more rigidly to the traditional concepts of Latin grammar than their European counterparts. This observation applies also to those Chinese linguists who never studied in the West.
6. For a survey of the earlier history of Chinese grammar in Europe cf. Harbsmeier 1979: 6ff.

la langue chinoise (1869/70) have added significantly to the knowledge of AC in the West. All these grammars were written by men with wide linguistic experience, but by and large they simply applied the concepts of Latin grammar to AC. The culmination of this traditional 19th century scholarship was G. von der Gabelentz's *Chinesische Grammatik* (1881).

J. Mullie's *Grondbeginselen van de Chinese letterkundige taal* (1948) continues the tradition rather unimaginatively, but in commendable detail.

W. A. C. H. Dobson, *Late Archaic Chinese* (1959) is a much more ambitious book. It purports to give a comprehensive formal account of AC grammar, and it uses a great deal of advanced linguistic terminology. Behind the formidable methodological facade this grammar has proved a notoriously unreliable and insensitive book, as many reviewers have pointed out.⁷

In Russia the linguist S. E. Jachontov has produced a much more reliable survey *Drevnekitajskij jazyk* (1965), but unfortunately this is not a very detailed book.

Most recently, Professor J. S. Cikoski has produced an impressive study *Three Essays on Classical Chinese Grammar* (1978) which I have reviewed in detail elsewhere. (*Acta Orientalia*, Vol. 41, 1980).

Apart from these monographs there has been a proliferation of student textbooks on AC, the most current ones being those by Haenisch (1933), Creel (1938–1952), Shadick (1968), Dawson (1968), and Cikoski (1976).

There are two books in the history of Chinese linguistics that stand out in my mind as unsurpassed monuments of sensitive scholarship and linguistic common sense. One is Gabelentz's old *Chinesische Grammatik*, and the other is Chao Yuen-ren's new *A Grammar of Spoken Chinese*.

Chao Yuen-ren's combination of logical sharpness with grammatical sensitivity have been a very important inspiration to me. I admire particularly his flair for unruly idiomatic detail and his good-humoured way of doing linguistics.

The qualities of Georg von der Gabelentz's work are less obvious.

7. Harshesht is J. S. Cikoski 1978:I.121 "Professor Dobson's works contradict much of what is most firmly and accurately known about Classical Chinese grammar, and also are contradictory and inconsistent among themselves, to such an extent that their validity and usefulness is practically nil".

My admiration has grown as time went by. Again and again I found that Georg von der Gabelentz had noticed important things and asked important questions that had got lost in current modern textbooks and grammars. In view of the bulk of the literature on AC since 1881 it is astonishing to realize that almost a hundred years after its publication one is still very much tempted to say that Gabelentz's book remains the finest detailed grammar in the field.

It may be useful, for a moment, to consider what it was that made these two achievements possible. I find it profoundly significant that both Gabelentz and Chao had a strong *general* linguistic interest. Both Gabelentz's *Die Sprachwissenschaft* (1891) and Chao's *Language and Symbolic Systems* (1968) are substantial contributions to general linguistics.

The abundance of the literature on AC might well lead one to assume that having first studied some textbooks and then read around in AC literature one has simply *lernt Classical Chinese* just as one might learn Classical Greek by studying standard textbooks and then browsing in the literature. The standard Greek or Latin grammars and dictionaries equip one quite adequately to read ordinary Greek or Latin texts. Anyone who, for example, is constantly forced to look things up in cribs and commentaries when he reads *De bello gallico* in Latin will be taken to be a raw beginner.

By contrast, the textbooks mentioned above do not begin to equip a student adequately to read ordinary texts like the Zuo Zhuan. It is not by chance that many Western sinologists usually add "tr. Legge p. . . ." when they quote Zuo Zhuan. Which classical scholar would dream of referring to translations of Caesar's *De bello gallico* when referring to a passage?

I do not mention this sinological practise in order to discredit it. But I am suggesting that it is not much of an exaggeration to say that our knowledge of AC is in many respects still at the stage that corresponds to that of the student of Latin who reads *De bello gallico* with a crib hidden under his desk. It is not just that we have not got an adequate *theory* of AC grammar. (*That we could live with.*) No, half the time we do not really know for sure what exactly AC sentences mean. And even when we feel sure what an AC sentence means we still are often uncertain how it comes to mean what apparently it does mean. Such, I am afraid, is the present state of the art.

Much of the difficulty is obviously due to our insufficient grasp of individual AC idioms, and also to the comparatively small size of the

corpus of AC texts that have come down to us. But I suggest that an important part of our difficulty is plain ignorance of basic structures of AC grammar. Basic structures like those I try to explain and explore in the present book.

Recognizing the poor state of our present knowledge of AC grammar is in my view a necessary first step towards improving the situation. But the necessary next step is definitely *not* to write yet another 'comprehensive' grammar of AC. The most useful thing, at the present stage, is to concentrate on those parts of AC grammar where one feels one can make the most constructive and helpful contributions. To concentrate on basic features of the language that are not at present properly understood.

Now I suspect that among the important basic things that any natural language will allow one to do are simple logical operations like negation, quantification, the articulation of conditional propositions, and reference to individual items in the world. These four operations are basic to what is generally known in the West as formal logic. Given the conditional and negation, all other logical sentence connectives can be defined in terms of these. And together with the universal and the existential quantifiers ('all' and 'some') these are central, basic terms in what has come to be called standard first order predicate logic.

The rather vague question: *Does Western logic apply to the Chinese language or is this logic a parochial Western product?* can now be answered in an inductive way.

First, we can ask: *Does AC have words that have a function that roughly corresponds to the logical negation of sentences?*

The answer is obviously yes. But the interesting point is how AC negation differs from negation in languages like English.

Second, we may ask: *Are there in AC constructions that roughly correspond to the logical notion of quantification?*

The answer is again obviously yes. But the interesting question is how precisely quantification works in AC.

Third, we may ask: *Are there in AC ways of articulating conditional propositions?*

Again, the answer is obviously yes. But the question remains what the precise force of the various conditional constructions in AC is.

Finally, we may ask: *Do we have reference by pronouns in AC?*

Obviously yes. But how do AC pronouns differ from the sorts of pronouns we know from other languages?

The four areas negation, quantification, conditionals, and (pronomi-

nal) reference are intellectually crucial areas in natural languages. They are crucial because they are indispensable for the articulation of complex scientific thought, and indeed for any complex thought whatever. It is therefore only natural to pay special attention to these areas in the study of AC grammar.

In this book I have chosen to concentrate on those problems within these four areas where I felt I had important new things to say. Things that I felt were sufficiently well understood as well as things that I felt I still did not begin to understand are mentioned only incidentally. I am quite sure that there remain plenty of new things to be discovered e.g. about negation in AC. And I do not wish to mislead the reader through a spurious appearance of completeness of treatment.

The main sources for my grammatical study were those AC books for which we have detailed concordances. I refer to these collectively as 'the indexed literature'. I have only occasionally referred to the *Shu Jing* and *Shi Jing* and I have disregarded *Lie Zi*, *Yantielun*, *Shishuo Xinyu* as well as the *Wen Xuan*, although I do have indices of all these. It would be very interesting indeed to trace back the phenomena discussed in this book to the language of the oracle inscriptions and forward to *Shishuo Xinyu*. But such historical perspectives had to be very largely excluded from the scope of this book. By choosing to concentrate on AC material I do not mean to deny in the least that historical comparison may cast new light on the problems I have discussed. On the other hand I do believe that there is good reason to separate diachronic and synchronic linguistics at this stage.

The AC books I was concerned with, then, were first of all the following:

Lunyu (LY)
 Mencius (Meng)
 Mo Zi (Mo)
 Xun Zi (Xun)
 Zhuang Zi (Zhuang)
 Lao Zi (Lao)
 Han Fei Zi (HF)
 Sun Zi (Sun)
 Zuo Zhuan (Zuo)
 Guan Zi (Guan)
 Yi Jing (Yi)
 Chu Ci (CC)
 Guo Yu (GY)

The Guo Yu concordance available to me is computerized and therefore not as convenient to use as the others. I have consulted it only when this was practicable. Thus I may sometimes refer to ‘the indexed literature’ without thereby meaning to imply that I have checked all my way through the digits of the Guo Yu concordance.

Apart from the indexed literature I have consulted the following books extensively:

Lü Shi Chun Qiu (LSCQ)
 Shang Jun Shu (SJ)
 Zhan Guo Ce (ZGC)⁸
 Li Ji (Li Ji)⁹

Since I have no adequate indices for these books, there is no way of checking on them in any systematic way for every grammatical observation one is interested in.

Obviously, the books mentioned above are from different historical periods. My main interest, however, was in texts that had a reasonable chance of being pre-Han. Certainly, many of the grammatical rules I discuss do not hold for a Han text like Shi Ji, although all of them *seem* to hold for Huai Nan Zi.

We know that the Chinese language changed from Lun Yu times to Zhan Guo Ce times. I mention such changes only when they matter to my argument.

For certain purposes I could not resist the temptation to include Han texts into my survey, particularly in connection with my discussion of hypothetical reasoning in AC. The texts I have worked with in this connection are, apart from the late chapters in the AC books listed above:

Huai Nan Zi (HNT)¹⁰
 Han Shi Wai Zhuan (HSWZ)
 Xin Xu (Xin Xu)
 Shuo Yuan (Shuo Yuan)
 Shi Ji (Shi Ji)

8. Obviously, ZGC is a compilation of the Han dynasty. On a number of grammatical points ZGC seems to be closer to Han Chinese than to AC.
9. Obviously, Li Ji is a compilation of texts from very different periods, and so are some of the indexed AC texts, notably Chu Ci and Guan Zi.
10. Grammatically, the HNT does not *seem* to differ significantly from pre-Han texts.

Only very occasionally have I referred to the grammatically very special Gu Liang and Gong Yang commentaries. Göran Malmqvist is currently giving these texts the special grammatical attention they deserve.¹¹

Considering the enormous body of the material to be surveyed my account clearly had to leave out many details: I could neither hope to line up as much of the evidence in favour of my analyses as I would have liked to, nor could I hope to discuss all the sentences I found that presented difficulties for my analyses. I had to limit myself to what I thought were 'representative' examples, and there is something irretrievably subjective and arbitrary in the choice of what is to be taken up for discussion. However, as a matter of principle, I have not hesitated to quote awkward examples that illustrate the limitations of my analyses.

In general, I had to try to strike a balance between boring the reader by presenting an unrealistically clean and neat picture of the grammatical facts on the one hand, and confusing the reader by paying too much attention to marginal and tricky sentences on the other.

Undoubtedly, some fellow sinologists would have preferred me to discuss more of the tricky cases, while others would have liked to see more of the clear confirming evidence. And in a way I would have liked to provide more of both these things. But there were obvious limitations of space. Moreover, I am afraid the amount of text surveyed is so large that I will have overlooked a number of examples that I would have loved to bring up and discuss or hated to see. It is in the nature of things that a book of this sort cannot plausibly pretend to be exhaustive.

One particular problem that one could have paid much more attention to than I have chosen to do concerns the systematic differences in grammatical usage between the various books I have used. I have found it useful for the purposes of this book to assume that we can speak of 'the grammar of AC' and to allow that certain grammatical distinctions come out more prominently in some texts than they do in others, that certain constructions are common in some books and absent in others, etc.

For a number of texts, (the Gu Liang and Gong Yang commentaries) it is clear that they differ so markedly from all the other texts we have that they need an extensive grammatical analysis of their own. We also

11. See Göran Malmqvist's current series of articles in BMFEA.

need a good explanation *why* these two texts should differ so markedly from both AC and Han literature. However, by and large it seems to me that the grammatical usages of the various AC books differ, but tend to be consistent with each other. They may even complement each other. I will not normally go into differences of this sort in any detail. That remains a task for future research.

In general, I have been much less interested in questions like “what is the correct theoretical linguistic analysis of sentences like S?” and “what is the theoretically correct phonological and etymological analysis of a given grammatical particle X?”. Instead, I have concentrated on more practical problems like “what do sentences like S mean?” and “what is the precise grammatical force of the particle X in sentences like S?”. By choosing to concentrate in this way on semantics and on syntax I do not in any way deny the importance of phonological and etymological analyses. But I find that etymological and phonological considerations are in principle only very indirectly relevant to the practical questions of how we are to understand AC sentences.

My method of disregarding phonological and etymological arguments in the present book may be considered dangerous by some. But I feel my method is justifiable on theoretical linguistic grounds. On the other hand my failure to pay detailed attention to the textual criticism of my AC texts has no theoretical justification, only a practical excuse: we just do not have sufficiently detailed critical variorum editions of these AC texts. P. M. Thompson’s outstanding textual study *The Shen Tzu Fragments* can serve as a model for the sort of critical editions of AC texts that we *do not* have but ought to have. Meanwhile the only practicable thing for me to do was to rely on the best critical editions of the texts at hand as I was writing this book.

All those who firmly believe in transformational generative grammar or any other formal theory of language may well find this book unsatisfactory. I do not feel committed to any one such general theory of language.

On the other hand those who believe that the logical analysis cannot fruitfully be applied to AC will also be thoroughly disappointed. I most certainly feel that I have to try and make good logical sense of Chinese grammar. I shall not begin to join battle with those who believe that oriental exotic languages operate according to completely different logical principles. I simply propose to go ahead on the assumption that Chinese sentences, when properly understood, make reasonable logical sense.

Fashions in general linguistics as opposed to logic have changed disconcertingly fast in the last decades. By 1965 linguistic writings from before 1957 looked positively antediluvian to transformational grammarians, and by 1968 almost every working linguist below the age of forty had converted to transformational grammar and began to talk of epicycles and transderivational constraints. Fashions changed so fast that books tended to be outdated by the time they were accessible to the general public.

Today, in 1980, the orthodox transformational grammarian has almost become a rare linguistic bird in Europe, a survival of days long past. He is likely, in public, to keep his epicycles and transderivational constraints to himself. He will hardly dare to speak, even, of deep structure and surface structure any more. And when he mentions the word 'transformation' he might easily get asked what on earth he means by *that* expression.

The things of lasting value that the transformational grammarians have contributed, are the many original concrete observations they used in their arguments. The striking pairs like *John is eager to please* and *John is easy to please*; *I don't believe he'll come* and *I believe he won't come*, etc. etc. These were systematic patterns of language the significance of which had not been appreciated properly before the coming of transformational grammar.

Considering the rapid rise and fall of transformational grammar, it is interesting to compare the general linguistic efforts of the Danish linguist Otto Jespersen. Many of the terms he used are now quite out of fashion: 'nexus' and 'rank' are not really current linguistic jargon today. Nonetheless, Jespersen's work *Analytical Syntax* and his *Grammar of English* continue to be recognized as mines of important intuitions and insights on grammar. Even transformational grammarians have spoken with reverence of Jespersen's work.

What is it that gives Jespersen's work such a timeless appeal? I believe it is mainly the fact that Jespersen had the knack of making his results perspicuous through the skillful deployment of example sentences. He had the ability to make his theoretical analyses almost redundant in this way, and yet to achieve an admirable precision of grammatical description.

Otto Jespersen's unobtrusive use of grammatical technical terms and his lively linguistic common sense have been an important inspiration for my work on Chinese grammar. As far as I could I have tried to make this book comprehensible and interesting for all those who want

to understand Classical Chinese sentences, not only for those who have a theoretical interest in Chinese linguistics. I would have loved to write a book entitled *Essentials of Classical Chinese Grammar* summarizing the facts of Classical Chinese as Jespersen summarized the facts of English in his *Essentials of English Grammar*, but I am afraid the time is not ripe for such an enterprise. We simply do not understand the language well enough to write a summarizing survey of this sort. We still have to establish basic syntactic and semantic regularities one by one and document them in detail. The summarizing work must come afterwards.

Establishing such regularities or grammatical rules is an extremely difficult exercise. For rules of grammar are conventions, and unlike laws of nature conventions may occasionally be broken. Either through carelessness or because a special purpose demands it. Conventions may be more or less strictly adhered to by various people, while it makes no sense to say that laws of nature hold more strictly for some things than for others.

For example, if Zhuang Zi really rejoiced at the death of his wife and did not bury her properly, that would not mean there was no convention in ancient China that a husband mourned for and buried his wife. And this convention is by no means just a matter of statistics. It is, so to speak, a very real force. This real force of conventions can be of varying strength, and it can occasionally be overridden.

When a 'law of nature' turns out to be occasionally broken this is simply proof that the 'law' in question is not really a law of nature. There is then something very seriously wrong with such a law, no matter how many ordinary experiments support it. But when a grammatical rule is occasionally broken this may even be due to a deliberate act of grammatical lawlessness.

Thus, when I say that a rule R is a grammatical rule in AC I do not mean to suggest that there are no exceptions to R, my only claim is that as far as I know there is no *coherent set* of counterexamples to R. And the recurrent difficulty that will never go away is the vagueness of the notion 'coherent set of counterexamples'. I have often been in doubt whether certain counterexamples invalidated a grammatical rule or not. In the end, my decisions were sometimes bound to be subjective. Occasionally, fellow sinologists are bound to disagree with my judgments. Such disagreement will be most welcome, especially if substantiated by coherent sets of clear AC examples.

There often seems to be an irreducible fringe of fuzziness in rules of

AC syntax, and I found it worthwhile to look very carefully at such apparently unruly, troublesome evidence. I quote such evidence as far as this is feasible without confusing the reader. I find it comforting to recall that this sort of residual uncertainty is by no means limited to Chinese grammar or even to the humanities. The Nobel-prize winner Niels Bohr, a physicist, once asked in a lecture: “What is the opposite of truth?” And after a pause he replied himself: “The opposite of truth is clarity!” God knows that this aphorism was in no way an excuse for scientific obscurantism on the part of Niels Bohr. It just expresses concisely a recognition of the fact that if a problem is really interesting and significant, the chances are that we cannot find a clear-cut solution.

I have not in general found it useful in this book to provide formal definitions for the basic linguistic terms I use. (Some preliminary definitions have been attempted in Harbsmeier 1978). The definition of basic terms in a science is always an extremely tricky and treacherous task. I believe that just as one can learn a great deal about arithmetics without a solid grasp of the subtleties of Frege’s definition of the concept of a natural number,¹² so one can talk sensibly about verbs, objects, nouns etc. without necessarily having water-tight definitions of these terms up one’s sleeve. It would be absurd to begin to sort out arithmetics for beginners by providing a set of abstract formal definitions. This would only obscure the basic task the beginner is facing: he is trying to sort out multiplication tables *et cetera*. In just the same way I feel we are still at the fumbling stage, sorting out basic practical things about AC grammar. It would be entirely counterproductive to preface this sort of work with a set of advanced formal definitions.

It seems to me that since Gabelentz 1881 we have seen an almost cancerous growth of terminological and methodological sophistication in linguistics. But at the same time there has been comparatively little substantial, basic progress in our comprehension of AC sentences. Such progress as there has been in the West, has come in detailed articles like E. G. Pulleyblank, *Fei, wei and certain related words* (1959), *Studies in early Chinese grammar* (1960); G. A. Kennedy, *A study of the particle YEN* (1940); A. C. Graham, *The relation between the final particles yu and ye* (1957), *A post-verbal aspectual particle in Classical Chinese: the supposed preposition hu* (1978), etc. and Sian L. Yen, *On the negative wei in Classical Chinese*. (1978). None of these works

12. Cf. Gottlob Frege, *Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl* (1934). Note that arithmetics had made healthy progress also before Frege’s contribution.

operates with elaborate formal definitions of all the basic terms they use, none of them introduces a great deal of neologisms and recondite grammatical terminology. But all of them report substantial and basic new insights on AC grammar that are important for everyone who wishes to work with the language. It is as if the results presented in articles like these did not need the trappings of a flamboyant innovating terminology or a flashy methodology to look respectable.

I am not arguing, in this book, for the appropriateness of any special grammatical terminology for the description of AC grammar. Therefore I avoid neologisms and uncommon technical terms wherever I can. I am also not concerned, in this book, with the general theoretical linguistic framework that is required for an adequate theory of AC grammar. Therefore I avoid abstract discussion of alternative formal descriptions whenever I can.

There may, of course, be some sinologists to whom terms like ‘quantification’ are new. But all they really need to learn is that quantifiers are words like the English ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘many’, ‘few’, ‘only’, etc., and that it is natural to call these ‘universal quantifiers’, ‘existential quantifiers’, ‘relative quantifiers’, and ‘restrictive quantifiers’ respectively. Really, that is all they need to know in order to understand the chapter concerned with quantification in this book. For this chapter is not concerned with the abstract notion of quantification as such but with some concrete AC words that are, admittedly on abstract logical as well as grammatical grounds, conveniently lumped together under the heading ‘quantifiers’. It might of course be impressive to begin with formidable definitions, but it would serve no serious purpose. Our pre-theoretical rough notions are quite sufficient at this stage. And if the words discussed under the heading ‘quantifiers’ turned out ‘really’ not to be quantifiers at all that would not matter very much in the end.

The logician Ludwig Wittgenstein advises us in one of his later philosophical works: “Don’t think! Look!” (Denk nicht, sondern schau!) And he adds in another place: “Say what you like as long as that doesn’t prevent you from seeing things as they are! (And when you see that, there are certain things that you will not go on saying)” (Sage, was du willst, solange dich das nicht daran hindert die Dinge so zu sehen wie sie sind. (Und wenn du das siehst, dann wirst du gewisse Dinge nicht mehr sagen)).¹³

These sentences have stuck in my mind ever since I read them as a grammar school boy. I cannot find a better instruction for the reader of

13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, No. 66 and No. 79.

this book: Do not speculate about concepts and definitions in Chinese grammar! Look at the example sentences with an uncluttered mind! Say what you like about the principles of Chinese grammar as long as that does not prevent you from understanding the Chinese sentences properly. (And once you understand those, there are a great many things that you *will not* go on saying about the grammar of Classical Chinese!)

I began my studies of AC syntax as a firm believer in the formalism of transformational generative grammar, but I have come to believe that the true art of writing the grammar of a language is the art of making one's own theoretical comments almost redundant through a skillful and systematic deployment of carefully interpreted examples from the language one is describing.

Again and again I found that when one's examples do not bring out a grammatical point clearly, no amount of grammatical ratiocination will. Points that I found difficult to illustrate abundantly with examples – I learnt to suspect – were not in the end properly understood. Revising this book consisted by and large in ironing out those points of my argument where I had tried to substitute sophisticated theoretical explanation for basic documentation.

While I was revising this book, I was at the same time working on the Chinese cartoonist Feng Zi-kai,¹⁴ and I found remarkable similarities between writing about works of art and writing about sentences. As I was trying to explain Feng Zi-kai's art it became obvious to me that my aim had to be to exhibit his works in such a way that the reader got into a position to relate directly and perceptively to the artistic subtleties of the pictures. I could not possibly hope to explain or make explicit all these subtleties. My conceptualizations had to be taken with the appropriate pinch of salt. The purpose was not to convince the reader that my conceptual analyses were the last word on their subject, *the purpose had to be to make the pictures speak for themselves*.

And that exactly is my purpose in this book: to make the Chinese sentences speak for themselves. To make my points, as far as possible, through the medium of examples. Not to impose any rigid formalism on the elusive subtleties of my material.

What I am aiming at is, I like to think, the linguist's virtue of *wu wei* 無為.

14. Cf. *Social Realism with A Buddhist Face. The Cartoonist Feng Zi-kai (1898–1975)* (forthcoming).

Negation

1.1 Verbal, Nominal, and Sentential Negation

Depending on intonation, the English sentence

(A) John didn't kiss Mary

can express very different thoughts:

a. It wasn't John who kissed Mary

(Here the scope of the negation is 'John')

b. It wasn't kissing that John did to Mary

(Here the scope of the negation is 'kissed'.)

c. What John did wasn't 'kissing Mary'

(Here the scope of the negation is 'kiss Mary'.)

d. It wasn't Mary whom John kissed

(Here the scope of the negation is 'Mary'.)

Consider now an AC sentence like

(B) 君不愛其臣

The ruler doesn't love his ministers.

Here the scope of *bu* will normally be the whole predicate *ai qi chen*

愛其臣. In certain cases *bu* may only go with the verb. But it seems that the scope of *bu* is never nominal. In those cases the ancient Chinese use constructions with *fei* like

(C) 君所愛非其臣也

It isn't his ministers that the ruler loves.

(D) 愛其臣者非君也

It isn't the ruler who loves his ministers.

It is customary to regard *bu* as a verbal negative and *fei* as a nominal negative.

Current grammars of AC have largely ignored the fact that the so-called 'nominal negative' *fei* is in fact quite common in pre-verbal

position.¹ In particular, the *relation* between pre-verbal and pre-nominal *fei* has not been satisfactorily explained.² As a result, the very common sentences with pre-verbal *fei* have been haphazardly and quite inadequately understood.

In this section I shall survey the pre-verbal uses of *fei*, and I shall try to relate these to the ‘standard’ uses of *fei* as a nominal negative.

If in a nominal sentence you replace the negative *fei* by *bu*, the sentence changes its syntax:

(1) a 白馬非馬也 ‘A white horse is not a horse.’

b?? 白馬不馬也 “?”

If the sentence with *bu* were to make any sense at all, the second *ma* 馬 would have to be taken in some exotic derived verbal sense.

Now consider what happens when in a verbal sentence you replace the negative *bu* by *fei*:

(2) a 馬不進也 ‘The horse didn’t go on’ Cf. LY 6.15.

b 馬非進也 ‘It wasn’t as if the horse went on’

In interpreting a sentence like (2) b we do not begin to convert *jin* 進 into a noun. The syntax of (2) a and b appears to be basically the same, although there is a noticeable semantic difference between the two. It is clear that *fei* is not in the same way restricted to a pre-nominal position in which *bu* is restricted to a pre-verbal position.

In many subordinate sentences of the verbal kind, one can appar-

1. Pulleyblank 1959 gives by far the best treatment of *fei* to date. But he does not consider the pre-verbal uses of *fei*. He treats *fei* as a pre-nominal negative.
2. Cf. Cikoski 1976: 87ff. Cikoski claims that ‘the nuclear sentence expresses the idea that some process occurs.’ (By the term ‘nuclear sentence’ he means what I call ‘verbal sentence’). But there clearly are verbal sentences that describe states or qualities, not processes. Referring to what I call nominal sentences, Cikoski claims “the appositional sentence expresses the idea that something is labeled”. But common nominal sentences like (52) below clearly have nothing whatever to do with labeling. Cikoski continues: “The two ideas can be combined to form the compound idea that the occurrence of some process is a timelessly true fact. This is done by embedding the nuclear sentence structure into the structure of the appositional sentence.” But the two ideas described by Cikoski would really be combined only in a sentence labeling a subject as a process. And we clearly do *not* interpret sentences like (2)b in this way: we do not take it to deny that *ma* 馬 has the label *jin* 進. Since Cikoski does not either, his account seems confused.

ently replace *bu* by *fei* without thereby affecting either syntax or semantics of the sentence involved:

(3) a 吾非至於子之門則殆矣

b 吾不至於子之門則殆矣

If I hadn't come to your door, I would have been in danger. Cf. Zhuang 17.4.

Before subordinate verbs, *fei* can often replace *bu* without a clear concomitant change of meaning.

Pre-verbal *fei* in the main clause

One is tempted to say that the scope of pre-verbal *fei* in the main clause is *the whole clause*, i.e. one is tempted to say that *fei* in these contexts is neither a verbal nor a nominal negative, it is a *sentential* or *clausal* negative, and translatable by 'it isn't as if ...'. Let us look at some examples:

(4) 學者非必為士，而仕者必如學

It isn't as if he who studies necessarily comes to act as an official, but someone who acts as an official necessarily conforms to some teaching. Xun 27.98.

My suggestion is that if we had *bu* instead of *fei* here, we would simply have a conjunction of two sentences. As it stands, (4) makes only one main claim, namely that anyone who acts as an official acts according to what he has learnt. The initial sentence is subsidiary to this main claim, it does not purport to be the main point. If we translate *fei* as 'it isn't the case that ...' we miss out on this crucial nuance. *Fei* in these contexts seems not just to deny a sentence, it *dismisses* it in order to move on to the main point. Pre-verbal *fei* expresses a negative *judgement* rather than a report that something did not happen or a straightforward description that something is or was not 'thus'. (See my *Current Issues in Classical Chinese Grammar*, Acta Orientalia, Vol. 41, 1980).

Note the absence of *ye* in (4). This is particularly common when *fei* precedes one of the so-called prepositions in a main clause:

(5) 古之善為道者非以明民將以愚之

It wasn't as if those who in ancient times were good at practising the

Way, were using it to enlighten people. They used it to keep them stupid. Lao 65.

(6) 非為身體皆為觀好

It wasn't as if they were for the body. They were all for external beauty. Mo 6.19.

(7) 古者列地建國非以貴諸侯而已

When the ancients parcelled out land and established states it wasn't as if that was just in order to cause the feudal lords to be honoured. Xun 27.76.

(8) 夫泚也非為人泚，中心達於面目

It wasn't as if they sweated for the others (to see). Their innermost hearts showed on their faces. Meng 3A5.

(9) 非曰能之，願學焉

It isn't as if I say, I am capable of it. I want to study it. LY 11.24.

(10) 非曰必亡「也」言其可亡也

It isn't as if it said that it will necessarily perish. It says that it should perish. HF 15 (81.7) (Here some editions have the bracketed *ye* 也.) It seems implausible to me to construe any of the last three examples on the lines of 'it wasn't a case of sweating for others', 'it wasn't a case of saying' etc. Since there is ample evidence for pre-verbal *fei* there is no need for such contortions.

(11) 吾非愛道也恐子之未可與也

It is not as if I was stingy with words. I am afraid that you cannot be associated with as yet. LSCQ 24.5.

(12) 臣非能相人也能觀人之友也

It isn't that I can physiognomize people. I can look at people's friends. LSCQ 24.6. Cf. LSCQ 25.3.

(13) 北方非畏昭奚恤其實畏王之甲兵也

It isn't as if the Northerners feared Zhao Xi Xie. In fact they are afraid of your soldiers. Xin Xu 2.3.

(14) 妄為楚國妖歟？

莊辛對曰：臣非敢為楚妖，誠見之也。

‘Are you viciously making up inauspicious stories about Chu?’ Zhuang Xin replied: ‘It isn’t as if I would dare to make up inauspicious stories about Chu. I have really seen this.’ Xin Xu 2.14.

Of course, one may object that the English ‘it isn’t as if . . .’ is much more cumbersome and pedantic than the plain pre-verbal *fei*, but this is only a stylistic point, and I am still trying to sort out the basic semantics of pre-verbal *fei*. Note moreover that the very smooth and unpedantic ‘*nicht etwa*’ in German provides an also stylistically satisfactory rough equivalent for pre-verbal *fei*.

(15) 紕非能害也知不足也，非敢私請…

It isn’t as if I could harm people. My knowledge is insufficient. It isn’t as if I would dare to make private requests . . . Zuo Xiang 23.11.

The *bu* in *bu zu* 不足 signals that this is the main point. Similarly in the following:

(16) 非敢後也馬不進也

It isn’t as if I would dare to come last. My horses wouldn’t go on. LY 6.15.

Compare the way Waley grapples with this sort of *fei*: “It was not courage that kept me behind. My horses were slow.” Waley 1938: 119.

(17) 非敢為佞也疾固也

It isn’t as if I would dare to practise clever talking. I disapprove of obstinacy. LY 14.32.

Here, as often, *fei* dismisses an idea that is either in the context or ‘in the air’. Cf. example (14) above.

Graham 1967:9 mentions sentences of this sort: “*Shi* 是, *fei* and the particle *ye* 也 are also used in the verbal sentence to turn a descriptive or narrative statement into a judgment between implicit or explicit alternatives.” *Fei* then stands before the verb:

臣非敢哭君師，哭臣之子也。

‘It is not that we are presuming to weep over Your Majesty’s army; we are weeping over our sons.’ Cf. Gong Yang Xi 33.3 which omits the *ye* 也. Now the crucial point is this: a sentence like *ma bu jin ye* 馬不進也 is also a judgment between alternatives, but *not* synonymous with *ma fei jin ye* 馬非進也.

An analysis of the following example will perhaps be helpful, precisely because it is awkward:

(18) 此繆公非欲敗於殽也，智不至也。

This was a matter of it not being as if Duke Mu desired to be defeated at Xiao but of his knowledge not reaching (or: being perfect). LSCQ 16.4 Cf. LSCQ 16.5. If we had 此非繆公欲敗..., we would translate ‘This wasn’t a matter of Duke Mu desiring to be defeated...’. And if we read 此繆公不欲敗..., we would translate ‘This was because Duke Mu wanted to avoid defeat...’.

Interestingly, the *fei*-clause can be an *afterthought*:

(19) 君問可非問讐也

You asked whether he was all right. It wasn’t as if you asked about whether he was my enemy. Xin Xu 1.5. Cf. example (15) above.

Cf. 君問可，非問子也。 *Ibidem*.

(20) 今臣言擊之者故非發而深入也

My present suggestion to attack them is certainly not in order to raise an army and enter deeply into their territory... Xin Xu 10.13 (p. 374)

(21) 悲在心也非在手也

Grief is in the mind. It isn’t as if it was in the hand. Xin Xu 4.24.

(The German word *etwa* provides a smooth and elegant way of putting the difference between *bu* and *fei* in sentences like that above:

不在手也: Er ist nicht in der Hand.

非在手也: Er ist nicht etwa in der Hand.)

(22) 令尹貴矣，王非置兩令尹也。

Chief Minister is a high rank. It isn’t as if the king appoints two of those. ZGC I. 108.

(23) 其幸大者，其禍亦大，非禍獨及己也。

As their luck becomes great, so does the disaster. And it isn’t a matter of disaster only reaching these people themselves. LSCQ 14.7.

I would feel more comfortable with this passage if *fei* preceded *du* here.

‘Not only’

When we use a phrase like ‘not only’ we suggest that the main point is not expressed in the clause containing ‘not only’:

- (E) a I not only like her I also like her sister.
 b I not only like her I love her.

In AC we frequently have *fei du* 非獨, *fei tu* 非徒, *fei te* 非特, *fei zhi* 非直 apparently used synonymously for ‘not only’. Hardly ever do we find *bu* 不 in any of these combinations.

Occasionally, the scope of the ‘not only’ is not a noun but a whole verb phrase:

- (24) 今吾為祭祀也非直注之汙壑而棄之也
 上以交鬼之禍下以令驩聚衆。

Now when we are performing sacrifices, it isn’t as if we are only pouring the libations into the gutter and throwing them away. Above we thereby establish contact with the blessings of the spirits, and below we thereby enjoy ourselves together, gather many people . . . Mo 31.105. Cf. *fei tu* 非徒 in LSCQ 2.3 (I suspect that *fei du* 非獨 would have been unacceptable in cases like these. But note that *fei tu* 非徒 and *fei zhi* 非直 can also refer to the object.)

With pre-nominal *du* 獨 the negation *fei* seems entirely natural:

- (25) 非獨國有染也，士亦有染。

It is not as if only states are subject to influences. Knights are also subject to influences. Mo 3.14. Cf. Mo 26.3, 3.2.

Similarly, *fei* seems natural when the scope of *du* 獨 is nominal:

- (26) 天非獨為湯雨菽粟
 而地非獨為湯出財物也

It isn’t as if it was only for the sake of Tang that Heaven rains on pulse and grain, and it isn’t as if it was only for the sake of Tang that the Earth brings forth its wealth. Guan 77 (3: 83.9).

In view of the use of *fei* before ‘prepositions’ like *yi* 以 and *wei* 為 noted above, the following example will also be expected to have *fei*:

- (27) 非特以為淫泰也固以為天下

These practices do not only have extravagance as their aim. They certainly have the domination of the world as their aim. Xun 10.30.

Note the absence of a second *ye* 也 at the end of the sentence. This is not incidental:

- (28) 故仁人之用國非特將持其有而已也
 又將兼人

Thus when a good man deals with a state, it isn't as if he was just concerned to hold on to his possession. He is also concerned to unite the people. Xun 10.115.

- (29) 察其始而本無生，非徒無生也而本無形
非徒無形也而本無氣。

I investigated her beginnings, and originally she had no life. Not only had she no life, originally she also had no form. Not only had she no form, originally she had no ether. Zhuang 18. 17. Pedantically, we should translate: 'It wasn't as if she only had no life, etc.'

Double negation

We do not get AC sentences like 馬不不進也 any more than we are likely to hear *The horse wouldn't not proceed*. On the other hand we frequently get sentences like 馬非不進也, just as we might well hear *It wasn't as if the horse wouldn't proceed*.

Fei before a verb negated with *bu* seems to work exactly like any other pre-verbal *fei* in a main clause. It is used to dismiss a certain – in this case negative – proposition as not being the point, and it is only used appropriately, when there is at least an expectation of a different, main point. In ordinary writing one does not use *fei bu* 非不 simply to make the logical point that a negative proposition is false, i.e., that its opposite is true. (The technical usages of Chinese logicians are a different matter which is beyond the scope of this note³).

A single example of this familiar phenomenon will suffice:

- (30) 子言非不辯也，吾所欲者土地也
非斯言所謂也。

It isn't as if your words were not eloquent. But what I want is territory, and not what your words are talking about. HF 49 (241.13).

Fei need not immediately precede the *bu* it negates:

- (31) 芷蘭生於深林非以無人而不芳

The *zhilan* grows in the deep forest, and it isn't as if because there are no humans it is not fragrant. Xun 28.38.

3. The practice of stripping words in common use of their idiomatic connotations to convert them into technical terms is characteristic of logicians everywhere.

Here, *fei* does not negate the prepositional phrase but the *bu fang* 不芳. The reason for *fei* is not the preposition *yi* 以.

Again the verb *wu* 無 'lack' seems negatable only by *fei*, never by *bu* 不. My explanation for this is that the combination *bu wu* 不無 would simply have been synonymous with *you* 有 and therefore redundant. By contrast, the combination *fei wu* 非無 is *never* simply synonymous with *you* 有. It is always translatable by something like 'it isn't as if there were no ...'.

- (32) 今利非無有也而民不化上
威非不存也而下不聽從
官非無法也而治不當名。

Now it isn't as if profit was non-existent, but the people do not change for their superiors; it isn't as if authority was not present, but the inferiors do not obey their superiors; it isn't as if the officers had no laws, but their administrative performance does not correspond to their titles. HF 45 (314.4)

The force of this sort of double negation in AC can also be captured by the emphatic 'do' in English: 'Profit does exist, ...'.

'Conditional' *fei*

A current way of expressing 'or' in AC involves the use of subordinate *fei*

- (33) 凡立國都非於大山之下必於廣川之上

Generally speaking one should establish the capital of a state either at the foot of a large mountain or on a broad river. Guan 5 (1: 16–13).

Now consider what happens when *fei* is replaced by *bu* in this sort of construction:

- (34) 女死不於南方之岸必於北方之岸
為吾屍女之易

If you are to die, do it either on the southern bank, or on the northern bank, so that I can collect your dead bodies more easily. LSCQ 16.4. The *bu* in this example clearly does not mean 'unless': it simply means 'not' but happens to be used in a subordinate sentence, so that we come to translate literally 'if you do not do it on the southern bank, be sure to do it on the northern bank.' The subordination is expressed – as often in AC – by the anteposition of the subordinate clause. The negation *fei*

is appropriate instead of *bu* in sentences like these because it negates non-main predicates, as we have seen in the previous section. The introduction of a separate sentence connective *fei* meaning ‘unless’ at this point is theoretically redundant albeit practically harmless.

(35) 夫万民不和，國家不安，失非在上則過在下。

If all the people are not in harmony and the state is not at peace, then the mistake lies either with those above or the transgression lies with those below. Guan 47 (2: 95–5). Cf. GY 6343.

Literally: ‘If the mistake does not lie with those above, then the fault lies with those below.’ We have here a change of subject from the subordinate to the main clause.

The scope of *fei* in such subordinate sentences can pose interesting problems:⁴

(36) 故君人者非能退大臣之議而背左右之訟
獨合乎道言也，
則法術之士安能蒙死亡之危而進說乎。

Now unless a ruler of men *is able to set aside arguments from his great ministers as well as representations from his courtiers and conform only (or: independently) to the voice of reason*, how can the ‘specialists’ brave danger of death to put forward their explanations? HF 52 (362.14).

The scope of *fei* is underlined in my translation, also in the following example:

(37) 今人主非肯用法術之士，聽愚不肖之臣
則賢智之士孰敢。

4. Note that not every *fei* that immediately precedes a verb is strictly speaking pre-verbal. It may well be pre-clausal. And defining the scope of this kind of pre-clausal *fei* can also pose interesting problems:

(a) 聖人之靜也非曰靜也善故靜也
万物無足以鏡之者故靜。

When the sage is quiet it isn’t as if *he said ‘quietude is good’ and therefore was quiet*, it is rather that none of the myriad things can disturb his mind, therefore he is quiet. Zhuang 13.2.

We definitely do not translate: ‘When the sage is quiet it isn’t as if he said ‘quietude is good’ and therefore he is quiet.’ The scope of *fei* is not *yue* 曰 ‘said’ but the whole clause underlined in the translation. The scope of *fei* ends where the main point begins.

Now if the ruler of men is not *willing to use the 'specialists'* but on the contrary listens to his incompetent ministers, then who among the talented and wise knights will dare to face the dangers these three men succumbed to, and put forward their wisdom and abilities? HF 52 (363.10).

The grammatical admissibility of my interpretation of the scope of *fei* in (37) is crucial. On this reading *fei* is not a sentence-connective 'unless' but simply a negation within a subordinate clause. Here, the interpretation of *fei* as a sentence connective is not only theoretically redundant, it is impossible: if we were to interpret (37) as involving two conjoined subordinate sentences, one introduced by *fei* 'unless', then we would quite definitely need something like *ruo* 若 to mark off the second subordinate clause as being conditional. Since there is no such *ruo* 若, this latter interpretation seems to me impossible.⁵

In this connexion it is instructive to compare the use of *bu* in roughly similar environments.

(38) 人主不能明法而以制大臣之威
無道得小人之信矣。

If a ruler of men is not able to make the laws clear and thus to control the authority of the great ministers he has no way of achieving the confidence of the commoners. HF 18 (85.10).

Whether a sentence has an explicit subject or not does not make a difference to our present argument. An idiomatic phrase like *fei ruo ci* 非若此 or *fei ru ci* 非如此 will be construed thus: '(if) (things) are not like this', i.e., 'otherwise'. (Cf. e.g. HF 34 (247.14).) Similarly for sentences like the following:

(39) 非背法專制無以為威

If they do not go against the law and exercise autocratic control they have not the means to exercise authority. HF 18 (85.13).

There is no need to give further examples of this sort of pre-verbal *fei*, but it is important to keep in mind that this construction – by contrast with the nominalizing *fei* before verbs – very rarely involves the final particle *ye* 也.

5. In Zhan Guo Ce I found historical conditionals like

(b) 齊非急以銳師合三晉必有後憂

If Qi does not quickly use her elite soldiers and join up with (the forces of) the three component states of Jin she is bound to have troubles afterwards. ZGC I.99/100.

Here is one of the exceptions:

(40) 非若是也則臣之志願少賜游觀之間…

If this is not the case, I crave the favour of an audience when you are at leisure. ZGC 93 (I.61).

Final remarks on pre-nominal *fei*

Sometimes pre-nominal *fei* seems closely linked with subordinate *fei*. It looks almost as if *fei* had been extraposed from an original pre-verbal position:

(41) 非吳喪越，越必喪吳。

If it is not Wu that ruins Yue, Yue is sure to ruin Wu. LSCQ 14.5.

(42) 非彼死則臣必死矣

If it is not they who have died, I am sure to have died myself. LSCQ 16.4.

But the following example suggests to me that my interpretation of (41) and (42) is at least feasible:

(43) 非楚受兵，必秦也。

If it is not Chu that is attacked by armed force, Qin is sure to be. ZGC 75 (I.81).

(Compare pre-nominal *wei* 唯 ‘only’: 唯楚受兵 would be ‘It is only Chu that receives an army’.) Also in sentences like the following, *fei* appears to be pre-nominal and *not* pre-sentential:

(44) 人能弘道，非道弘人。

Man can make the Way great. It is not the Way that can make men great. LY 15.29..

Again, there is a familiar periphrastic way of expressing ‘only’ in AC which involves a pre-nominal ‘subordinate’ *fei*:

(45) 非聖人莫之能為

Only a sage can do this. Xun 8.10.

Literally, ‘As for non-sages, none of them can do it.’

(46) 非于是子莫足以舉之，故舉是子而用之。

Only this man was qualified to be raised, so he raised and employed him. Xun 12.91.

Note the use of *yu* 于 to indicate that the topic is the ‘psychological’ object of the main clause. LY 11.4.

In (45) and (46) *fei* looks as if it is marking a negative topic, not a subordinate nominal clause. But now look at this:

(47) 苟非聖人莫之能知也

Only a sage is able to understand this. Xun 19.121.

What is the sentence connective *gou* 苟 doing here? It looks as if we should translate ‘If someone really isn’t a sage he cannot understand this.’ But in that case, why do we have *mo* 莫 instead of *bu* 不? To me, this fuzziness indicates the close connection between generic subjects and subordinate sentences in AC. (Cf. Harbsmeier 1978: 219–257).

Further patterns with subordinate pre-nominal *fei* are easy to find. I need not illustrate them here.

We have seen that *fei* negates non-main predicates and non-predicate nouns. But what about noun predicates? Clearly, *fei* is used in classifying negative sentences like this:

(48) 非吾徒也

He is not my disciple! LY 11.17.

And here the noun predicate expresses the *main* predication. It wouldn’t sound right to translate: ‘It isn’t as if he was my disciple!’ *Fei* does not have its quasi-subordinating function in nominal sentences. And yet it seems to me that the classifications expressed in nominal sentences of this sort are typically – not always – used to express judgements as a background to a main other point. If Confucius had said, 不從我: ‘He doesn’t follow my ways’, such a statement would not have looked so much like the background to a main point to be made. By contrast it seems to me to be typical that (48) continues:

(49) 小子鳴鼓而攻之可也

It will be right for you to beat the drums and attack him! *Ibidem*.

A crucial question that arises in this connection is this: why do AC writers sometimes use nominal sentences when what appears to be the same meaning could be conveyed in a much simpler verbal sentence

(50) 回也非助我者也

Hui is not the sort of person who helps me. LY 11.4.

Why does the Master not say 回不助我: 'Hui doesn't help me'? It seems to me that this is because he wants the hearer to focus on the second part of his dictum:

(51) 於吾言無所不說

He rejoices in everything I say. *Ibidem*.

Nevertheless there are plenty of nominal sentences that are not 'quasi-subordinate' by any stretch of the imagination. Typically the reason for the nominality of such sentences has to do with their thematic organization:

(52) 夫仁義辯智非所以持國也

Goodness, righteousness, eloquence and cleverness are not the means by which one maintains a state. HF 49 (341.15).

In sentences of this latter sort the connection between pre-verbal and pre-nominal *fei* is lost completely. Or is it? Does not a sentence like (52) suggest that something else *is* the means by which one maintains a state?

1.2 Neg-raising in AC

Consider the following sentences:

(1) 絕其根本勿使能殖

If he extirpates their roots and ensures that they are unable to multiply ... Zuo Yin 6.2.

Why do we have the *prohibitive* negative *wu* 勿? And why does it precede *shi* 使?

(2) 其事號令毋使民淫暴

In his administration of edicts and orders he ensured that the people were neither extravagant nor overbearing. Guan 40 (2.79-9).

Why the *prohibitive wu* 毋 here? And why does the negative come before *shi* 使?

Lü 1941 has given abundant evidence that the ‘prohibitive’ negatives regularly occur in the sentential complements of verbs like *shi* 使, *ling* 令, and *yu* 欲. The continuation of the passage just quoted from Guan Zi has an instructive example of this:

(3) 使民毋怠

He saw to it that the people were not lazy. Guan, *Ibidem*.

I suggest that the explanation for sentences like (1) and (2) is by the same sort of principles as the explanation of sentences like *I don't think that will do* which we ordinarily take to mean something like *I think that won't do*. I.e. I argue that we have here a case of neg-raising in AC, and that the rule of neg-raising has applied in (1) and (2), but not in the semantically closely related (3).

Examples of this sort of neg-raising in AC are in fact quite common:

(4) 且比化者無使土親膚於人也獨無悛乎

“Furthermore, does it not give some solace to be able to prevent the earth from coming into contact with the dead who is about to decompose?” Meng 2B7, tr. Lau 1970:90.

Note that ‘prevent’ is by no means the same as ‘not cause to happen’. In fact, ‘prevent’ means roughly the same as ‘cause not to happen’. The

joy Mencius is describing is about *making sure that the earth does not reach* the dead body; just not making sure that the earth reaches the dead body would be unsatisfactory since it leaves the possibility open that the earth does in fact get to the body, and that would be shameful.

Again, the presence of *wu* 無 in front of *shi* 使 is conveniently explained by assuming that something like neg-raising has operated and that the *wu* 無 in (4) ‘originated’ inside the clause governed by *shi* 使. The presence in non-imperative contexts of the prohibitive negatives *wu* 勿, *wu* 毋, and *wu* 無 before *shi* 使 is clear syntactic evidence for neg-raising in AC. (Cf. Seuren and Harbsmeier 1973:272ff for syntactic arguments for neg-raising in English).

Sometimes it is not clear whether a context can count as ‘imperative’:

(5) 使人給其食用無使乏

He ordered somebody to supply her with food and necessities and (thus) ensured that she did not suffer need. ZGC Qi Ce 4.

Here one might be tempted to translate: ‘He ordered somebody to supply her with food and necessities *and to* ensure that he did not suffer need’. Thus we do not necessarily have to appeal to neg-raising to explain the presence of an imperative negative in (5).

In that case the question that still remains is: why does the negative come before and not after *shi* 使? The current answer to this one would be that *shi* 使 in contexts like these does not mean ‘cause to’ or anything of that sort at all it means ‘to allow, to permit’. However, it has apparently not been noticed so far that neither *Kang Xi zidian*, nor *Ci Yuan*, nor *Ci Hai*, (nor even *Grammata Serica Recensa*) say that *shi* 使 can mean anything like *xu* 許. Moreover, even if we admitted that in AC *shi* 使 can mean ‘to allow’ the current answer does not work well for examples like the following:

(6) 堅築毋使可拔

Make strong fortifications and ensure that they cannot be taken. Mo 56.14 and Mo 63.21.

I find a translation like ‘and do not allow them to be conquerable’ most implausible, but I am not very clear why. Perhaps adherents of the meaning ‘allow’ for *shi* 使 have different intuitions in cases of this sort. But these adherents have – as far as I know – no way of accounting for the non-imperative sentences like:

(7) 勿使四民雜處

They ensured that the four kinds of people (knights, peasants, craftsmen and merchants) did not live together. Guo Yu SBBY 6.2b.

(8) 斬鄭無使自殺

If one decapitates Zheng one causes him not to commit suicide. Guo Yu SBBY 9.7b.

For they can perhaps get away with translations like ‘They did not permit the four kinds of people to live together’ and ‘... one does not permit him to commit suicide’ but in that case they cannot account for the presence of imperative negatives like *wu* 勿 and *wu* 無 in these sentences. If their grammatical analysis was correct, we should surely expect *bu* 不.

Thus my case for neg-raising in AC is essentially independent of the question whether we are entitled to take *shi* 使 to mean ‘allow’ or not. The crucial evidence is sentences like (1), (2), (4), (7), and (8).

On the other hand, once we recognize that there is neg-raising in AC in connection with *shi* 使, the vast majority of cases¹ where we used to think of *shi* as ‘allow, permit’ cease to be clear evidence that the word does indeed have that meaning. Examples of this are easy to find: we are used to translating *bu shi* 使 regularly as ‘not allow’, but assuming neg-raising we can now take *shi* 使 in its ordinary sense and translate ‘cause not to’.

(9) 明君之於內也娛其色而不行其謁不使私請

As for (the women in) his harem, the enlightened ruler enjoys their beauty but does not act according to suggestions (from the girls). He ensures that they do not make personal requests. HF 9 (38.5).

There are half a dozen of the relevant *bu shi* 不使 in this passage from Han Fei Zi.

(10) 惡不仁者其為人矣不使不仁者加乎其身

As for a person who abhors wickedness, he would be practicing goodness in such a way that he would cause wickedness not to get at him. LY 4.6. Cf. Waley 1938:103.

(11) 毋使人欲之

Make sure that the people do not desire these things! HF 5 (19.9).

(12) 天生民而立之君使司牧之，勿使失性。

1. For an isolated exception see HF 32(211.15) and Xin Xu 5.30.

When Heaven gave birth to the people it established rulers, made them shepherd the people and ensure that they did not lose their proper nature. Zuo Xiang 14 fu 3. The pattern is repeated once in the same passage.

Certainly, an order by a superior to do something also (incidentally) *entitles* the recipient to do what he is ordered to do. An order to do something *entails* permission to do it, and sometimes this entailment is very prominent. In the following passage one might be tempted to take *shi* to mean ‘allow’:

(13) 今君人者釋其刑德而使臣用之，則君反制於臣矣。

Now if those who rule over men don’t want to get involved in punishments and rewards and have their ministers see to these things, then as a result the rulers are controlled by their ministers. HF 7 (27.7).

One might be tempted to translate: ‘... and allow their ministers ...’. But in any case we are dealing here with an *ex gratia* relegation of authority to inferiors, an *order* which in this case at the same time entitles the recipient to do what he quite possibly might have liked to do anyway. Examples like these are in my judgment no evidence at all that *shi* regularly means ‘to allow, to permit’ in AC.

Finally, a case of neg-raising with the idiomatic *shi* 使 that occurs at the beginning of prayers and speeches:

(14) 無使吾君得罪於群臣百姓

Hightower 1952:318 translates: “... and may my Prince not offend against his ministers and people”. HSWZ 10.1. Hightower’s translation is surely correct. And as if to prove the optionality of neg-raising in cases like these, the Xin Xu writes in its version of the same story:

(15) 使主君無得罪群臣百姓

I suspect that in this kind of idiomatic *shi* a subject like ‘the spirits’ is understood, so that we should literally translate ‘may the spirits cause my ruler not to offend ...’. It then turns out to be quite natural that neg-raising should apply also in cases like these.

Neg-raising with *ling* 令

Some readers may still have lingering doubts that the facts discussed so far can somehow be accounted for by an idiosyncratic ambiguity of the word *shi* 使 in AC. But it turns out that neg-raising in AC is not

limited to *shi* at all. For a start, it is also common with *ling* 令:

(16) 勿令通言

Liao I:32 translates: “Do not let them speak to each other”. HF 5 (19.5).

But why not: ‘Make sure that they do not talk to each other’?

Again, there is – as far as I know – no early evidence that *ling* 令 can mean anything like ‘allow’, ‘permit’. But such a meaning would have to be assumed if we wanted to get by without neg-raising in the following example:

(17) 無令與師淹於君地

“... (and sent us, his ministers, to intercede for them with your great State), charging us that we should not remain long in your territory.” Zuo Cheng 2.4, tr. Legge 345.

Legge had no axe to grind about neg-raising, but he clearly takes *wu ling* 無令 to mean something like *ling wu* 令無. I believe he was dead right. The translation ‘not permitting us to remain...’ is not very plausible, since it seems to presuppose a request.

In the late military chapters of the Mo Zi I found no less than 15 examples of *wu ling* (勿令 / 無令 / 毋令) apparently meaning ‘cause not to’. Here are a few examples of this group:

(18) 毋令外火能傷也

Make sure that fire cannot do any harm to it from the outside. Mo 52.55.

(19) 毋令水潦能入

That makes sure that floods of water cannot enter. Mo 61.1.

(20) 止之勿令得行

One must stop them and make sure that they do not go on. Mo 52.89. (There are examples also in chapters 62, 63, 70, and 71, and apparently none in any of the other chapters.)

(21) 著十二矢，遂不令中公子。

She received twelve arrows on her body and made sure they did not hit the prince. HSWZ 9.6.

The optionality of the application of the rule of neg-raising with *ling* may be illustrated by the following two versions of the same sentence

(22) 勿令知也

... and to make sure they didn't find out. Xin Xu 4. 128.

Xin Shu 7.873 writes: 令勿知也.

The traditional account would have us believe that in Xin Xu the relevant *ling* 令 means 'allow', and in the Xin Shu parallel it means 'cause to'. I find it much more plausible to say that in Xin Xu neg-raising has applied while in Xin Shu it has not.

One might object that I have not so far given clear *syntactic* evidence for neg-raising with *ling* 令. I have only suggested an alternative way of describing the semantics of a certain kind of negated *ling*. And I have not made it clear what the advantages of the new account involving neg-raising are.²

My first claim is that my account *simplifies* the dictionary entry for *ling*: we no longer need to list an extra meaning 'allow' for the word.

Secondly, I claim that quite apart from the apparent lack of early glosses to support the assumption that *ling* can mean 'allow', this assumption raises considerable problems: why, if *ling* can mean 'allow', does it almost invariably mean that when negated and extremely rarely – if at all – when unnegated? One might be tempted to answer that *neg-ling* is an idiom, and that *ling* just happens to mean 'allow' only in this idiom. But in that case I would simply reply that neg-raising provides a much more economical account for this idiom than the assumption of an extra meaning for *ling*.

Thirdly, since we do need a grammatical rule of neg-raising to explain negated *shi* 使 it seems only plausible to apply the rule also in the case of *ling* 令. Note the parallelism between neg-raised *bu shi* 不使 and *bu ling* 不令 in HF 9.

2. Note that there is syntactic evidence for neg-raising with *ling* in

無令天下久聞

He made sure that the matter didn't get talked about in the empire for a long time. Shi Ji 126.

Neg-raising with yù 欲 ?

The sentence

(23) I do not want him to come.

has at least two readings:

A I want him not to come.

B It is not the case that I want him to come.

The readings *A* and *B* are not only not synonymous, they have different truth conditions; for they are not both compatible with the truth of:

(24) But I don't mind if he does come.

Sentences of this sort have been discussed extensively in the linguistic literature. It is commonly said that in a reading like *A* a grammatical rule of *neg-raising* is involved. Cf. e.g. Seuren and Harbsmeier 1973.

Now the question arises whether this is a parochial feature of English and a few other related languages or if the phenomenon of neg-raising in connection with verbs expressing a desire for something to be the case can also be discovered for example in Ancient Chinese.

Having shown that something like neg-raising appears to be a grammatical rule needed to explain the semantics and syntax of the verbs *shì* 使 and *lìng* 令, I now wish to present some evidence for the claim that neg-raising might also be useful to explain the semantics of the verb *yù* 欲.

In Zuo Zhuan it is customary to say that soldiers 'do not wish to fight' 不欲戰, cf. e.g. Zuo Ai 11.1. What is involved here, however, is not the absence of a wish to fight but rather the *refusal* to fight or more explicitly 'the desire not to fight'. The people involved are – unfortunately for their generals – not only not keen to fight, they are unwilling to fight, i.e. determined not to fight. And *that* is the trouble.

What makes the Ancient Chinese hard for us to analyse is that the English translation that comes to mind is logically no more perspicuous than the original.

Consider now Waley's perceptive translation of the following passage in the Analects:

(25) 禘自既灌而往者吾不欲觀之矣

"At the Ancestral Sacrifice, as for all that comes after the libation, I had far rather not witness it!" LY 3.10, Waley 1938:96.

Correctly, Waley transposes the negative. Logically, what is involved

is not the absence on the part of Confucius of a wish to see what goes on but rather the desire to be spared this experience, the desire not to witness these things.

Strictly parallel considerations apply to the famous:

(26) 我不欲人之加諸我也吾亦欲無加諸人

That which I wish others not to do to me I also wish not to do to others. LY 5.12.

Waley's translation makes use of the fact that in English as in Ancient Chinese we have neg-raising: "What I do not want others to do to me, I have no desire to do to others."

(27) 凡人臣者有罪固不欲誅，無功者皆欲尊顯。

Speaking of ministers in general, if they have committed a crime they certainly want to avoid punishment; although they may have no merits, they all want to be honoured and famous. HF 14(73.16). We might, of course, also translate: 'if they have committed a crime they certainly have no desire to be punished'. Grammatically, there is an ambiguity. (Another such ambiguous passage is HF 32.(207.2) 意不欲寡人反國邪? (Don't you want me to return to my state?))

(28) 叔孫不欲聞人聲

Shu Sun does not want to hear a human voice. HF 30.532.

The idea here clearly is not only that Shu Sun has no particular desire to hear a human voice: he specifically wishes to be spared this experience. In this instance, neg-raising seems to be in order *both* in English *and* in Ancient Chinese. This makes the example intuitively less convincing than the examples with *shi* 使 and *ling* 令. But logically speaking this should make no difference. Semantically, we seem to have a case of neg-raising.

The same seems to be true of the following example:

(29) 吾不欲與汝及若

I do not wish to have anything to do with you. Guan 12 (2.54-4).

The point is again, that the duke *not only* has no particular desire to get involved with these men: he expresses the desire to *avoid* this. For a similar example see Zuo Zhao 4.6.

Zhuang Zi has a neat example of the same sort:

(30) 吾不欲見也

I am determined not to see the man! Zhuang 21.8.

Again Watson's translation makes use of the rule of neg-raising in English: "I have no wish to see any such person." Chmielewski 1953, in his scholarly Polish version, makes use of the rule of neg-raising in Polish: "(Dłatego) nie (not) pragne (wish) ich przyjac." Chmielewski 1953: 224.

Two further passages about the 'Way' illustrate our point:

(31) 凡道不欲壅

Speaking of the Way in general, it likes not to (does not like to) be blocked. Zhuang 26.38.

(32) 夫道不欲雜

Speaking of the Way, it likes not to be mixed up with external things. Zhuang 4.4.

(Note that it is impossible to take *bu yu* 不欲 as 'one doesn't wish to' in the last two examples: the point is that stupid people do have such desires to block up and mix up the Way.)

The situation is different with the following superficially similar passage from Lao Zi. But this Lao Zi text again turns out to provide good evidence for my case:

(33) 保此道者不欲盈

"He who holds fast to this way/ Desires not to be full." Lao 15, tr. Lau 1963: 71.

Perceptively, D. C. Lau comes to translate as if he read *yu bu* 欲不 and not *bu yu* 不欲. (His decision to omit the third *bu* 不 in our received text does not matter to the point at issue.)

Now Mei 1929: 14 translates *bu yu* 不欲 consistently as 'to abominate':

(34) 天之所欲則為之，天所不欲則止。

"What Heaven desired they would carry out, what Heaven abominated they refrained from." Mo 4.11.

(35) 天必欲人之相愛相利而不欲人之相惡相賊也

"Certainly Heaven desires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates to have them hate and harm one another." Mo 4.12.

Essentially, I think such a way of taking *bu yu* 不欲 is correct: *bu yu* is often not just the negation of *yu* 欲, it is the *opposite*. (We have

a similar phenomenon in the pair *nice/ not nice* in English. In AC *bu yu* the *bu* is rather like *dis-* in the English pair *like/dislike*.)

I suggest that the syntactic origins of this idiomatic usage might have been in neg-raising. But I find it hard to be sure.

There is no doubt whatsoever, on the other hand, that *bu yu* 不欲 as used in Mo 4.11 was felt to be equivalent to *wu* 惡. Otherwise the following question would have been out of place:

(36) 然而天何欲何惡者也

“Now, what is it that Heaven desires, and what it abominates?” Mo 4.11, tr. Mei 1929: 14.

Neg-raising is *not* common with *jiao* 教, but it does occur:

(37) 今魚方別孕不教魚長又行罟罾貪無芸也

Now the fish have just had their young fishes. To see to it that the fish do not grow up and to put out nets is boundless greed. GY 4.3480.

Here again, of course, a lexical solution to the problem is theoretically possible. Against all the lexicographical evidence we can take this sort of sentence to be evidence that *jiao* 教 can mean ‘allow’.

A brief note on an Ancient Chinese precedent of *bu yao* 不要 ‘don’t!’

Consider the following piece of ancient Chinese advice:

(38) 賞不欲僭，刑不欲濫。

When giving rewards, do not overdo it! When meting out punishments, do not go too far! Xun 14.25.

For a set of further examples see Bao Pu Zi 13.7b SBCK.

Here one might object that the meaning of *bu yu* 不欲 is an impersonal ‘one doesn’t wish’ rather than an imperative ‘don’t’. But Xun Zi is not describing people’s desires in general, he is not describing what ‘one wishes to do’ when giving rewards, or what one abominates on these occasions. Xun Zi is making a strong recommendation. He is giving advice. An impersonal ‘When giving rewards, one doesn’t wish to overdo it’ doesn’t capture his meaning, but fascinatingly the translation ‘*One doesn’t want to overdo it!*’ on its most obvious reading does capture the meaning of the sentence! Probably the Ancient Chinese *bu yu* 不欲 does indeed rather mean ‘you don’t want to’ rather than the harsher imperative ‘don’t!’. Compare:

(39) 處大官者不欲小察不欲小智

If you administer a large office you don't want to get involved in petty investigations, you don't want to be clever in a petty way. LSCQ 1.4.

Here we have neither a command (don't!) nor a description (one doesn't) but a piece of advice.

It is against this background that we can understand Confucius' advice:

(40) 問政子曰無欲速

He asked about government. Confucius said: 'You don't want to go for speed!' LY 13.17. Cf. Xun 15.50 for an unnegated piece of advice with *yu*.

1.3 Gnostic *wei* 未 and the Final Particle *yi* 矣

As a pro-verb *wei* often substitutes for *wei* + VP. We have:

(1) 學詩乎？對曰未也

Have you studied the Book of Songs? Answer: Not yet. LY 16.13.

But we also have:

(2) 有諸？對曰未也

Is that true? Answer: I did not go as far as that! Meng 2 B 8 where *wei* is short for *wei zhi you* 未之有, and where *wei* certainly does not mean ‘not yet’.

Again, we have the following pair:

(3) 天下未之聞也

No one in the world has heard of this yet. HF 35(256.6).

(4) 天下未之有也

No such thing ever happens in the world. Zhuang 10.12.

It is currently assumed in Western grammars of AC that *wei* means ‘not yet’ or ‘never’. It has also been noticed that *wei*-clauses are never followed by *yi* 矣, while the corresponding *yi* 已 ‘already’-clauses often are. (See however the interesting exception in Zhuang 22.74.)

In this section I want to demonstrate that there also is a non-temporal ‘gnomic’ use of *wei* which is naturally related to but clearly distinct from the basic *temporal* ‘not yet’. In this ‘gnomic’ sense, *wei* comes to mean ‘not necessarily’, ‘not quite’, etc., like the non-temporal ‘still’ in ‘99 still isn’t 100’. Gnostic *wei* will be seen to refer to a ‘logical’ rather than a temporal progression.

(5) 可也，未若貧而樂富而好禮者也

That’s all right! But it hasn’t got to the stage of being as good as being joyful in poverty or loving ritual as a rich man. LY 1.15.

There is absolutely no suggestion that the state of affairs described by Confucius changed at a later stage. And the translation ‘But it is never as good as . . .’ seems inappropriate.

- (6) 由是觀之吾未知亡國之王
不可以為賢主

From this point of view I am not so sure that a king who has lost a state cannot become a talented ruler. LSCQ 4.5.

'I do not know yet' and 'I never know' are impossible renderings for this sort of *wei zhi* 未知.

- (7) 若令桀紂知必國亡身死殄無後趙
吾未知其屬為無道至於此也

If Jie and Zhou had known that their states were certain to be lost, that they themselves were certain to die and go under without successors, I am not so sure that their cruelty and immorality would have gone so far. LSCQ 7.4.

- (8) 吾未知聖知之不為桁楊接楛也
仁義之不為桎梏鑿枘也

I am not so sure that the knowledge of the sages should not be taken to be the wedge that fastens the cangue, that goodness and duty shouldn't be taken to be the loop and lock of these fetters and manacles. Zhuang 11.27 (2 examples).

I have no doubt that idiomatic *wei zhi* 未知 often comes to mean 'I suspect that not'. (Compare the idiomatic English sentence 'I don't know that she is so pretty!') But the nuance expressed by *wei zhi* 未知 is not always the same. Compare the following:

- (9) 而未知吾所謂之其果有謂乎其果無謂乎

But I am not so sure whether what I have said in fact has a meaning or does not have a meaning. Zhuang 2.51.

- (10) 俄而有無矣而未知有無之果孰有孰無也

Suddenly there is being and nothingness. And I am not so sure which of them there is and which of them there is not. Zhuang 2.50. Cf. Zhuang 12.84, Zhuang 18.7.

It is vitally important to realize that *wei* does not mean 'not yet' in contexts like these. Otherwise one would have to suspect that Zhuang Zi thought that there *were* correct answers to these questions in the end. And that would be a profound misunderstanding.

The combination *wei zu* 未足 may be translatable as 'not yet suffi-

cient’, but the important point is that the ‘yet’ involved here is *logical*, not temporal.

(11) 士志於道而恥惡衣惡食者未足與議也

When a knight is intent on the Way but is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, he is not quite worth talking to. LY 4.9.

The use of *wei* instead of *bu* 不 suggest that the kind of knight in question fulfills some but not all the conditions for being a worthwhile partner for discussion. He has further to go before he is worth talking to. Contrast:

(12) 其餘不足觀也已

The rest is just not worth looking at. LY 8.11. Cf. LY 14.2.

The contrast between *bu zu* 不足 and *wei zu* 未足 is by no means restricted to the Analects:

(13) 烈士為天下見善矣未足以活身

The distinguished knight may be considered good by everyone in the world, but that is not necessarily sufficient to keep him alive. Zhuang 18.6 (Note the unorthodox passive!)

If I understand *wei* correctly, its use must imply that it would be natural to expect that somebody who commands this universal respect will not lose his life on this account. *Wei zu* 未足 ‘is not necessarily sufficient’ contrasts with *bu zu* 不足 ‘is insufficient’.

(14) 由此觀之賢智未足以服衆

From this point of view talent and knowledge are *not by themselves* sufficient to bring the masses to heel. HF 40(297.8).

The point is not that talent and knowledge are always insufficient, or that talent and knowledge might be sufficient in the future.

(15) 方馬埋輪未足恃也

Hobbled horses and buried wheels are *not by themselves* sufficient to rely on (for preventing defending troops from fleeing). Sun 11.31.

There seems to be a clear contrast between *bu ke X* 不可× ‘un-X-worthy’ and *wei ke X ye* 未可×也 ‘not quite Xworthy’. It is useful to keep this contrast in mind, even when at first sight this seems an awkward thing to do:

(16) 貴賤有時未可以為常也

High status and low status have their times. They cannot necessarily be taken to be constant. Zhuang 17.35.

If I am right on *wei*, then Zhuang Zi shows he is aware of the limitations of social mobility by using *wei* instead of *bu* 不. It is as if he feels *bu* 不 would be too strong a word to use in this context.

Wei ke X 未可 × can also come to mean ‘not quite Xable’:

(17) 所食之粟伯夷之所樹抑亦盜跖之所樹歟
是未可知也

Was the millet he ate grown by a (worthy like) Bo Yi, or by the bandit Zhi? One does not have sufficient information to know. Meng 3 B 10. The translation ‘the answer cannot be known’ is not outrageously wrong, but I find it treacherously unobvious.

It seems that *wei jin* 未盡 means ‘not quite completely’, and this is again what we would expect:

(18) 謂武盡美矣未盡善也

He said the *Wu* was completely beautiful, but not quite completely good. LY 3.25.

(19) 二子之於法術皆未盡善也

In relation to law and ‘the arts’ the two were both not quite completely good. HF 43 (306.9). Cf. HF 43 (305.12).

(20) 管仲不死曰未仁乎

Guan Zhong did not die for him. Do we say he fell short of goodness? LY 14.16.

If we had read *bu ren hu* 不仁乎 we might almost have translated ‘Do we say he was a scoundrel?’ *Wei* seems to mean something like ‘not quite’ here, but one might try to translate ‘Do we say he was not good yet (at that stage)?’

(21) 吾未之樂也，亦未之不樂也

I do not quite enjoy it, but I don’t quite not enjoy it either. Zhuang 18.10.

(22) 里人有病，里人問之。病者能言其病
然其病病者猶未病也

When a villager is ill, but talks about his illness when the villagers

ask him, in such a case the person who considers his illness as an illness is still not quite ill. Zhuang 23.33.

Here Nanrong Zhu reports an everyday observation. He has just said the villager is ill. It would be strange for him to conclude that the man is not ill *yet*. Clearly the idea is that he is not *really* ill. The contrast with Lao Zi's abstract argument on the same theme is illuminating:

(23) 聖人不病，以其病病是以不病。

The Sage does not get ill. Because he considers illness as illness he does not get ill. Lao 71.

Here the point is that the Sage is *above* illness. In the important sense he does not get sick at all! Lao Zi is being deliberately paradoxical, whereas Nanrong Zhu appeals to common sense.

Wei easily comes to mean 'not necessarily'.

(24) 可與共學未可與適道

When someone is fit to study with he is not necessarily fit to reach the Way with. LY 9.30 (3 examples in the context).

(25) 鄉人皆好之如何？子曰：未可也。

'What about someone whom everybody in the district loves?'

The Master said: 'He is not necessarily commendable.' LY 13.24.

Confucius' point is that a person loved in this way does not by virtue of being so loved fulfill all the conditions for being 'all right'. There is no suggestion that such a person 'never' is all right, or that he is 'not yet' all right, but will become so in the future.

Our grammatical distinction turns out to be of profound philosophical significance in passages like:

(26) 天下是非果未可定也

In the end one cannot quite fix or pin down right and wrong in this world. Zhuang 18.11.

We are not any longer *grammatically constrained* to take this *wei* as 'never'. The question whether we nonetheless should continue to do so is too complex to go into at this point.

Against this background it will not be found surprising any more that an idiomatic negation of *bi* 必 'necessarily' is *wei bi* 未必 'not necessarily'.

(27) 窮為匹夫未必賤

Someone as poor as the common man in the street is not necessarily vulgar. Zhuang 29.62 (2 examples). Cf. Zhuang 26.2; 26.3.

There are no less than 17 examples of *wei bi* 未必 in HF, and in none of these do we understand the combination on the lines of 'he never has to' or 'you don't have to ... as yet'.

(28) 脩士者未必智，智士者未必信。

A cultivated knight is not necessarily wise, and a wise knight is not necessarily trustworthy. HF 47(325.4).

The logical crux is that in these *wei bi* 未必 -phrases there is no suggestion that anything will be or might be necessary in the future.

The idiomatic force of *wei bi* 未必 comes out beautifully in

(29) 故塗之人可以為禹 則然。塗之能為禹未必然也

Thus a dirty man from the street *may* become an Yu, that is so. But it is not for that reason necessarily so that the dirty man from the street *is able* to become an Yu. Xun 23.72.

By contrast with *wei ke wei* 未可謂 'cannot quite be called' we have *ke wei yi* 可謂...矣 'may properly be called' (e.g. Meng 3A2). Commonly we have:

(30) 若此則可謂直士矣

If someone is like that then he may properly be called a straightforward knight. Xun 3.42 (5 examples). The combination *ze ke wei y X yi* 則可謂X矣 comes no less than 17 times in Xun Zi alone. And it is worth pointing out that the combination *ke* 可 VERB quite regularly has the final particle *ye* 也 in other contexts, hardly ever *yi* 矣.

The fact that final *yi* is so frequent in the apodoses of conditional clauses with *ze* 則 in general can now be explained as follows: the use of *yi* in these conditionals indicates that the conditions mentioned in the protasis *are completely* sufficient to guarantee the truth of the apodosis. The crucial evidence for my explanation is that 'conditional' *yi* can occur in quite abstract 'tenseless' sentences:

(31) 類與不類相與為類則與彼無以異矣

When the similar and the dissimilar form one similarity class, then they are indistinguishable from a different thing. Zhuang 2.48. Cf. Mo 43.28. One may quibble about my exact interpretation of this abstract argument, but there is not the slightest doubt that the argument is *logical*. Consequently *yi* cannot here be a marker of *temporal* aspect.

And even when the topic is manifestly historical, ‘conditional’ *yi* can often not be taken as a marker of *temporal* aspect:

(32) 伊尹毋變殷太公毋變周則湯武不王矣

If Yi Yin had not transformed the Yin, and if Tai Gong had not transformed the Zhou, then Tang and Wu would not have become true kings. HF 18(87.7) (2 examples). Cf. Zhuang 17.5.

It is not as if Tang and Wu would have *ceased* to become true kings! It turns out that the pattern *ze* 則... *yi* 矣 is remarkably common. (Of 28 occurrences of the particle *yi* in the Shen Zi fragments, for example, no less than 22 fall into this pattern.) Given examples like (26) and (32) we are now free to consider *yi* as the opposite of gnomic *wei* in a large number of cases.

Also outside conditional contexts. But this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the notoriously ill-understood particle *yi* 矣.

Quantification

2.1 Universal Object Quantifiers

Compare the following sets of sentences:

- (A) a 上咸愛下
 b 上俱愛下
 c 上舉愛下
 d 上莫不愛下
 e 上皆愛下
 f 上各愛其下 'Each superior loves his inferiors'
- } Roughly:
 'All superiors love inferiors'
- (B) a 上兼愛下
 b 上徧愛下
 c 上周愛下
 d 上汜愛下
 e 上悉愛下
 f 上盡殺其下 'Superiors kill all their inferiors'
- } Roughly:
 'Superiors love all their
 inferiors'

I propose to call the quantifiers in (A) subject quantifiers and those in (B) object quantifiers. The distinction seems fundamental for an understanding of quantification in AC. It has not so far been properly appreciated. (Cf. e.g. Dobson 1959: 78ff).

We shall find that there are significant distinctions to be made within the classes of subject quantifiers and object quantifiers. Until now, these have also never been worked out properly.

In this section I shall present a survey of the quantificational uses of

the words *jian* 兼, *bian* 偏, *pian* 偏, *zhou* 周, *fan* 汎, *xi* 悉, *jin* 盡, and also *gong* 共.¹

Jian 兼

Jian is a specialized object quantifier derived from the common verb ‘to combine, to unite’. Less common is the adjectival use of *jian*:

(1) 寒暑不兼時而至

Heat and cold do not arrive at the same time. HF 50(352.9).

It may be instructive to illustrate the evolution of *jian* from a lexical verb to a grammatical particle. Consider the following examples:

(2) 桓公兼此數節而盡有之

Duke Huan combined these skills and had them all. Xun 7.8.

(Note the use of *jin* here as a regular object quantifier.)

This *jin* can be omitted in similar constructions:

(3) 故今世為人臣者兼刑德而用之

Now the ministers of our age combine punishment and generosity (in their power) and use both of them. HF 7 (27.12).

(4) 今夫天兼天下而愛之

Now Heaven (combines everyone and loves them, i.e. :) loves everyone. Mo 27.33. Cf. Mo 28.22.

(5) 兼此而能之備矣

He who is capable of all these things is a perfect man. Xun 24.23. Cf. HSWZ 4.11. Note the nontemporal use of the final *yi*.

(6) 而王者兼而有是者也

1. Compare incidentally the following use of *quan* 全:

(a) 秦故地可全而有也

The original territories of Qin can all be brought under control. Xin Xu 10.9.

The translation ‘...can be kept complete and controlled,’ seems etymologizing in this context. But, so far as I know, *quan* did not evolve into an object quantifier in AC.

Another word that was on its way to becoming an object quantifier was *bing* 並:

(b) 天生五材，民並用之，廢一不可。

Heaven produces five materials and the people use all of these. It would be wrong to give up any one of them. Zuo Xiang 27 fu 2.

The true king is the sort of person who has all of these things. Xun 11.74. Cf. Xun 11.78.

The object quantifier often retains a connotation of ‘uniting’ the (differing) objects, but this may be absent:

(7) 人主兼而禮之

The rulers of men treat all of them with politeness. HF 50 (352.8). The nuance expressed by the bracketed ‘differing’ turns out to be important. Typically, the object of the verb *jian* 兼 ‘unite, combine’ refers to divergent, different things. Thus *jian* as an object quantifier comes to mean something like ‘all the different objects’, ‘each of the (different) objects’. And the link between verbal and quantificational *jian* is brought out by the interesting idiom *jian er* 兼而 VERB OBJECT, which one might translate literally as ‘combiningly VERB the OBJECTs, but which really comes to mean ‘VERB all the (different) OBJECTs’. This link is crucial for a proper understanding of the nature of the quantifier *jian*:

(8) 然而兼而用之

And Ritual uses both these things. Xun 19.64.

The point Xun Zi makes is that Ritual combines and uses these *different, divergent* things, each in its appropriate way.

I suspect our nuance is present even in:

(9) 若夫兼而覆之，兼而愛之，兼而制之…

If one holds one’s hand over each one, loves each one, and controls each one ... Xun 10.45.

It seems clear that *er* 而 is optional in (8):

(10) 周人脩而兼用之

The Zhou people cultivated these and used them all. Li Ji I.648. Cf. 盡用: ‘use all of the stuff’. Zhuang 18.4.

(11) 周人兼用之

The Zhou people used both of these things. Li Ji I.169.

Similarly, we have parallels for (9):

(12) 合德而兼覆之則万物受命
無親而兼載之則諸生皆殖
無私而兼照之則美惡不隱

If you integrate your generosity and cover each of them with it, then all creatures will obey your orders . . .

If you are without partiality and you support them all, then all living things will grow abundantly . . .

If you are without private preference and you throw light over them all, then beauty and ugliness will not be hidden. Guan 66 (3.50–11).

And the optionality of *er* 而 is neatly illustrated in a single passage like:

(13) 何以知兼愛天下之人也，以兼而食之也。

How do we know that Heaven likes all the people of the world? Because it gives them all nourishment. Mo 28.19.

From the quantificational uses of *jian* adduced so far one might get the impression that the object quantified tends to be pronominalized by *zhi*, and indeed this is very commonly the case:

(14) 晉侯兼享之

The Marquis of Jin entertained them all. Zuo Xiang 26, cf. also Zuo Ding 6.

(15) 趙孟，叔孫豹，曹大夫入於鄭，鄭伯兼享之。

Zhao Meng, Shu-sun Bao and the Great Officer of Cao entered the capital of Zheng. The Earl of Zheng gave them all an entertainment. Zuo Zhao 1. (Cf. Legge 577).

(16) 唯君子然後兼有之

Only the gentleman can have all these things. Xun 18.110.

(17) 兼指之

It points to all of them. Mo 43.43.

Further examples are in e.g. Sun 11.119; Xun 10.83; Xun 11.54; Xun 12.21; HF 50 (352.02); HF 49 (344.10).

(18) 兼權之

(One must) weigh them all against each other. Xun 3.46.

The examples could easily be multiplied.

But as (13) already suggests, the pronominalization of the object is clearly optional:

- (19) 天之裁大故能兼覆万物
地之裁大故能兼載万物。

The plans of Heaven are large, so it can cover all things. The plans of Earth are large, so it can sustain all things. Guan 64 (3.34–13).

Jian may quantify quite complex objects:

- (20) 宋公兼享晉楚之大夫

The Duke of Song entertained all the great officers of Jin and Chu. Zuo Xiang 27.

Here, as often, *jian* has a connotation of simultaneity. But it is clear that this connotation is not always present.

- (21) 兼服天下之心

He made all the hearts of the world follow him. Xun 6.27.

- (22) 兼愛天下之人

He loves all the people of the world equally. Mo 28.19.

- (23) 今兼聽雜學繆行同異之辭安得無亂乎

“Now that heretical studies are equally listened to and contradictory theories are absurdly acted upon, how can there be other than chaos?” HF II.1085; tr. Liao II.300. Cf. GY 19.13866.

Of course, the quantified object can also be a single word:

- (24) 兼制人，莫得而制也是人情之所同欲也。

To have universal control over men (lit: control them all), and to have none of them able to dictate to oneself, that is what people by nature equally like. Xun 11.74.

Tong seems here almost on its way to becoming a quantifier. This *tong* makes it easy to see how adverbs can become quantifiers.

- (25) 大國不過欲兼畜人

Large states just want to rear all men. Lao 61 (The line is certainly difficult to understand fully, but note that many translators fail to understand *jian*. Cf. D. C. Lau p. 122).

- (26) 兼制天下

He controlled everyone in the world. Xun 8.3. Cf. Xun 10.31.

- (26a) 精於道者兼物物

He who subtly understands the way treats all things as things. Xun 21.52.

(27) 今以一人兼聽天下

Now if as a single person one listens to everyone in the world . . . Xun 11.58. Cf. HSWZ 4.7.

In exceptional cases *jian* can quantify both subject and object, although one feels that such a way of describing the situation in the following sentence is pedantic:

(28) 若使天下兼相愛

If the world (i.e. everyone in the world) loved everyone . . . Mo 14.17. Note that *xiang* can be understood as a preposed object pronoun.

Under certain circumstances *jian* can occur without any explicit object which it quantifies:

(29) 兼覆無遺

He holds his hand over each thing, leaving nothing out. Xun 9.5.

(29a) 墨子汜愛兼利而非鬪

Mo Zi loved everyone, worked in the interest of everyone and criticised war. Zhuang 33.18.

(30) 有兼聽之明

He had the intelligence of someone who has heard everything. Xun 22.43.

Fascinatingly, the grammaticalized use of *jian* can itself again be reverbalized:

(31) 乃若兼則善矣

If he is universal, he is good. Mo 15.16.

More expectedly, the grammaticalized use of *jian* can be nominalized:

(32) 故兼者聖王之道也

Universalism thus is the way of the Sage King. Mo 16.83.

Finally one of those puzzling counterexamples.

(33) 兼忘天下難，兼忘天下易，使天下兼忘我難。

Forgetting the whole world is difficult. Forgetting the whole world is easy; making the whole world forget oneself is difficult. Zhuang 14.10. Note that the last *jian* seems to function as a subject-quantifier. I find it plausible to assume that this kind of use of *jian* is entirely motivated by considerations of style and parallelism. I feel that Zhuang Zi would not ordinarily use the word in this function. He uses a grammatically odd form in order to achieve stylistic parallelism.

Note further that the first two clauses in (33) are *not* a contradiction. The semantics of relative predicates like *good*, *easy*, etc. in AC has yet to be explained. Once that is done, the notion of the comparative construction in AC will also begin to be understood.

It seems natural that Zhuang Zi should use *jian* as a *subject* quantifier at this point, also because *jian* functions as a pivot in this sentence. Cf. example (98) in this section.

Fan 汎

The quantifier *fan* 汎 is so rare that I can list all the occurrences I have found.

(34) 汎愛万物天地一體也

If you love all things, Heaven and Earth are like one body. Zhuang 33.73.

(35) 汎拜衆賓於堂上

He bowed to all the guests up in the hall. Li Ji.

(36) 墨子汎愛兼利而非斗

Mo Zi advocated universal love, benefitting everyone, and he argued against war. Zhuang 33.18. Cf. Xun 25.19 汎利兼愛.

Bian 徧

I have suggested that *jian* 兼 does not just mean, ‘all the objects’, but tends to mean something rather like ‘all the different objects’, ‘each of the objects in their way’. Now I want to go on to show that *bian* 徧 doesn’t mean just ‘all the objects’ but rather something like ‘all the objects indiscriminately’, ‘all the objects everywhere’.

There is a superb illustration of what I am getting at in Mencius. The passage is worth quoting at length:

- (37) 知者無不知也當務之為急
 仁者無不愛也急親賢之為務
 堯舜之知而不徧物急先務也
 堯舜之仁不徧愛人急親賢也

The knowledgeable person has knowledge about everything, but he makes the most urgent efforts on the tasks at hand.

The humane person has love for everyone, but he considers it his task to make the urgent efforts for relatives and men of talent.

Although Yao and Shun were knowledgeable, their knowledge did not cover all things indiscriminately, they made their most urgent efforts on their first tasks.

Although Yao and Shun were humane, they did not love all men indiscriminately, they made their most urgent efforts for relatives and men of talent. Meng 7A46.

It seems clear that in this passage Mencius exploits a subtle difference between the 'anti-septic' object quantifier *wu bu* 無不 (which is idiomatically short for *wu suo bu* 無所不) and the word *bian* 徧. In fact the whole point of the passage lies in this distinction.

I feel that there is a profound reason why Mencius could not have used *jian* 兼 for *bian* 徧 to make his point. For polemic reasons he would surely have loved to use *jian ai* 兼愛 thereby directly discrediting the Mohists. But *jian* does not mean the same as *bian*. And *both* are not simply synonymous with *wu bu* 無不.

In the logical chapter of Xun Zi there is another helpful passage with *bian*:

- (38) 故万物雖衆有時而欲徧舉之

Thus although the 10,000 things are many, one sometimes wishes to refer to all of them indiscriminately. Xun 21.23.

My suggestion is that one would not normally use *jian* in (38). *Jian* does not normally express this sort of blanket generality. But cf. ex. (17) above.

- (39) 徧問於大夫

He asked all the grandees indiscriminately. GY 14.10 295.

In (39) the subject, Xian Zi, asks about a certain piece of information. If he had asked everybody's advice and weighed each piece of advice individually, I suspect this would make *jian* inappropriate.

The object quantified by *bian* can be grammatically quite complex:

- (40) 君子之所謂賢者非能徧能人之所能之謂也
 君子之所謂知者非能徧知人之所知之謂也
 君子之所謂辯者非能徧辯人之所辯之謂也
 君子之所謂察者非能徧察人之所察之謂也

What the gentleman calls a worthy, is not someone who is in a position to do everything that others can do.

What the gentleman calls a knowing man is not someone who is in a position to know everything that other people know.

What the gentleman calls a good arguer is not someone who is in a position to argue for everything that others are able to argue for.

What the gentleman calls a perceptive person is not someone who is in a position to investigate everything others are investigating. Xun 8.25.

My suggestion is that *bian neng* 徧能 describes a blanket coverage of abilities, while *jian neng* 兼能 would describe a combination of individual skills.

Now ‘blanket coverage’ of e.g. two items would be an absurd notion, and so far as I know *bian* never means ‘both the objects’. *Bian* would be quite inappropriate in sentences like (11) above:

- (41) 周人徧用之

If this is at all acceptable, then it would have to refer to more than just the two things referred to in (11). But in fact I find it very interesting that the combination *bian yong* 徧用 ‘use all of them’ never occurs, while *jian yong* 兼用 is very common.

Again it seems significant that we have three instances of *jian xiang* 兼享 ‘entertaining all the objects’ while we have

- (42) 盈出徧拜之

Ying came forward and bowed to everyone on all sides in one blanket gesture. Zuo Xiang 23.7.

Still, one might insist that it is by coincidence that we have found several instances of *jian xiang* 兼享 and none of *bian xiang* 徧享. For consider:

- (43) 於是徧飲而去

Then he offered them all a drink and went his way. LSCQ 8.5. Surely, it would make no difference if we had *jian* here! Note first that the parallel passage in Han Shi Wai Zhuan also has *bian*:

(44) 繆公乃求酒徧飲之

Then Duke Mu found some wine and gave a round of drinks. HSWZ 10.12.

The story is that the Duke gives a round of drinks to some peasants in the countryside. I submit that if he had treated the feudal lords to champagne the text might well have used the politer *jian yin* 兼飲.

There is good reason, then, that we have *bian* and not *jian* in

(45) 程嬰徧拜諸將

Cheng Ying bowed to all the generals. Xin Xu 7.258.

And it is also clear why *bian* is appropriate in

(46) 徧告諸將曰

He announced to all the generals: . . . Xin Xu 7.254.

(47) 徧戒其所知曰...

He issued a blanket warning to all those he knew . . .GY 15. 11 015. Cf. GY 1. 331.

(48) 天子徧祀群神品物

The emperor sacrifices to all the various spirits (indiscriminately: no matter which part of the empire they are attached to) with the sacrificial items. GY 18.12 715.

It should be clear by now why you wouldn't naturally have *jian* in sentences like

(49) 目不徧視，手不徧操，口不徧味。

The eye does not see everything (everywhere indiscriminately), the hand does not grasp everything, the tongue does not taste everything. Mo 6.25. (There often seems to be a spatial nuance to *bian*).

On the other hand there are sentences where it does not seem to make much difference whether we have *bian* or *jian*:

(50) 無天下之委財而欲徧澹万民利不能足也

If one lacks the combined stocks of the world but wishes to give enough to all the myriad people of the world, then one's goods will be insufficient. HNT 11.8a.

The nuance expressed by *bian* seems to be something like 'the myriad people *everywhere*'.

- (51) 徧知万物而不知人道，不可謂智。
徧愛群生而不愛人類，不可謂仁。

If someone knows all things but does not know the way of men, he cannot be called wise; if someone loves all the various living things indiscriminately but does not love mankind, he cannot be called good. HNT 9.32a.

- (52) 凡戰必悉孰徧備

Speaking of battles in general, one must be familiar with everything and prepared for everything. LSCQ 16.6.

- (53) 義者非能徧利天下之民也而天下從風

Although a righteous man cannot give benefits to everyone in the world, the people of the world follow his lead. HNT 9.26a.

- (54) 般之序徧祭之

According to the order in which they are served he sacrifices for them all. Li Ji I.35.

Bian can also occur adjectivally meaning ‘the whole of’ an area:

- (55) 是以徧天下之人皆欲得其長上之賞譽避其毀罰

Therefore the people of the whole world all desire reward and praise from their superiors and try to avoid criticism and punishment. Mo 13.39. Cf. also Mo 13.25 and Mo 12.64.

- (56) 徧國中無與立談者

In the whole state there is no one with whom to stand and talk. Meng 4B33.

Such examples obviously have to do with the common ‘spatial’ nuance of *bian*. (Cf. Guan 29 (2.23-7) 千里徧知之 ‘everywhere within a thousand miles they know it’).

The following example is interesting for many reasons, but among other things it illustrates the fact that *bian* may be used as a subject quantifier equivalent to *jie* 皆 or *bi* 畢:

- (57) 上不天則下不徧覆
心不地則物不畢載。

If superiors do not behave like Heaven then those below will not all be

covered; when the mind does not behave like the Earth then the creatures will not all be sustained. HF 29 (157.6).

One is tempted to say that *bian* here quantifies an *underlying* object that has been shifted into subject position, and point to the following as a similar example:

- (58) 搖木者一一攝其葉則勞而不徧
左右拊其本而葉徧搖矣。

If someone wants to shake a tree and pulls the leaves one by one, that will be hard work but he will not shake the whole tree. If he attacks the root (stem) from left and right, then the leaves will all be shaken. HF 35 (258.9).

The generalization seems to be that object quantifiers may occasionally quantify the subject of 'passivized' verbs.

- (59) 券遍合

When the tallies had all been matched ... Zhan Guo Ce, quoted according to Shadick 1968:29.

Zhou 周

Remembering the phrase *bian bai* 徧拜 compare now:

- (60) 周麾而呼曰

He waved all around and shouted ... Zuo Yin 11.3.

The parallelism with *bian* becomes explicit in:

- (61) 文王周視得失徧覽是非

King Wen looked at all successes and losses, surveyed all rights and wrongs. HNT 9.31a.

The spatial connotation of *zhou* comes out beautifully in:

- (62) 周知九州之地域

He knew all the areas of the Nine Continents. Zhou Li, Diguan, Dasitu.

It is on the basis of usages of this sort that the Mohist logicians converted the word *zhou* into a formal object quantifier:

- (63) 待周愛人而後為愛人
不愛人不待周不愛人。

Someone has to love all men, only then does that count as loving men;

but one does not have to dislike all men to qualify for the predicate 'does not love men'. Mo 45.23.

- (64) 不待周乘馬而後為乘馬
待周不乘馬而後為不乘馬。

Someone does not have to ride all horses in order to qualify for the predicate 'rides horses', but only if he not-rides all horses can one say that he does not ride horses. Mo 45.24.

The logicians' usage was not taken up by others.

Pian 偏

Pian is sometimes used as non-universal object quantifier meaning 'only some but not all of the objects'.

- (65) 偏誅而不盡

He executed some of them, but not all. HF 31 (182.10).

- (66) 三者偏亡焉無安人

Where one of these is missing there is no peace for the people. Xun 19.15. Note that *wu* 亡 is a transitive subjectless verb.

- (67) 損偏去也

To diminish is to discard some parts (of oneself) but not all. Mo 40.18.

- (68) 偏去也者兼之體也
其體或去或存，謂其存者損。

As for discarding some parts: if you take all the parts together, they are the complete body. Of this body, some is discarded, some remains. We say of what remains that it is diminished. Mo 42.18.

In the Mo Jing, *pian* is clearly a technical term. Graham 1971:84 recognized this, but he did not characterize *pian* as an *object* quantifier.

- (69) 樞不可偏舉字也

If a volume is such that you cannot refer only to it and not to others, then that volume is called 'space'. Mo 43.67. (Contrast Graham 1971:102).

- (70) 異類異故則不可偏觀也

If things are of different kinds and have different causes, one must not look at only one of them. Mo 45.10.

(71) 老聃之役有庚桑楚者，偏得老聃之道。

Among the attendants of Lao Dan was a certain Gengsang Chu who had mastered some but not all of the Way of Lao Dan. Zhuang 23.1. (Compare Hu Yuan-rui's comment on the passage: 偏者所謂知其一不知其二者也。(Hu 1968:187)).

(72) 二名不偏諱

As for the two names, one does not avoid each of them singly, (only the conjunction). Li Ji, Qu Li, cf. Zhongwen da cidian 1112.

The following late text shows neatly how *pian* 偏 is felt by Xi Kang to be equivalent to *bu jian* 不兼:

(73) 偏恃者以不兼無功

If you rely on some things to the exclusion of others, then because of your lack of universality you will not achieve success. Xi Kang, Yangsheng lun.

(74) 偏聽生姦／獨任成亂／

Listening to some to the exclusion of others creates wickedness. / Relying on one person to the exclusion of others brings about chaos. / Shi Ji 83.24.

This passage brings out the structural parallelism between some uses of *du* and the object-quantifier *pian*. (For further discussion of the use of *du* as an object quantifier see the section on *restrictive quantifiers*).

(75) 偏喪有咎

If you lose out on one of these you will be unfortunate. Guo Yu 3. 1746.

(76) 樊於期偏袒扼腕而進曰…

Fan Yu-qi bared one arm, grasped his wrist and went up saying... ZGC 473 (II.129).

(77) 鞿偏緩

One of the reins was loose. LSCQ 25.5.

Here *pian* seems to function as a subject quantifier. But we may also

translate: 'The reins were loose on one side.' In fact, I prefer the latter reading. Compare:

(78) 使居天子之位則天下徧為儒墨矣

If they had occupied the emperor's throne then the people of the empire everywhere would have become Confucians and Mohists. HNT 9.24b. Cf. Mo 12.63.

Here one might insist that *bian* is a subject quantifier 'all', but we may also take it as 'everywhere'.

I would need more examples than the above two to make up my mind between these alternative analyses. But however we treat examples of this sort, the close parallelism between *pian* 徧 and *bian* 徧 is obvious. It is because of this interesting parallelism that I have treated the non-universal quantifier *pian* in this section.

Xi 悉

The quantifier *xi* is standardly glossed by *jin* 盡, never, so far as I know, by the more frequent universal quantifier *jie*. The reasons for this are not difficult to find: *xi* as a main verb can be synonymous with *jin* and mean something like 'to exhaust', and when used as a quantifier *xi* again tends to quantify the object of the verb it precedes:

(79) 乃悉取其禁方書盡與扁鵲

Then he took all his secret books on medical method and gave them all to Pian Que. Shi Ji 105.3.

The use of *xi* as an object quantifier is old:

(80) 悉率左右

"We led on all the attendants." Shi 180.3, tr. Karlgren.

(81) 悉聽朕言

Listen to all our words. Shu 10.9.

(82) 悉索敝賦

We called out all our levies. Zuo Xiang 7.7.

(83) 去者之父母妻子悉舉民室木材瓦

The parents, wives, and children of those who had gone took up all the beams and tiles from the peoples' houses. Mo 70.56.

An instructive example comes in a probably late part of the Li Ji:

- (84) 哀公問曰：敢問儒行。孔子對曰：遽數之不能終其物，悉數之乃留，更僕未可終也。

Duke Ai asked: 'Please tell me about the manner of a Confucian!' Confucius replied: 'If I go through this fast I cannot get to the end of the matter. If I go through all of this that will take time: I won't be finished by the time the guard is changed. Li Ji II.601.

- (85) 臣願悉言所聞

I want to tell all I know. HF 1.1. Cf. ZGC I.29.

- (86) 齊悉復得其故城

Qi got all its original cities back. Shi Ji 34.19.

This example shows that *xi* may stand before an adverb-verb-object construction, not only before a straightforward verb-object-construction.

There is a most revealing contrast between (86) and the following example which significantly has *jie* instead of *xi*:

- (87) 而齊七十餘城皆復為齊

And the seventy-odd cities of Qi all became part of Qi again. Shi Ji 82.6.

- (88) 乃悉以其裝齋置二石醇醪

Then for all his official clothing he bought two gallons of wine. Shi Ji 101.12.

For the purposes of quantification 'prepositions' like *yi* 以 appear to operate like verbs.

- (89) 慶年七十餘，無子，使意盡去其故方更悉以禁方予之。

At the age of seventy-odd years, and without a son, Qing ordered Yi to forget about all his old methods and instead passed on to him all his secret methods. Shi Ji 105.9.

This is strongly reminiscent of the first example in this section, but fortunately the order of the application of *jin* and *xi* is reversed to illustrate the interchangeability of the two.

- (90) 願君讓封勿受，悉以家私財佐軍。

I wish your lordship would politely refuse and not accept the appoint-

ment, and help the army with all your family's private means. Shi Ji 53.10.

(91) 悉以家財求客刺秦王，為韓報仇。

Using all his family means he tried to get a retainer to assassinate the King of Qin as a revenge on behalf of Han. Shi Ji 55.3.

(92) 幣邑雖小已悉起之矣

My city may be small, but I have already mobilized all the soldiers. ZGC II, 74.

(93) 飛鳥悉翔舞於城中下食

Birds were fluttering about everywhere in the city, descending for food. Shi Ji 82.3.

(94) 是日悉封何父子兄弟十餘人，皆有食邑。

On that day he enfeoffed Both Xiao Ho's father, sons, and his brothers, in all more than ten people. They all had towns to live on. Shi Ji 53.9.

(95) 因悉起兵復使甘茂攻之

So he called out all his soldiers and again ordered Gan Mao to attack them. ZGC I.51. Cf. ZGC 323 (II.38) and ZGC 473 (II.128).

Consider now an important apparent counterexample where *jie* and *xi* are used in parallel constructions:

(96) 諸男皆尚秦公主，女悉嫁秦諸公子。

All his sons he managed to match with princesses from the House of Qin, all his daughters he gave away to one of the various princes of the House of Qin. Shi Ji 87.14.

Shang is 'to marry someone off to a person of higher status' and *jia* 'to give away in marriage'. The subject of these verbs is not the boys and girls respectively but their father Li Si. In the section of subject quantifiers we have found that *jie* regularly quantifies topicalized preposed objects. It is in this function that there is indeed a clear overlap in the use of many subject and object quantifiers. (I do not say 'all' because e.g. *mo* 莫 cannot quantify preposed objects.)

Predictably, when the subject is unquantifiable *xi* may also be interchangeable with *jie*:

(97) 項羽乃悉引兵渡河皆沈船破釜甌

Then Xian Yu led all his soldiers across the river and proceeded to submerge all the boats and destroy all the pots and pans. Shi Ji 7.

But examples like (97) really belong to the section on subject quantifiers.

In embedded object clauses we sometimes get *xi* where one might expect a subject quantifier:

(98) 王命衆悉至于庭

The King ordered the masses all to come to his courtyard. Shu 16.144.

(99) 使吏召諸民當償者悉來合券

He sent out officers to summon the people who had to pay debts to all to match their tallies. ZGC. Cf. Shi Ji 53.5.

It will be noticed that *xi* is quite rare in AC texts but becomes common in Shi Ji, and was current in pre-Classical Chinese.

Jin 盡

Let me begin with some contrasts between *jin* 盡 and *jian* 兼. For example, *jin ai* 盡愛 is far from synonymous with *jian ai* 兼愛:

(100) 復盡愛之道也

(The ritual of) recalling (the soul) is the way of consummate love. Li Ji, Tan Gong, I.199.

Again, compare *jin shan* 盡善 with *jian shan* 兼善:

(101) 子謂韶盡美矣又盡善也

The master called the Shao Music perfectly beautiful and at the same time perfectly good. LY 3.25.

(102) 窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下。

When they were poor they only worked for the goodness of their own persons; when they had success they worked for the goodness of the empire. Meng 7A9.

It seems clear that *jin* is not as specialized in its function as a quantifier as *jian* is. And obviously, the lexical items *jin* and *jian* are not synonymous. But even when *jin* does function as a quantifier it does not work quite like *jian*. For one thing *jin* regularly quantifies subjects of sentences while *jian* never does. It is this use of *jin* that the Mohist logicians had in mind when they wrote:

(103) 盡莫不然也

'*Jin*' is 'nothing is not so'. Mo 40.17.

Indeed, sentences like

(104) 万物盡然

Things are all like that. Zhuang 2.78, Guan 53 (3.6–10) mean roughly the same as

(105) 万物莫不然

Jin regularly quantifies the subject when there is no suitable object to be quantified. Unlike *jie* 皆, *jin* may then well refer to amounts of things or kinds of things rather than to individual items:

(106) 越國之寶盡在此

The whole lot of Yue's treasures are here. Mo 15.24.

(107) 以天下之美為盡在己

He considered that all the beauty of the world was within himself. Zhuang 17.2.

I suspect that *jie* would have been unacceptable in the Zhuang Zi passage, and if in the Mo Zi passage we had *jie* for *jin* we would expect that the sentence was about contextually determinate specific troves. It is significant that one is often tempted to translate *jin* as 'the whole lot of', because even when *jin* does refer to items it seems to do so in a rather more indiscriminate way.

When there is a suitable object to be quantified *jin* tends to quantify this object even if the subject is also quantifiable. But even when we choose to take *jin* as an object quantifier it still is far from synonymous with the object quantifier *jian*. Also here *jin* retains some of its lexical meaning.

Consider the contrast between *jin quan* 盡權 and *jian quan* 兼權 in the following two passages:

(108) 物之可備者 智者盡備之
可權者 盡權之

As for those things that one can prepare oneself for, the wise man prepares himself for the whole lot of them. As for those things that one can weigh against each other, he weighs all of them against each other. HNT 9.32b.

(Note incidentally that there is no question of *jin* referring to *zhi zhe* 智者.)

(109) 而兼權之

...and he weighs both these things (profit and harm) against each other. Xun 3.46.

When the focus is on clearly distinguished individual objects Xun Zi naturally comes to use *jian*. When in Huai Nan Zi there is talk about something that is considered as an open set one naturally writes *jin*. Note that what is in question here is the subjective perspective of the writer, not the objective logical question whether a given set is well-defined, open or closed.

It seems that *jin yong* 盡用 (use up all of a certain kind) is in significant contrast with *jian yong* 兼用 (make use of all the objects).

(110) 多積財而不能盡用

They accumulate a lot of wealth and cannot use it all. Zhuang 18.4.

(111) 子皮盡用其幣

Zi Pi used up all his silk offerings. Zuo Zhao 10.5.

Jian would be inappropriate in (110) and (111). On the other hand it is called for in

(112) 周人兼用之

The Zhou people used both these things. Li Ji, Tan Gong, I.169.

In combination with *yong* 用 *jin* retains some of its original lexical meaning 'to exhaust'. Similarly for *jin shi* 盡食 'eat all of, eat up':

(113) 盡食其肉獨舍其肝

They ate up all his flesh, leaving only his liver. LSCQ 11.3.

Significantly, the parallels in Xin Xu 8.279 and HSWZ 7.11 also have *jin* in this context: the other object quantifiers seem inappropriate.

Here is a later example where *jin* comes to mean 'all of the object stuff', but here other object quantifiers like *zhou* 周 or *bian* 徧 do not seem to be obviously excluded:

(114) 盡散飲食饗士令甲皆伏

He distributed all his drink and food to feed his soldiers, and he ordered all the men in arms to go into hiding. Shi Ji 82.5.

Note the use of *jie* 皆 in the second clause.

The object quantified by *jin* may even be abstract:

(115) 盡棄其學而學焉

He rejected the whole lot of the things he had learnt and became a follower of Xu Xing. Meng 3A4.

The object may also be omitted:

(116) 盡去而後慊

... and he will first be at ease when he has got rid of the whole lot of these clothes. Zhuang 14.41.

Jin is particularly appropriate here because Zhuang Zi does not want to distinguish between the individual pieces of clothing the monkey gets rid of.

The scope of *jin* can apparently cover more than one verb/object construction:

(117) 非盡亡天下之兵而臣海內之民則不休矣

Unless she annihilates the whole of the armed forces of the world and makes *the whole lot of* the peoples of the empire her servants she will not give peace. ZGC 363 (II.56). Cf. Shi Ji 34.18.

The contrast between *jin* and *jie* 皆 becomes beautifully clear in the following example:

(118) 季氏擇二，二子各一，皆盡征之。

The Ji clan took two parts, the two barons one each, and they all (*jie*) collected revenues from the whole of (*jin*) their lands. Zuo Zhao 5.1.

Examples like (118) are crucial evidence for the claim that *jin* is an object quantifier. And if this claim is correct *jin* simply *has to* quantify the object in sentences like

(119) ...而上盡制之

The superior controls all these things. HF 6 (23.14)

Not: 'all the superiors control these things.'

(120) 聖人盡隨於万物之規矩

The sages follow all the laws and rules governing the 10,000 things. HF 20 (112.3).

Not: 'all the sages follow the ...'

I am painfully aware that in practise it is difficult to be sure when

exactly an object has to count as quantifiable and therefore has to be quantified in a given context.

Logically, the contrast between the subject quantifier *jie* and the object quantifier *jin* is basic. But it is important to be clear about the differences among the object quantifiers themselves. We have noticed the obvious contrasts between *jin* and *jian*. Let me now turn to the important difference between *jin* and *bian*. It seems to me that the difference between *bian zhi* 徧知 and *jin zhi* 盡知 is like that between ‘knowing about all the objects’ and ‘knowing all about the objects’.

(121) 民之情偽盡知之

(The Lord of Jin) knows all about people’s true nature and their false pretenses. Zuo Xi 28.5.

If the meaning had been ‘he knows both the true nature on the one hand and the false pretenses on the other, not just one of these’ I suspect we would have to have *jian* 兼 for *jin*.

(122) 必盡知之

(The military leader) must know all about all these things. Guan 27 (2.20–13).

Compare the phrase current in Guan Zi, *bian zhi tianxia* 徧知天下: ‘cover the whole world in one’s knowledge’.

(123) 人事者吾已盡知之矣

As for human affairs, I already know all about them. ZGC I.110.

One of the reasons why one is often tempted to translate *jin* as ‘the whole lot of the objects’ is the very striking fact that *jin* seems to be the only object quantifier co-occurring idiomatically with verbs like ‘kill’, ‘slaughter’, ‘drive out’, etc. etc.

(124) 吳人往報之，盡屠其家。

The people of Wu went out to seek revenge and slaughtered all his family. LSCQ 16.6.

(125) 史駢之人欲盡殺賈氏

Shi Ping’s people wanted to kill all the members of the Jia (Gu?) clan. Zuo Wen 6.8. Cf. Zuo Ai 14.10; Xuan 13.4.

(126) 盡滅其族

He extinguished the whole lot of his clan. Zuo Xuan 13.4.

By and large the sentences in Zuo Zhuan that involve *jin* as an object quantifier give a pretty grim picture of ancient Chinese society.

Sentences like

(127) 救火者盡賞之

If you reward the lot of those who helped with the fire ... HF 30 (168.16) are *comparatively* rare in AC texts, and in these sentences, like all the others I have quoted in this subsection on *jin*, the same sentence with *jian* would not mean the same thing. But in the following example the reason for *jin* is simply stylistic:

(128) 桓公兼此數節而盡有之

Duke Huan of Qi combined all these skills and had the lot of them. Xun 7.8. Cf. Xun 16.67.

There can be no question here of an undifferentiated lot of objects.

And the objects in the following sentence are as itemized as they possibly can be:

(129) 今天下之士君子之書不可勝載言語不可盡計

Now the books of the knights and gentlemen of the empire cannot be completely recounted; their speeches cannot be exhaustively counted. Mo 26.43 (The reason why I do not line up *sheng* 勝 as a quantifier is that this sort of *sheng* is restricted to idioms like *bu ke sheng* 不可勝 *VERB*.)

It is important to realize, finally, that there is no sharp distinction in AC between the adverb *jin* ‘exhaustively, perfectly’ and the quantifier *jin* ‘the whole lot of the objects’. Consider:

(130) 盡信書則不如無書

A. It is better to have no books than to believe completely in them.

B. It is better to have no books than to believe in the whole lot of them. Meng 7B3.

The distinction between readings A and B is important if we want to know what exactly Mencius’ attitude was, and in this context I prefer the reading B. But the crucial point is that the contrast between A and B may be a case of vagueness rather than of ambiguity.

Nonetheless, the grammaticalized meaning of *jin* is not *simply* a

function of the lexical meaning of the word. The object quantifier *jin* and the subject quantifier *bi* 畢 can in fact be used synonymously as lexical verbs:

- (131) 聖王不能二十官之事
然而使二十官盡其巧畢其能。

The sage kings were unable to do the work of the twenty officials, but they ordered the twenty officials to use all their skills and their abilities. LSCQ 17.4.

Gong 共

One word that was clearly on its way towards becoming a quantifier is *gong*. As in the case of *ju* 俱 and *jie* 皆 one meaning of this word seems to have been ‘together’, and from this meaning the quantificational use of *gong* is clearly derived. I quote some examples where the ‘together’-connotation seems to be largely absent:

- (132) 湯與仲虺共非之

Tang and Zhong Hui all (both) disagreed with this. Mo 36.26.

With this last passage in mind, there seems to be no *need* to emend the following:

- (133) 故雖昔者三代暴王，桀紂幽厲之所以共擅其國家
傾覆其社稷者此也。

Thus the reason why even the cruel kings of the three dynasties of antiquity, Jie, Zhou, Yu and Li all lost their states and had their altars of the land and grain overturned is this. Mo 37.43.

However, the emended text with *shi* 失 for *gong* 共 certainly is a *lectio facilior*.

- (134) 夫天地者，古之所大也
而黃帝堯舜之所共美也。

Now Heaven and Earth are things that the ancients considered as great and they are things which the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun all regarded as beautiful. Zhuang 13.44.

(Note that the Yellow Emperor and Shun were not considered as contemporaries.)

There are also passages where *gong* 共 seems close to functioning as an object quantifier:

(135) 四海之內共利之之謂悅，共給之之謂安。

To profit everyone within the Four Seas, that is his pleasure. To give them all enough, that is his peace. Zhuang 12.74.

(Cf. Cheng Xuan-ying's commentary: 夫德人惠澤弘博，徧覃群品。‘The virtuous man's generosity is far-reaching and covers all the various creatures.’)

(136) 居處不理，飲食不節，勞過者病共殺之
 居下而好干上嗜慾無厭求索不止者刑共殺之
 少以敵衆，弱以侮強忿不量力者兵共殺之。

“Those whose residence is not taken care of, those who are immoderate in eating and drinking, those who in toil and idleness go to excess, will all of them be killed off by sickness. Those who, occupying an inferior position, like to oppose their superiors; those whose desires are insatiable; and those who seek incessantly will all of them be killed by the law. Those who with a few oppose the many, who with weakness insult the strong, who in anger do not take stock of their strength will all of them be killed in war.” HSWZ 1.4, tr. Hightower. (Clearly a more literal translation of the relevant phrase would be ‘...illness kills them all off...’ Jia Yu 1.28b is entirely parallel in the relevant respect. Kramers 1950: 229 translates: “...sickness will kill them all... punishment will kill them all... armed force will kill them all.” Cf. Wen Zi 1.23a, SBBY.

2.1.1. The Use of *liang* 兩 as an Object Quantifier

Syntactically, numbers seem to function quite differently from quantifiers in AC. An exception to this general rule is the number *liang* 兩 ‘two’.¹ When *liang* precedes the subject of a sentence, it tends to mean ‘the two’, i.e. the word refers to a contextually determinate pair of things.

(1) 兩君就壇

The two rulers proceeded to the altar. Gu Liang Ding 10.3. But cf. Shen 98.

When *liang* precedes the object, it tends to mean just ‘two’ without necessarily referring to a certain pair:

(2) 事兩君者不容

He who serves *two rulers* will not be accepted. Xun 1.22. Cf. Zuo Xiang 14, Zuo Xiang 30, Zuo Zhao 23.

But when you want to use *liang* to refer to ‘*the two objects*’, i.e. if you want to say ‘the subject verbed both the objects’, then the parallelism between *liang* and the other adverbial quantifiers comes out quite clearly:

(3) 二者安得無兩失也

... as for the two (i.e. rewards and punishments), how can you fail to make mistakes with both of them? HF 55 (368.8).

Clearly, *er* 二 and *liang* 兩 are not interchangeable in contexts like these. If you have doubts whether pre-verbal *liang* can refer to the object, look at the following:

1. Zhou 1959: 188–191 is the most detailed account of the uses of *liang* 兩, that I am aware of. He does notice that *er* 二 and *liang* 兩 are not freely interchangeable in pre-verbal position, but he simply doesn’t say what he wants to do about pre-verbal *liang*. Wang Li 1962: 54 also notices what he calls ‘adverbial *liang*’, and he does at least try a definition: ‘both engage in the same action or both suffer the same action’. Unfortunately, the definition does not work.

- (4) 吾欲兩用公仲，公叔其可乎？
 對曰：不可，晉用六卿而國分，簡公兩用田成闞止而簡公
 魏兩用犀首張儀而西河之外亡
 今王兩用之…

I want to use both Gong Zhong and Gong Shu. Would that be all right?
 Reply: No. Jin used six chief ministers and the state was divided. Duke
 Jian used both Tian Cheng and Piao Zhi, and was killed. Wei used both
 Xi Shou and Zhang Yi, and the area outside Xi. He was lost. Now if
 your majesty uses both these people . . . HF 22(129.1).

(Note incidentally that a number like *liu* 六 could clearly not be used as
 an object quantifier.)

- (5) 兩展其足

He stretched out both his legs. Zhuang 29.16.

The object quantifier *liang* is most common when the object is pro-
 nominalized by *zhi*:

- (6) 君兩失之

Your Majesty has made both mistakes (has failed on both accounts).
 Zuo Ai 16.4.

- (7) 是兩智之也

This is knowing both. Mo 43.56. Cf. Mo 41.20.

- (8) 故儒者使人兩得之者也
 墨者使人兩喪之者也。

Thus the Confucians are the sort who cause people to get both. The
 Mohists are the sort who cause people to lose both. Xun 19.13.

Like the object quantifier *jian* 兼, *liang* can have *er* 而 after it:

- (9) 姑嘗兩而進之

Let me just try and set out both points of view. Mo 16.23.

The object pronoun *zhi* 之 is often omitted:

- (10) 不如兩忘

It is best to forget both. Zhuang 18.13 and Zhuang 26.23.

- (11) 義與利者人之所兩有也

As for righteousness and profit, people have both these things. Xun
 27.65.

When there is no object, *liang* can very occasionally function as a preposed indefinite object: ‘two things’:

(12) 目不能兩視而明

An eye cannot look at two things (at once) and see clearly. Xun 1.22. Not: The eyes cannot look in both directions (forward and back)!

But most of the time there seems to be a definite pair of objects referred to by pre-verbal *liang*:

(13) 有甚憂兩陷而無所逃

If one has strong worries, then one is trapped into both worries and pleasure and has nowhere to escape to. Zhuang 26.4.

Guo Xiang’s commentary on this passage agrees with this interpretation: …而陷於憂樂.

It is not always easy to be definite on what one is to consider as ‘definite’:

(14) 是之謂兩行

This is called ‘acting out both alternatives’. Zhuang 2.40. Cf Graham 1969: 154.

What is involved here are *the* two alternatives in *any given* situation. An idiomatic translation would be ‘This is called having it both ways.’

When there is no object it is not always clear whether the verb which *liang* precedes is transitive:

(15) 行不兩全，名不兩立。

In conduct I do not fulfill both (the demands of loyalty and filial piety); as for reputation, I do not establish both (that for loyalty and that for filial piety). HSWZ 10.24. Cf. Lai 1973:438 and Hightower 1952:345. Can one be sure that *quan* 全 and *li* 立 are not intransitive verbs here?

(16) 聖也者盡倫者也，王也者盡制者也
兩盡者足以為天下極也。

The Sage is the sort of person who exhaustively knows the moral principles. The King is the sort of person who exhaustively knows the principles of political control. He who has an exhaustive command of both these things is qualified to become the supreme man in the empire. Xun 21.82.

I quote this passage so fully because it makes the peculiar function of the object quantifier *liang* so explicitly clear.

The cases of *liang* before objectless transitive verbs are often difficult to be sure about. But it is worth remembering that these cases are marginal. The decisive evidence which proves that pre-verbal *liang* regularly – though not always – functions as an object quantifier are sentences like these:

- (17) 一之於禮義則兩得之矣
 一之於情性則兩喪之矣

Therefore, if someone concentrates his efforts on propriety and righteousness, then he can achieve both (his natural and moral aims). If he concentrates on his emotions and his nature, then he will lose both. Xun 19.13.

There is no doubt that the phrases in (18) are roughly equivalent:

- (18) a 兩得之矣 } 'achieved both'
 b 得此兩者矣 }

This rough equivalence, however, has no parallel with standard object quantifiers like *zhuān* 專 or *xī* 悉. The standard object quantifiers *never* occur in object position. There is a lingering suspicion concerning pre-verbal *liang* that it is really to be explained in terms of some sort of inversion or extraposition, whereas there can be no such suspicion concerning the other object quantifiers.

2.2 The Subject Quantifiers *jie* 皆 and *ge* 各

We have seen that the object quantifier *jin* 盡 may quantify the subject *when the object is unquantifiable*. I now propose to demonstrate that the subject quantifier *jie* 皆 may quantify the object, but only *when the subject is unquantifiable*.

The commonest case of the phenomenon in question is that of pronominal subject:

(1) 汝皆說之乎

Do you enjoy all these things? Zhuang 2.16.

(2) 我皆無之

I have none of these things. Zuo Xiang 9.3.

(3) 彌與紇吾皆愛之

I love both Mi and Ge. Zuo Xiang 23.11. Cf. Zuo Zhuang 14, fu 1.

Obviously, proper-name-subjects will also be a case in point:

(4) 孫子皆殺之

Sun Zi killed them all. Zuo Xiang 14.4.

(5) 齊侯皆斂諸大夫之軒

The Duke of Qi collected the carriages of all the various grandees. Zuo Ding 13.1.

An object quantified by *jie* in this way clearly has to be a kind of 'topic' of the discourse that is 'in the air'.

(6) 皆取其邑而歸諸侯

(He took them all prisoner and) in all cases took their cities and returned them to the feudal lords. Zuo Xiang 27 fu 1.

The last examples have shown that the object quantified by *jie* does

not have to be pronominalized by *zhi* 之, although most of the time it is.¹ In the following example *jie* even quantifies an indirect object:

(7) 宣子皆獻馬馬

Xuan Zi gave horses to all of them. Zuo Zhao 16 fu 3.

Naturally enough, the unquantifiable subject may be implicit:

(8) 請皆逐之

May I banish all of them? Zuo Ding 13.7.

(9) 皆賞之

And he rewarded them all. Zuo Ding 3 fu 1.

(10) 皆召其徒

He summoned all his followers. Zuo Zhao 4.6.

Here is an example that may seem out of place at first sight:

(11) 昔者十日並出万物皆照

In ancient times ten suns rose simultaneously and they shone upon all the 10,000 things. Zhuang 2.63.

Here *jie* quantifies a preposed object in a way that *ge* apparently never does in AC. Or do we have to take the 10,000 things all to be shining?

Let me add here one of those counterexamples one just has to live with:

(12) 宋人皆醢之

The people of Song stewed them all. Zuo Zhuang 12.5.

Obviously, one would have expected an object quantifier for *jie* in this passage. The reason why this slip does not make the sentence incomprehensible is that it is so abundantly clear from the context what the quantifier has to refer to.

1. That *jie* can quantify even very complex objects emerges from a famous passage in Shi Ji:

項羽乃悉引兵渡河
皆沈船破釜甑

Then Xiang Yu led all his soldiers across the river and proceeded to submerge all the boats and destroy all the pots and pans. Shi Ji 7.

It is very hard, though, to find good examples of this in AC texts.

Examples (1) to (12) form a coherent set of counterevidence to Professor Dobson's suggestion that *jie* always quantifies the subject. (Cf. Dobson 1959:78 and 126). Suspicious readers might even begin to suspect that the difference between the subject quantifier *jie* and the object quantifier *jin* may in the end turn out to be of a statistical nature only: *jie* tends to quantify subjects, and *jin* has a somewhat weaker tendency to quantify objects.

I want to argue that the difference between *jie* and *jin* is by no means just a matter of tendencies. We have to do with some quite sharp grammatical contrasts.

To begin with, *jin* may quantify mass terms while *jie* cannot. Compare the following sentence and its hypothetical counterpart:

(13) 姦盡止

- a. All the wicked people stop their activities.
- b. All wickedness stops. HF46 (322.6).

(14) 姦皆止

All wicked people stop their activities.

Never: All wickedness stops.

As far as I know, *jie* regularly quantifies over individual items, hardly ever over amounts of a certain stuff. By contrast, we have seen that *jin* quite regularly comes to mean something like 'all of the stuff'.

But even when quantification over individual items is involved, there are clear-cut contrasts between *jin*, *jie* and *ge*. Consider the following patterns:

(A) 百姓盡殺其上

The people killed all their superiors.

(B) 百姓皆愛其上

The people all like their superiors. Xun 10.76.

(C) 民各愛其上

The people each like their own superiors.

Dobson and Shadick suggest that *jin* can simply refer either to the subject or to the object. On their view (A) would apparently also have a reading where it becomes synonymous with (B). (Cf. Dobson 1959:78 and Shadick 1968:756).

Again, if Shadick 1968:755 were right, (B) should have a reading

where it becomes synonymous with (A), for Shadick claims that *jie* can simply refer either to the subject or to the object.

Really, one feels that the distinction between the common patterns (A), (B) and (C) should be painfully obvious. But, surprisingly, it seems to be only dimly appreciated in current grammars of AC. Dobson 1959:78, for example, defines *ge* thus: "Of the agents each, both, all".

My contention is that *jie*, *jin*, and *ge* are never synonymous in the patterns (A), (B), and (C).

Compare the following two examples:

(15) 天下非有公是也而各是其所是

It isn't as if there was a commonly acknowledged concept of what is right in the world. Everybody considers *his own* concept of right as right. Zhuang 24.40.

(16) 人皆尊其知之所知 (而莫知...)

Everybody sets store by what his knowledge knows. Zhuang 25.52. The contrast here is with what is beyond human knowledge, not with what other people know.

Again, the following pair is instructive:

(17) 大夫各愛其家

The grandees each love *their own* families. Mo 14.11.

Mo Zi is clearly criticising the egotism and partiality of the attitude he describes. By contrast, Mo Zi is commending patriotism in the following passage:

(18) 天下之王公大人皆欲其國家之富也

Kings, Dukes and grandees of the world all want their states and families to be wealthy. Mo 10.1.

The contrast between *jie* and *ge* is neatly illustrated also by the following single example:

(19) 梁之邊亭與楚之邊亭皆種瓜各有其數

The border posts of Liang and of Chu were both growing gourds, and they each had their method. Xin Xu 4.13.

Of course each of the groups grow their own melons, and both of them have methods which they follow. But this is *not* the point of (19).

For a proper understanding of the following passage, our contrast makes all the difference:

(20) 孟子曰今人之性善將皆失其性故也

When Mencius says that the nature of contemporary men is good, that is presumably because they all have lost their (evil) nature. Xun 23.14.

It looks as if *jie* means something like ‘all the subject alike’ while *ge* means rather ‘each of the subjects separately, in its own way’. It is for this reason that we could not, apparently, have *jie* in sentences like the following:

(21) 各有異則

They each have their own different principles. Guan 58 (3.23–5). Cf. Guan 24(2.14–3).

(22) 万物各異理

Each of the 10,000 creatures have (their own) different principles. HF 20 (107.15). Cf. Zuo Ding 1.2.

(23) 耳目鼻口形能各有接而不相能也

Ears, eyes, nose, mouth and the bodily functions each have their own area of competence (literally: thing they come into contact with) and they cannot replace each other. Xun 17.11. Cf. GY 18.12567.

And if instead of a sentence like

(24) 物各從其類

The creatures each follow their different species. Xun 1.15
we had

(25) 物皆從其類

All creatures follow their species, the point would have been entirely different, and inappropriate to Xun Zi's argument. For we can paraphrase (24) as ‘The creatures differ in that they each follow their own species’, while we have to paraphrase (25) on the lines of ‘Creatures have this in common that they all follow their species.’

Such contrasting paraphrases work even when there is no *qi* 其 in the object:

(26) 民各有心

People differ in that they each have their different ways of thinking. GY 8.6627. Cf. GY 7.5509.

The old commentary is gratifyingly explicit on our grammatical point: 各有心：所愛不同也。

(27) 人皆有不忍人之心

Men have this in common that they all have commiserating minds. Meng 2A6.

It is against this background that we can interpret the following passage properly:

(28) 亂主不知物之各有所長所短也

The ruler bound for chaos does not realize that things differ as to their strengths and weaknesses. Guan 64 (3.36–2).

Of course, the translation overemphasizes the nuance expressed by *ge*, but it captures the crucial point of the argument in the Guan Zi text.

The decisive point is that the pronoun introducing the object in the pattern (C) must refer back to the subject while no such rule holds for patterns (A) and (B). The use of *ge* in exhortations and emphatic orders that is already old-fashioned by AC-times is in accordance with our general rule:

(29) 桓公曰，各保治爾所
無或淫怠而不聽治者

Duke Huan said: May each and every one of you go and keep your places in order! And may not a single one of you be lazy and not attend to your administrative duties! GY 6.4845.

This use of *ge* is very common in Shi Jing, Shu Jing and still current in the Analects. (Of course, the pronoun in the object has to be *er* 爾 never *ru* 汝). I quote the continuation of the *ge*-clause in (29) because I find the opposition *ge* 各/*wu huo* 無或 very revealing. (It seems clear that the origin of the imperative *mo* 莫 ‘don’t’ is in this collective imperative *wu huo* 無或).

Note that *ge* would be quite inappropriate in the AC-version of “May ye all push your cart out of the bog!” *Ge* is inappropriate when a communal effort is involved.

The reader will have noticed that in all the examples of *ge* that I have quoted so far, *ge* precedes essentially transitive verbs. The fact is that *ge* is extremely rare before intransitive verbs, and impossible in sentences like this:

(30) ?? 其子各死

?? Each of her children died.

On the other hand, there is nothing at all wrong with sentences like

(31) 各死其鄉

They each die in their home districts. Guan 38(2.71–8).

(32) 各死其君

They each die for their own ruler.

But even if a verb is transitive and is followed by an object, *ge* is often unacceptable not for semantic but for grammatical reasons. For example, I have not found a single sentence like

(33) ?? 各愛齊桓公

?? Each of them in their different ways love Duke Huan of Qi.

My impression is that *ge* is appropriate only when the object either is or could be preceded by *qi* 其. This explains why in the vast majority of cases *ge* occurs in the pattern (C): ...各...其

Let me now turn to some further contrasts between *ge* and *jie*.

1. In view of examples (1) to (8) of this section it is important to stress that *ge* can never occur in sentences like

(34) ?? 汝各說之乎

?? Do you enjoy each of these things?

or

(35) ?? 吾各愛之

?? I love each of these people (in a different way).

(36) ?? 孫子各殺之

?? Sun Zi killed each of these people (by a special method).

I dwell on these impossible sentences because they raise an interesting question: How *do* you express the meanings indicated in my 'impossible' translations in smooth and straightforward AC? Perhaps we have here a kind of structural semantic gap in AC. But consider the following unique example:

(37) 五教各習...

If these five instructions are each practised on (in their different ways) ... Guan 17 (1.80–7).

Or is it *jian* 兼 that means ‘all the objects separately’? In the section on object quantifiers I have argued that it is.

2. Obviously, *ge* would be unthinkable in sentences with nominal predicates, especially in sentences like:

(38) 敗韓魏殺犀武攻趙取蘭離石祁者皆白起也。

The person who defeated Han and Wei, the person who killed Xi Wu, the person who attacked Zhao and conquered Lan, Li-shi and Qi, all were (identical with) Bai Qi. ZGC 13 (SBCK 1.11a).

Note that the ‘adverb’(?) *jie* precedes a noun in these notorious and not uncommon sentences.

3. *Ge* has some very special idiomatic uses connected with number phrases:

(39) 季氏擇二，二子各一。

The Ji chose two (of the four parts). The two barons one each. Zuo Zhao 5.1.

But these are marginal. For example (39) seems simply to be short for 二子各擇其一 Similarly for

(40) 取水左右各一人

He chooses from the left and right bank, one man each. Guan 57 (3.17–12).

Cikoski 1976:78 seems to be quite wrong in his literal paraphrase of this passage: “... in each case he causes-to-be-one the person.” In view of sentences like (39) we have to admit that *ge* has some idiomatic elliptic uses in front of number phrases. And it is most implausible to construe *ren* 人 as the object of *yi* — in a common phrase like *yi ren* 一人.

Cikoski is apparently determined to treat *ge* as pre-verbal throughout. It would be interesting to know how he proposes to take

(41) 又封二子者各万家之縣一則吾所得者少

If I go on to enfeoff the two barons with a district of 10,000 families each, then there will be little left for me. HF 10 (49.11).

In any case, we can note that (39) to (41) become ungrammatical when *ge* is replaced by *jie*.

4. *Jie* can not only quantify subjects but also ‘topicalize’ time-expressions:

(42) 是以春秋冬夏皆有麻枲絲繭之功

Therefore in spring, autumn, winter, and summer, at all these times there was work to do on hemp and silk. LSCQ 26.3.

I think in sentences like these, *ge* would again be impossible.

5. *Jie* can also come to quantify what look like subordinate sentences:

(43) 先王喜怒皆得其齊焉

The former kings achieved the proper balance both when they were glad and when they were angry. Xun 20.13.

This kind of *jie* reminds one strongly of the modern Chinese *dou* 都. I have not found *ge* in this sort of construction.

6. Another idiomatic phrase where *jie* reminds one of modern *dou* 都 comes in the Analects:

(44) 自古皆有死

From antiquity there has always been death. LY 12.7.

7. There is an emphatic way of universally quantifying sentences where apparently *jie* cannot be replaced by any other subject quantifier:

(45) 今天下無大小國皆天之邑也

Now in the world every state, no matter whether large or small, is a City of Heaven. Mo 4.3.

In this sort of construction, *jie* will always refer to the subject:

(46) 自古及今無有遠靈孤夷之國皆芻豢其牛羊犬豕

From antiquity to the present, no matter how distant or isolated or barbarian states were, they all fed their oxen, sheep, dogs and pigs ... Mo 28.20.

Not: ‘They fed all their oxen etc.’. (The meaning of *ling* 靈 here is obscure to me. But this does not affect our grammatical point.)

8. Sometimes, *jie* does not strictly quantify the subject:

(47) 其所循皆小人道也

What they followed was in all cases the way of the petty man. Mo 39.21.

This example is especially interesting because it draws attention to the fact that *jie* 皆 is grammatically extremely awkward after *suo* 所. What the author of (47) was trying to say was ‘what they all followed was the way of the petty man’, but apparently he felt he could neither say *qi jie suo xun* 其皆所循, nor *qi suo jie xun* 其所皆循.

Jie 皆-raising

Finally, I should like to discuss a phenomenon that I call *jie*-raising in analogy with *neg*-raising, because like *neg*-raising it seems to be common with verbs like *ling* 令 and *shi* 使:

(48) 魏文侯燕飲，皆令諸大夫論己。

Lord Wen of Wei held a drinking party and ordered all the various grandees to discuss themselves. LSCQ 24.3. Cf. Mo 52.29.

(49) 皆使人載其事而各得其宜

They made all men fulfill their tasks and they made each of them find his own proper place. Xun 4.73.

The phenomenon is curiously common in Xun Zi. There are further examples in Xun 18.57, 18.82, 19.116, and 12.49.

(50) 胡亥下皆視群臣履狀善者

Hu Hai stepped down and saw that the various ministers had arranged their footwear neatly. Xin Xu 5.23.

Note that Hu Hai does not, at this point, see the various ministers. It does not therefore seem plausible to take *jie* as an object quantifier.

One would not have thought that *ge* can be raised out of an embedded clause in this way, but look at this:

(51) 立五正各使聽一屬焉

He established five officials and ordered them to administer one district (*shu*) each. GY 6.4838.

It will be clear, by now, why the writer could not have used *jie*.

2.3 Existential Quantification in AC

Compare the following English sentences:

- (A) *Someone* very close to me got married yesterday.
 (B) *Someone* very close to me must have leaked the secret yesterday.

I propose to say that we have *definite* existential quantification in sentences like (A) and *indefinite* existential quantification in sentences like (B). In English, we use a word like ‘some’ for two quite distinct purposes: 1. in order to refer to a *certain* object or set of objects the precise identity of which does not matter in the context; and 2. in order to claim that a certain set is non-empty.

Now when we turn to AC we find a verb *you* 有 ‘to have, contain’ and sometimes apparently translatable by ‘there is’, ‘there exists’, and a related grammaticalized particle *huo* 或 ‘some’ which works like an adverbial subject-quantifier. Correspondingly we have a verb *wu* 無 ‘to lack’ and sometimes translatable by ‘there aren’t any’ with a related grammaticalized particle *mo* 莫 ‘none’ which again works like a subject quantifier.

In this note I want to discuss these four AC-words with special reference to the distinction between definite and indefinite existential quantification.

Consider the following patterns:

- (A) 古之人有行之者

Of the men of antiquity a certain person (certain persons) practised this.

- (B) 古之人或行之

Of the men of antiquity some practised this (i.e. the set of ancient practitioners of this is non-empty).

The difference between (A) and (B) is clear enough, but so far as I know it has never been noticed in the literature. The reason for this may be that in practise it is not always easy to distinguish clearly between definite and indefinite existential quantification. Suppose I say “Someone came to my office to visit me but I sent him away before he

could even open his mouth.” Do we have definite or indefinite quantification in the word ‘*someone*’? The tricky question is: how much do I have to know about a person for him to qualify as ‘a certain person’. But the fact that there is no clear answer to this sort of question does not mean the distinction between definite and indefinite existential quantification is void, it just means the distinction is vague round the edges. And such vague distinctions do play their important part in grammar.

Indefinite quantification with *huo* 或 and *you* 有

Let me begin by exemplifying three common patterns of indefinite existential quantification:

(1) 是以臣或弑其君，下或殺其上。

Therefore some ministers will kill their rulers and some subordinates will kill their superiors. Xun 10.42.

(2) 子有殺父，臣有殺君。

Of sons there are those who kill their fathers. Of ministers there are those who kill their rulers. Zhuang 23.14.

(3) 臣弑其君者有之，子弑其父者有之

That sons should kill fathers was something that happened. That ministers killed their rulers was something that happened. Meng 3B9.

As a rule, it looks as if *huo* always expresses indefinite quantification:

(4) 物或惡之

Some creatures hate such action. Lao 24.

(5) 而物或間之邪

Is there anything that intervenes? Zhuang 23.20.

(6) 今人或入其決潰竊其豬彘…

If, for example, there is anyone who gets into a house through the gutter and steals a pig ... Xun 18.96.

(7) 上所不為而民或為之

If any commoner does what his superiors do not do . . . Zuo Xiang 2.

(8) 其鄉人或知之

A compatriot of his (it doesn't matter who it was) got to know about the matter. Zuo Zhao 12.8.

(9) 鼓人或請降

Some people from Gu asked to surrender. Zuo Zhao 15.5.

If we had read *Gu ren you qing xiang zhe* 鼓人有請降者 we would translate 'there was a certain person (or group) who begged to surrender', and we would expect to hear more about this group. Compare the closely parallel GY 10927.

The following is a typical use of *huo*:

(10) 諸侯或相侵也則討之

If any of the feudal lords invade each other, you must punish them. Zuo Xiang 26 fu 9.

Clearly, it does not matter *which* of the feudal lords invade each other. Similarly in the following:

(11) 一農不耕民或為之饑
一女不織民或為之寒。

As soon as one peasant does not till the land, some of the people will go hungry on account of that. As soon as one woman does not weave, some of the people will be cold on account of that. Guan 80 (3.98–1).

Now fortunately we do have a logical definition of *huo*:

(12) 或也者不盡也

'*Huo*' means not exhaustively, not all. Mo 45.3.

And this definition does suggest clearly that *huo* involves indefinite quantification. (That the definition seems logically inadequate because it does not exclude the case of 'none' does not have to concern us here.)

When the set under discussion consists of exactly two objects *huo* . . . *huo* naturally comes to mean 'one of the two . . . the other of the two':

(13) 此兩者或利或害

Of these two one is profitable, the other is harmful. Lao 73. Cf. GY 18. 12567.

But in general the pattern *huo* . . . *huo* does not mean 'some . . . the others':

(14) 故物或損之而益
或益之而損

Thus some things are such that if you take away from them they become more, others are such that if you add to them they become less. Lao 42. Cf. LSCQ 15.8 and 16.5.

Lao Zi does not here exclude the possibility that there is a third set of those things that behave as we should, in general, expect.

Very occasionally a pair of *you ... zhe* 有...者 constructions can work almost like *huo ... huo* 或...或

(15) 人主有誘於事者，有壅於言者。

Some rulers are beguiled by business, others are blocked up by words. HF 18 (86.1).

Here, as with *huo ... huo*, there is no suggestion that *all* rulers must fall into either one or the other of these categories. There is no suggestion of *tertium non datur*. (The latter idea has to be expressed by the pattern *fei ... ze* 非...則 as I have illustrated in the section on pre-verbal *fei*.)

Similar considerations apply to the following much older passage:

(16) 星有好風，星有好雨。

Some stars are fond of wind, others are fond of rain. Shu 24.975.

Obviously, most stars are indifferent to both.

Indeed, there are a few instances where AC writers have *you* for *huo* in indefinite quantification:

(17) 故臣有叛主

Then among ministers there will be those who rebel against their rulers. HF 27 (154.1)

(18) 物有結之

Among things there are those that tie him up. Zhuang 6.53.

There is also another example in Shu Jing:

(19) 民有不若德

Some people fail to act according to virtue ... Shu 18.52.

The crucial thing is that in these sentences the writers do not purport to know *who* the rebelling ministers are, *which* things tie him up, *which* people fail to act according to virtue. The writers may in fact happen to

know the answers to these questions, but in these sentences they do not let the reader understand that they do. They do not focus on the fact that they know, if they know. And the typical cases are those like

(20) 馬或有角

Some horses grow horns. LSCQ 6.5.

Definite existential quantification with *you ... zhe* 有…者

Now the common pattern SUBJECT *you* 有…*zhe* 者 is apparently regularly associated with definite existential quantification of the type ‘there was a certain’:

(21) 群臣有紫衣進者

Among the various ministers there was a certain person who came forward wearing a red robe. HF 32 (211.2).

(22) 人有設桓公隱者

There was a certain man who set a riddle for Duke Huan of Qi. HF (283.16).

For grammatical reasons we cannot translate ‘some of the various ministers came forward wearing a red robe’.

(23) 軍人有病疽者

A certain soldier had piles. HF 32 (206.4).

It would be ungrammatical to translate ‘some soldier or other had piles’, and in the context of Han Fei’s story it is abundantly clear that it was a *certain* soldier whose father had had poisonous piles and who now suffered from the same disease.

(24) 古之人有行之者

There was a certain person who practised this in antiquity. Meng 1B10. If you have any doubt that Mencius is having a certain individual in mind, look at the continuation of the passage:

(25) 武王是也

And that person was King Wu. *Ibidem*.

But, of course, King Wu could be taken to prove an indefinite existential claim.

(26) 宋人有酤酒者

There was a certain wine-merchant in Song. HF 34(241.16).

This could never mean ‘there are wine-merchants in Song’ in the sense of ‘the set of wine-merchants in Song is not empty’.

There are plenty of examples supporting my generalization on the pattern *you* 有... *zhe* 者 in the indexed literature, especially in Han Fei Zi. But instead of indulging in a presentation of these I shall now turn to the consideration of a few of the tricky cases I found:

(27) 故言有辯而非務者
行有難而非善者

Thus there are *certain* ways of talking that are rhetorically skillful but not to the point. There are *certain* actions that are hard to perform but by no means good. Guan 16 (1.75–16).

My generalization commits me to the view that this sentence does not express a despondent observation to the effect that ‘some ways of talking (and there is unfortunately no way of knowing which!) may be skilful but are not to the point . . .’ And the context makes it perfectly clear that Guan Zi had nothing of that sort in mind. He was indeed thinking of certain specifiable ways of talking. He goes on to explain which. Thus the apparent counterexample (27) turns out to be no counterexample at all.

But if this explanation of (27) is correct, what are we to make of the closely parallel following passage?

(28) 言有召禍也
行有召辱也。

Some words bring on disaster, some actions bring on disgrace. Xun 1.17.

Here I can only lamely suggest that *ye* 也 in this context seems to have the same effect as *zhe* 者, and that the reason why we have *ye* 也 instead of the more common *zhe* 者 may well be that the above passage is the *final summary* of an argument which it would be unnatural to finish with a particle like *zhe* 者 which normally raises an expectation of more to come.

Now in Xun Zi we find the following clause:

(29) 物有同狀而異所者

On my present analysis this sentence cannot have an interpretation on

the lines of ‘the set of things of similar shape but in different places is non-empty’. It should be impossible to translate ‘Some things have similar shapes but are in different places.’ Let us look at the Xun Zi passage in full:

(30) 物有同狀而異所者
有異狀而同所者，可別也。

Things that have a common shape but are in different places, and things that have different shapes but are in the same place, can be distinguished. Xun 22.27.

Here we can either say that *zhi* 之 is understood after *wu* 物 so that we would have two ‘relative clauses’ dependent on *wu* 物, or we can take the clauses after *wu* 物 to be conditional ‘as for things, if they ...’. Either of these interpretations is easily consistent with my generalization. (29) does not begin to be counterevidence to my claim.

Another slightly marginal case will help to make my point more precise:

(31) 齊人有欲亂者

A man from Qi wanted to start a rebellion. HF 30(177.14).

My point is not that Han Fei must have known the name of this rebel when he told the story or even that he would be able to specify in more detail who the rebel was. But he must have referred to a *certain* man, not to the existence of people with rebellious intentions in Qi. In more technical terms: Han Fei was, by asserting (31), not just claiming that the set of people harbouring rebellious intentions in Qi was non-empty. By contrast, the question in (5) 而物或聞之邪 was *precisely* whether the set of intervening things was empty or non-empty. Again (4) 物或惡之 claims *exactly* that the set of haters of such actions is non-empty, and (7) 民或為之 claims *exactly* that the set of people who do this is non-empty, etc. etc.

Finally, there are cases like

(32) 北冥有魚

In the Northern Sea there is a certain fish. Zhuang 1.1.
which seems syntactically close to

(33) 上古有大椿者

In high antiquity there was the Great Chun tree. Zhuang 1.12.
One might take this to be evidence that *zhe* 者 after *you* does not

regularly have to do with definite existential quantification. One might suspect that the use of *zhe* in these contexts depends on the complexity of its scope. But the semantics of these sentences like (32) and (33) is quite radically different from that of the patterns of quantification discussed above. For (32) does not quantify over Northern Seas, it does *not* say that there is a certain (kind of) fish that belongs to the set of Northern Seas. Similarly, (33) does not quantify over high antiquities.

One feels quite certain that (32) could mean ‘the Northern Sea is not empty of fish’ from a grammatical point of view, while I have a distinct suspicion that a sentence like *Bei Ming you yu zhe* 北冥有魚者 would come to mean something like ‘those who own fish in the Northern Sea’, or ‘as for the fact that there are fish in the Northern Sea’ or ‘as for the expression “*bei Ming you yu*”’. It would be strange if it turned out to be synonymous with (32). But these are speculations.

The quantifier *mo* 莫

Consider some ancient uses of the combination *miwo g'wek* 無或:

(34) 非汝封刑人殺人，無或刑人殺人。

If not you, Feng, punish people and execute them, there will not be anyone who punishes and executes people. Shu 29.397. Cf. Shu 29.411.

(35) 民無或胥譁張為幻

Of the people there were none who cheated each other or made pretenses. Shu 35.248 (Cf. Qu 1970:140).

Compare also:

(36) 自時厥後亦罔或克壽

From that time onwards there was no one who managed to live to an old age. Shu 35.436. Cf. Shu 48.91 and Shu 47.428.

Miwo g'wek 無或 ‘there are not any who’ can easily come to mean ‘let there be no one who!’:

(37) 無或敢伏小人之箴

Let there be no one who dares to hide away the representations of the people. Shu 16.133.

(38) 無或失職

Let no one be remiss in his duty. Zuo Zhao 19 fu 5.

Sometimes we have the graphs 毋或:

- (39) 先王之法曰，臣毋或作威
毋或作利從王之指，毋或作惡。

The law of the former kings says: 'No ministers shall be a source of authority, none shall be a source of profit. They must follow the king's instructions. Let none of them do evil. HF 6 (24.10).

- (40) 止聲色毋或進

(The gentleman must) abstain from music and sex (at this time) and let none of these come into his presence. Li Ji I.364. Cf. also Zuo Xiang 23.11 (end). I have counted no less than seven instances of this kind of *miwo g'wek* in the Yue Ling section of Li Ji alone.

I do not pretend to understand very well the rules by which etymological guesses become respectable, but the close grammatical parallelism between the old *miwo-g'wek* and the AC *mak* is strongly suggestive: I find it plausible to consider *mo* as a fusion of *wu* 無/毋 and *huo* 或. Moreover it seems to me, that the homonymity of *wu* 無 and the imperative *wu* 毋 provide a perfect explanation for the otherwise most confusing fact that *mo* 莫 later comes to be used as an imperative negative. (If, with Cikoski 1976:68, one slips in a /u/ here and there in the reconstructions of the words involved, even the phonology of the fusion looks neat. Cf. also Shadick 1968:789.)

In the extended literature on fusion words in AC it is often quite wrongly assumed that fusion is not much more than an abbreviated writing convention. The fusion word is often conceived as just 'short for' its extended version. But in fact the phenomenon of fusion belongs to the realm of etymology, and upon close investigation it turns out that fusion words may often come to assume functions which the combinations they derive from could not possibly have. For example, we found in the section on restrictive quantifiers that one does get the fusion word *er* 耳 (= *er* 而 + *yi* 已) immediately after the formula *er yi* 而已 itself. Surely, you could never have a sequence of two *er yi*'s at the end of any AC-sentence! Fusion words are autonomous *new* words, they do not 'stand for' but *derive from* the elements they fuse.

Nonetheless, in this instance I feel that the probable etymology of *mo* provides a neat explanation for the close syntactic similarity between *huo* and *mo* on the one hand, and of the semantic relation between *wu* 無/毋 and *mo* on the other.

Let me turn to the parallelism with *huo* first. Anyone who learns to translate into AC will know that if you want to talk about ‘some objects’ in that language you have to use *you suo* 有所, never *huo*. *Huo* cannot quantify an object even when that object is extraposed into subject position. Now it turns out that exactly the same restriction holds for *mo*.

Let me begin with a sentence where both *mo* and *huo* occur:

- (41) 天或維之，地或載之
天莫之維則墜矣，地莫之載則沈矣。

There is something that spans out Heaven, there is something that holds up Earth. If nothing spanned out Heaven it would collapse. If nothing held up Earth it would sink down. Guan 38 (2.71–1).

It is clear from (41) that the quantifier *huo* does not always quantify the noun phrase that immediately precedes it, although – of course – it standardly does. It should be clear too from (41) that the parallelism between *huo* and *mo* 莫 is not absolute: like other negatives *mo* triggers the inversion of the pronominalized object *zhi* 之.

An exposed object cannot be quantified by *huo*:

- (42) 言必或傳之

Someone must have transmitted the words. Zhuang 4.45.

Not: ‘One must transmit some words.’

- (43) 且其所循人必或作之

Moreover, as to that with respect to which one follows others, someone must have originated that. Mo 39.21.

The general rule seems to be that *huo* – like *mo* – has to refer to the subject even when there is an exposed, topicalized object. But this raises certain logical problems: what if you want to talk about ‘some objects’ in AC? How, for example, do you say ‘he killed some prisoners’? Well, it appears that the authors of Mo Zi felt obliged in this instance quite simply to break the grammatical rule:

- (44) 或殺人其國家禁之

If one kills *some people*, the state and clan forbid this. Mo 28.67.

Fortunately for the authors of Mo Zi they were not forced to break any grammatical rule in order to talk of ‘many objects’:

- (45) 有能多殺其鄰國之人，因以為文義。

If someone is able to kill a large number of people belonging to a neighbouring state, one considers him cultured and righteous on this account. Mo 28.68.

Or are we not to construe *huo* in (44) as parallel with *duo* 多 in (45)? It is hard to be absolutely sure.

Consider now a plain sentence like this:

(46) 人莫得而制也

None one can manage to control them. Xun 11.74.

It would be definitely *ungrammatical* to construe *ren* 人 as an exposed object here and translate on the lines of 'he (understood subject) was unable to control anyone (extraposed object quantified by *mo* 莫)!

Similar considerations apply to

(47) 群臣莫逮

None of the various ministers are a match for him. Xun 32.4.

Not: 'He was not up to any of his various ministers'.

Some people might object that the readings for (46) and (47) which I exclude as ungrammatical are logical contortions that nobody in his right mind would begin to conceive of as plausible interpretations of sentences like (46) or (47) in the first place. The logical point of my analysis would remain unaffected by this sort of objection, even if it were true. But the objection is not only logically irrelevant, it appears also to be factually incorrect: e.g. Shi Ji does not follow our rule.

(48) 富人莫肯與者，貧者平亦恥之。

Ping would not associate with any rich girl, and he was ashamed of poor girls, too. Shi Ji 56.2.

In this connection it is interesting to note a grammatical distinction between the combination *mo bu* 莫不 which always refers to the 'proper' subject and the combination *wu bu* 無不 which can refer to the object, i.e. be equivalent to *wu suo bu* 無所不. A detailed investigation of *mo* 莫 in the indexed literature shows that you could never have *mo* 莫 for *wu* 無 in sentences like the following:

(49) 天無不覆
地無不載。

Heaven covers everything, Earth supports everything. Zhuang 5.26.

(50) 其為物無不將也無不迎也

Its nature is to see everything off, to welcome everything. Zhuang 6.42.

(51) 無不愛也，無不敬也。

He loves everyone and pays everyone his due respect. Xun 6.31.

Even a *mo bu* 莫不 in the following tempting context is taken to refer to the proper subject:

(52) 凡此五者將莫不聞之

All generals have heard of these five points. Sun 1.11. Cf. Giles 1910:3, Griffith 1963:1965; Guo 1962:10; Sun Zi 1977:4 who all agree with my interpretation. One further example of this must suffice:

(53) 人莫不貴

Everyone holds him in high esteem. Xun 2.22.

Not: 'People hold all such men in high esteem.'

2.4 Relative Quantifiers and the Comparative Degree

In most languages that I know of there are either different forms of words (e.g. dry/drier/driest) or specialized words (e.g. more, most) that are associated with the comparative constructions in those languages and mark them out as a unique set of constructions that cannot be explained by the principles operative elsewhere in the grammar. The constructions are so special that they are naturally singled out for special attention and for a special technical term: ‘the comparative constructions’.

I pick out the case of Malay because I happen to be familiar with that language. Here we have sentences like

- (A) *Ahmad besar*
AHMAD TALL
Ahmad is tall
- (B) *Jusuf kecil*
JUSUF SMALL
Jusuf is small
- (C) *Ahmad lebeh besar daripada Jusuf*
AHMAD MORE TALL FROM JUSUF
Ahmad is taller than Jusuf
- (D) *Tetapi Hamid yang besar sa-kali*
BUT HAMID HE-WHO TALL ONCE
But Hamid is the tallest

The word *lebeh* is always associated with comparative constructions and *daripada* is used in a perfectly unique sense in (C). Again (D) *yang ... sa-kali* is a construction that is not explicable in terms of the meanings and functions of the words *sa-kali* and *yang* elsewhere in Malay grammar.

I have not the slightest hesitation about applying the term ‘comparative construction’ to Malay, because even if one did not use the term one would still have to introduce coextensive terms to cover precisely the same unique constructions so conveniently labeled as ‘comparative’. On the other hand the so-called ‘comparative constructions’ in AC are not unique at all but continuous with the rest of the grammar to such an

extent that they seem explicable in terms of the more widely applicable principles of syntax and semantics.

The point seems obvious once you come to think of it, and I do believe some sinologists have been thinking along roughly these lines. But the matter seems to me to be of sufficient theoretical importance to deserve elaboration and proper justification.

Consider for a moment the language of children. Before children understand grammatical comparatives they can perfectly well answer questions like

(E) Take A and B, which is (the) large (one)?

Similarly, small children will express the view that there are more pellets in box A than in box B by saying something like

(F) There are many in A and few in B.

long before they say that there are '*more in A than B*'.

I suppose one used to be inclined to say in a discriminating way that these children have not learnt their comparatives yet and have to make fumbling efforts to get by without them. But surely a more enlightened linguist will simply comment that the comparative construction does not play any part in the grammatical system that these children employ. The fact that the children have not mastered the comparative construction does *not* mean at all that they are unable to compare things.

Turning now to AC grammar my point is that the notion 'comparative construction' is systematically redundant in the grammatical system of AC. But this does not commit me to the obviously mistaken view that the ancient Chinese could not compare things e.g. for size and quantity:

(1) 一少於二

One is few in relation to two. Mo 41.14.

The point is that the preposition *yu* 於 is here taken in a perfectly standard sense that has no particular connection with a special 'comparative construction'. Strictly speaking, *er* 二 is here simply an indirect object. And the proof of this contention is the observation that this object can be 'pronominalized' by *suo* 所:

(2) 厚有所大也

'Thickness' is 'having something in relation to which one is thick.' Mo 40.2.

Graham 1971:91 innocuously reads a comparative into this: “‘Dimensioned’ is having something than which it is bigger.’ Graham’s translation is essentially correct, but it does not *show how the Chinese works*. It fails to *explain* how the Chinese construction comes to be translatable by a comparative.

It might look at first sight as if ‘being thick’ was something like ‘being two-legged’, i.e. just a property a thing has or fails to have. But the Mohists knew that being ‘thick’, ‘many’ or ‘large’ etc. is essentially not a property but a relation between a thing and a ‘standard’ of thickness, maniness, largeness. Thus the *basic* meaning of a word like *duo* 多 is ‘be many or much (by comparison with something)’. And verbal *duo* becomes translatable by ‘be many’ only when the standard of comparison is not made explicit, i.e. when the ‘object’ of *duo* is left out, i.e. when the bracketed optional semantic element is not realized in the ‘surface structure’ of the sentence.

Questions like the following illustrate again the arbitrariness of talking about a comparative in connection with AC:

(3) 身與貨孰多

As for your person and your goods, which is (the thing that is) worth much? Lao 41.

An English translator will be tempted to think of *duo* as having a ‘comparative’ meaning in this sort of construction: “Your person or your goods, which is worth more?” Lau 1965:105. A Danish translator might at first sight even be tempted to think of a ‘superlative’ meaning for *duo* since he is constrained by his Danish grammar to say something like ‘which is the most valuable?’ (*hvilket er det mest værdifulde?*) It seems to me that the conventions of e.g. English and Danish grammar should not get in our way when we analyse the Chinese. An Englishman has no excuse for ascribing a derivative ‘comparative’ meaning to *duo* in sentences like (3), and a Dane has no right to credit the Chinese with a superlative.

Nevertheless it is crucial to understand that (3) can never mean anything like ‘as for your person and your goods, which are worth a lot’, where a conceivable – and reasonable – answer would be: ‘Both!’. Consider in this connection:

(4) 東西南北其修孰多

Of the distances between east and west and between south and north,

which is (the) long (one). CC 154 Hawkes 1959:49 mistranslates: “What are the distances from south to north?”

Duo 多 ‘there are many’

After an indication of a place *duo* works syntactically like *you* 有 and means ‘there are many’. In this context the non-relative quantifiers cannot occur:

(5) 魯多儒士少為先生方者

In Lu there are many Confucian knights but few of your calibre. Zhuang 21.39. Cf. Zuo Xiang 29.8.

(6) 醫門多疾

At the door of the medicine-man there are many sick people. Zhuang 4.3. Cf. Zuo Xiang 30. fu 2.

Occasionally, *duo* can even take on a possessive meaning ‘have many’, and this is clearly in analogy with *you* 有. In the following passage *duo* ‘have many’ contrasts with *wu* 無 ‘have none’:

(7) 有寵於蘧子者八人，皆無祿而多馬。

Wei Zi had eight favourites. They were all without official emoluments but had a lot of horses. Zuo Xiang 22.6.

(8) 國險而多馬，齊楚多難。

The state is inaccessible and it has many horses; and Qi and Chu face many difficulties. Zuo Zhao 4 fu 1.

The indication of a place before ‘existential’ *duo* cannot, however, be omitted: if you just want to say ‘there are many X’ you are grammatically forced – in this construction – to make the place explicit and say ‘in the world there are many X’:

(9) 天下多美婦人

There are many beautiful women in the world. Zuo Cheng 2 fu 1.

It is significant that you never find *ye* 也 after these existential sentences with *duo*. It is therefore most implausible to interpret (9) on the lines of ‘in the world many people are beautiful women’, i.e. to take *duo* as a subject and *mei furen* 美婦人 as a complex nominal predicate. Even taking *tianxia* 天下 as ‘mankind’ and translating ‘of the humans

in the world many are beautiful women' wouldn't help. We would quite definitely expect the occasional final *也* if this was the correct analysis. In point of fact *duo* apparently never precedes nominal predicates in sentences like 'Many Cretans are liars'.

Zhong and *duo* are often interchangeable in this 'existential' construction:

(10) 市南門之外甚衆牛車...市門之外何多牛屎

Outside the southern city gate there are a great many buffaloes and carts ... Why is there so much cow dung outside the southern city gate? HF 30 (175.12ff).

But it looks as if *zhong* has a more 'itemized' meaning than *duo*: *zhong* always refers to many things, *duo* often to much of a certain stuff.

Occasionally we also find this sort of *duo* after indications of time:

(11) 春多雨則夏必旱

If in spring there is a lot of rain, then in summer there is bound to be a draught. LSCQ 2.3.

***Duo* 多 as a subject quantifier**

Consider now the following pair of sentences:

(12) 故越王好勇而民多輕死
楚靈王好細腰而國中多餓人。

Thus the King of Yue loved courage, and of the people there were many who weren't afraid to die. The King Ling of Chu loved slender waists and in the state there were many hungry people. HF 7 (28.14).

The parallelism between the two constructions with *duo* is spurious. A comparison with *you* brings this out nicely. We tend to have sentences like

(13) 國中有餓人

There were some hungry people in the state.
rather than 國中或餓人. And we expect

(14) 民或輕死

Some people are not afraid to die.

rather than 民有輕死. The contrast *you* 有 / *huo* 或 marks a grammatical distinction which remains unmarked in the case of *duo*. And it is instructive to note in this connection that the grammatical contrast between *you* 有 and *huo* 或 is not always strictly observed. Occasionally we get *huo* where we would expect *you* and vice versa. The two grammatical uses are distinct, but they are closely related.

Even in adverbial position, *duo* may be modified by *shen* 甚:

(15) 牛馬甚多入人田中

When a great many buffaloes and horses entered people's fields . . . HF 30 (176.13).

Sometimes adverbial *duo* has something openly 'comparative' about it:

(16) 富歲子弟多賴，凶歲子弟多暴。

In good years more young people are lazy. In bad years more young people are violent. Meng 6A7.

Lau 1969: 164 translates even: "In good years the young men are mostly lazy, while in bad years they are mostly violent." Yang Bo-jun 1960 takes a similar view of *duo* in this context.

Again, it is sometimes quite clear that *duo* refers not just to 'many' of the subjects but rather to the majority of them:

(17) 故世人多不言國法而言縱橫

Thus the majority of people today do not talk about the laws of the state but about the vertical and horizontal alliance. HF 51 (361.8).

Not: ' . . . many people do not talk about . . . '

Duo 多 as an object quantifier

Very occasionally *duo* refers to a pronominalized object *zhi* 之:

(18) 道譬諸水，溺者多飲之即死
渴者適飲之即生。

The Way is like water: someone drowning drinks a lot of it and dies; someone thirsty drinks a convenient amount and survives. HF 20 (108.10).

(Note the beautiful use of *shi* 適 here: it seems to be syntactically 'infected' by *duo*)

But most commonly, *duo* refers to specified objects:

(19) 夏多積薪

In the summer they collected a lot of firewood. Zhuang 29.29.

Dobson 1959:83 provides some examples with countable objects. He fails to realize that grammaticalized *duo* can also refer to uncountable nouns. The quantifiers *duo* and *jin* 盡 are in fact closely similar in this respect, and the similarity is neatly illustrated by the following:

(20) 多積財而不得盡用

They amass a lot of wealth and cannot manage to use it all. Zhuang 18.4. Cf. Mo 32.36; 32.41; 37.35.

Note that we could have neither *zhong* 衆 for *duo* 多 nor *jian* 兼 for *jin* 盡 in this passage. There seems to be a clear distinction in AC grammar between mass quantifiers and item quantifiers.

The object quantified by *duo* can be quite complex:

(21) 有能多殺其鄰國之人，因以為文義。

But when someone is able to kill many people from his neighbouring state they consider him as cultured and righteous on this account. Mo 28.68.

When the subject of the main verb *duo* is sentential, *duo* can come to mean something like ‘be frequent’, and it is then conveniently translated by ‘on many occasions’:

(22) 吳犯閭上國多矣

Wu has on many occasions offended against the places between it and your state. Zuo Ai 20 fu 3.

But the situation is not always clear. There are cases when the main verb *duo* seems to quantify the subject of *its sentential subject*:

(23) 人以其全足笑吾不全足者多矣

Many people have ridiculed me for my damaged feet because they had undamaged feet. Zhuang 5.21. But one could also read this as ‘People have on many occasions ...’

Similarly, one is occasionally tempted to take the main verb *duo* to quantify the object of *the sentential subject*:

(24) 余殺人子多矣

I have killed many children of other people. Zuo Zhao 13.3.

Alternatively: 'I have on many occasions killed other people's children.'

Here is an unambiguous case:

(25) 關中載書甚多

In a case on his cart he took along a great many books. Mo 47.32.

Not: 'On a great many occasions he took books along ...'

Similarly:

(26) 今夫子載書甚多何有也

Now you are taking a great many books along: what are we to think of that? Mo 47.33.

The cases of *duo* with a sentential subject must be distinguished carefully from the standard usage where *duo* just happens to have a complex nominal subject:

(27) 如此則姦人為之視聽者多矣

If things are like this then many wicked people will keep their eyes and ears open on his behalf. Guan 67 (3.56–13). Cf. e.g. Mo 52.8.

The object quantified by *duo* is often omitted:

(28) 大夫多貪求欲無厭

The grandees will be greedy after many things. Nothing will satisfy their demands and desires. Zuo Xiang 31, fu 1. (The reason that *duo* does not quantify the subject here is that *tan* 貪 requires an object.)

(29) 惠者多赦者也

The generous person is the sort of person who pardons many people. Guan 16 (1. 72–11).

(30) 故能多舉而多當

Therefore he can undertake many things and get many things right. Guan 64 (3.32–13).

This sort of object quantification is frequently hard to distinguish from adverbial modification by *duo*. Consider for a moment the syntax of the following English sentences:

- (G) a He talked a lot
 b He said a lot
 c He read a lot

It seems that 'a lot' is an adverb in (G)a and a quantified object in (G)b,

while (G)c is ambiguous in the relevant respect. Quite often I feel uncertain whether a given adverbial *duo* works like ‘often’ or means ‘many objects’.¹

(31) 主多怒而好用兵

If the ruler gets angry a lot and likes to use armed force ... HF 15 (80.4). For 少怒 see HF 27(153.6).

Nu 怒 is very often used intransitively, so one is tempted to take it that way here. But it is hard to say whether one is under a *grammatical* constraint to do so.

On the other hand there is no doubt whatever with a verb like *sha* 殺 ‘kill’ in:

(32) 多殺次之

Killing many (enemies) is the next best thing. Mo 19.14.

Similarly we have:

(33) 少聞曰淺少見曰陋

Having heard about few things is called superficiality, having seen few things is called vulgarity. Xun 2.14.

Xian 鮮

Xian occurs regularly as a verb ‘to be few’, typically with the particle *yi* 矣. Even intrasententially, when *xian* acts as an adverbial subject quantifier, *yi* 矣 can occur:

(34) 巧言令色鮮矣仁

Those who speak cleverly and have an insinuating appearance are rarely good. LY 1.2, LY 15.4. (Note that *rarely* in my translation is a quantifier meaning ‘few of them’. We find the same ambiguity with many AC quantifiers.)

Apparently the use of *xian* as a quantifier is old:

(35) 人有言德輶如毛民鮮克舉之

1. This phenomenon is remarkably general. Consider: Intelligent children are often difficult. Intelligente Kinder sind oft schwierig. Intelligente børn er ofte vanskelige. Intelligentye deti casto tjazholye. Les enfants intelligents sont souvent des enfants difficiles.

“The people have a saying: ‘Virtue is light as a hair, but among the people few can lift it.’” Shi 260.6, tr. Karlgren 1950:229.

(36) 由姦詐鮮無災

Few of those who follow wickedness and fraudulence avoid disaster. Xun 25.27.

What immediately precedes *xian* as a noun is not always the quantified subject:

(37) 天下鮮矣

They are rare in the world. HF 44 (313.12).

Sometimes *xian* is used together with the quantifying verb *you*:

(38) 雖有不亦鮮乎？

Although they exist, are they not rare? Xun 31.5.

(39) 民鮮久矣

Few people are able to persist in it (virtue) for a long time. LY 6.29.

(40) 吾聞曰世祿之家鮮克由禮

“I have heard the saying ‘Families which have for generations enjoyed places of emolument seldom observe the rules of propriety.’” Shu 44.249, tr. Legge 575.

(Note that ‘seldom’ here means ‘few of them’; at least it can mean that, and such a reading is a correct way of understanding the text.)

(41) 鮮不赦宥

You rarely failed to pardon them. Zuo Xiang 11.10, Legge 453 does not seem to understand the passage. Here we seem to have a clear case of a temporal *xian*.

(42) 夫火烈民望而畏之故鮮死焉

Few unruly men fail to suffer harm. Zuo Xiang 31.4. Cf. Legge 563.

(43) 夫火形嚴故人鮮灼

When fire is bright, people are afraid of it from the distance, and few of them will die in it. Zuo, Zhao 20 fu vii.

I have not found a single instance where *xian* quantifies an inanimate subject. When, as in Zuo Zhao 1.4 it occurs in sentences where it

cannot be taken to quantify animate beings, it is clear that it must mean 'rarely, seldom'.

Except for the problematic (41) I have not found *xian* to quantify anything but the subject; it does not even seem to quantify the topicalized object so far as I can see. I suggest that it probably has to be taken in its temporal meaning in (41) and not as an object quantifier.

2.4.1 A Note on the Superlative Degree in AC

Consider:

(1) 吾自以為至通

I thought I understood things perfectly. Zhuang 5.48.

Not: ‘I thought I understood things best’. When Duke Ai of Lu says (1) he does *not* necessarily imply that he is *the only one* who has understood things perfectly, or that he understands things *better* than everyone else. But now contrast:

(2) 然惠施之口談，自以為最賢。

Nonetheless, in his rhetoric Hui Shi considered himself the most talented. Zhuang 33.81.

Here it looks as if the logician Hui Shi does not necessarily consider himself as perfect: he thinks he is *superior* to everyone else.

It seems clear that there is a deep contrast between the words *zhi* 至 and *zui* 最 when they are used to mark what we might roughly describe as the ‘superlative degree’.¹ In this note I shall try to work out this contrast, and then I shall speculate on the question why *zui* is so much rarer than *zhi* in AC.

Let us begin with a question: could we have *zhi* for *zui* in contexts like the following?

(3) 廐何事最難

What work in the horse-stable is most difficult? Guan 51 (2.108–10).

(4) 畫孰最難者曰犬馬最難

“What drawings are the most difficult?” “Dogs and horses are the most difficult things to draw.” HF 32 (202.10).

Zui can be left out in this construction:

(5) 事孰為大，曰事親為大。

1. Dobson 1959: 164 writes: “A word determined by *Jyh* (至) ‘to arrive at, or reach, the peak or acme, the furthest point’ forms a superlative degree.” He gives the example: “至大至剛 ‘the greatest, the toughest’.” Mencius 2a2.16.

“Which service is the important one?” “Serving one’s parents is the important thing.” Meng 4A20. (The pun on *shi* 事: business/service does not affect our grammatical point.)

On the other hand I have not found *zhi* in this construction, and I suspect that *zhi* would in fact not be grammatically acceptable in such contexts.

In other contexts, replacing *zui* with *zhi* would seem to make a sharp semantic difference:

(6) 知氏最強

The Zhi clan is the strongest. HF 38 (288.15).

Note that the Zhi clan is claimed to be the strongest *in Jin*. I suspect that by using *zhi* one would suggest that the Zhi clan was the strongest of all clans that exist. Compare:

(7) 天下者至大也

The universe is the largest of all things, the perfectly large thing. Xun 18.34. Cf. Xun 18.24, 8.12 etc.

(8) 介子推至忠也

Jie Zi-tui was a model of loyalty, the most loyal of all men. Zhuang 29.42.

Compare again:

(9) 最小而賢

He was the youngest, but talented. Xin Xu.

(10) 至小無內

The perfectly small thing has nothing inside it. Zhuang 33.70.

(11) 至精無形，至大不可圍。

The perfectly fine thing has no form; the perfectly large thing cannot be encompassed. Zhuang 17.20.

The contrast between *zui* and *zhi* should be clear.

Careful consideration of the following might further clarify the contrast I am getting at:

(12) 清商固最悲乎

Are you sure that the ‘pure *shang*’ note is the saddest? HF 10 (43.14).

I have a strong feeling that a hypothetical sentence like

(13) 清商固至悲乎

would come to mean something like “is the ‘pure *shang*’ note the saddest thing in the world?” For we have:

(14) 今彼神明至精

Now Spiritual Enlightenment is the subtlest thing in the world. Zhuang 22.18. Cf. also (7) and (8).

Zhi involves comparison not with a limited set of things but with an open totality of existing things. A sentence like (14) could never begin to mean anything like: ‘Spiritual Enlightenment is the subtlest of the above-mentioned things.’

One might think that *zui* always has to precede the ‘adjective’ that it puts into the ‘superlative degree’. This is not so:

(15) 此五害之屬水最為大

Of these five harmful things floods are the worst. Guan 57 (3.16–13).

(16) 故最為天下貴也

Therefore he is the noblest thing in the world. Xun 9.70. Cf. also Xun 15.34.

(17) 蚩尤最為暴

Chi You was the most cruel. Shi Ji 1.

(Yang Shu-da 1957 has a rich selection of further examples from Shi Ji.)

Apart from the pattern *zui wei* 最為 there are also cases like this:

(18) 治國最美患

In running a state, what should one consider the greatest disaster? HF 34 (242.7). Cf. also the wonderful superlative in Shen 42!

Sentences (15) to (18) would simply be ungrammatical if we replaced *zui* with *zhi*.

Zui in front of transitive verbs is also in clear *syntactic* contrast with *zhi*:

(19) 最苦社鼠

One should be most worried about the rats in the altars of the land. HF 10 (43.14). Cf. Guliang, Wen 11.6.

(20) 天者百神之君也，王者之所最尊也。

Heaven is the ruler over all the spirits, it is the thing which the ruler honours most. Chunqiu Fanlu (ZWDCD 6692).

Zhi would be ungrammatical also in this sort of adverbial position.

Given the uses of *zui* that I have surveyed, *zui* seems to be an excellent grammatical particle to have around in AC grammar. Why is it, then, that neither Mencius, nor Yi Jing, nor Chu Ci, nor Guo Yu, nor Lun Yu, nor Zuo Zhuan, nor Sun Zi, nor Shu Jing or Shi Jing have use for the word? Why can one make do without *zui* in AC?

I cannot pretend that I have a completely satisfactory answer to this important question. But consider the ‘superlatives’ with *mo* 莫: it seems significant to me that in AC we have plenty of sentences like:

(21) 故有血氣之屬莫知於人

Thus man is the most knowing of the creatures that have blood and ether. Xun 19.100.

On the other hand I have not found a single instance like:

(22) 有生之最靈者人也

Of the living things the most spiritual is man. Lie Zi 7 (39.20).

The standard AC way of saying that Socrates is the greatest philosopher turns out to be to say that *no philosopher is great in relation to Socrates*.

(23) 福莫長於無禍

The most lasting good fortune is absence of disaster. Xun 1.6. For close parallels with *hu* 乎 for *yu* 於 see Xun 15.47.

(24) 學之經莫速乎好其人

No guideline of study is faster than that of loving the right person. Xun 1.35.

(25) 故主道莫惡乎難知，莫危乎使下畏己。

There is no worse policy for the ruler than to make himself hard to understand, and none more dangerous than to make subordinates fear himself. Xun 18.9.

The topic of this sort of sentence does not have to be the logical subject of the superlative construction:

(26) 故人莫貴乎生莫樂乎安

Thus life is the most precious thing for man, and peace is the most enjoyable thing. Xun 16.46.

(27) 莫見乎隱，莫顯乎微。

Nothing is more visible than that which is hidden; nothing more obvious than that which is subtle. Zhong Yong 1.

(Is *hu* 乎 in sentences like (23) to (27) really a post-verbal aspectual particle in the sense of Graham 1978, incidentally?)

My suggestion, then, is that the ‘superlative’ in AC is very often paraphrased for example with constructions involving *mo* 莫, and that words like *zui* 最 are therefore dispensable.²

But let me end with a delightful syntactic blend where *zhi* 至 (!) is not dispensed with in spite of the presence of a construction with *mo* 莫:

(28) 万物莫如身之至貴

None of the 10,000 things are as perfectly valuable as one’s person. HF 4 (16.12).

Perhaps, after all, *zhi* does have marginal uses, where it comes close in meaning to *zui*:

(29) 夫瓦器至賤也不漏可以盛酒

Earthenware vessels are the humblest ones, but as long as they do not leak one can put wine in them. HF 34 (241.4).

But I think I still prefer to take *zhi* as ‘extremely’ in cases like these.

2. Another idiomatic way of expressing the superlative without a special superlative particle involves the verb *wei* 為. I have a nice example from Da Dai Li Ji at hand:

(a) 古之為政愛人為大

As for administrative practise of the ancients, love of men was the most important things in it. Da Dai Li 41.31.

2.5 Restrictive Quantifiers

Consider for a moment the contrast between the English words ‘merely’ and ‘only’. In view of sentences like (A) you might consider the two words as synonymous:

- (A)a He was only joking
 b He was merely joking

But now note that we have sentences like (B)a, but never sentences like (B)b:

- (B)a Only *he* was joking
 b ?? Merely *he* was joking.

And in fact there are plenty of sentences where it makes a *semantic* difference whether you use ‘merely’ or ‘only’:

- (C)a I only kissed Mary
 b I merely kissed Mary

A sentence like (C)a can mean *either* that I was the only one to kiss Mary, *or* that I did not go further than kissing Mary, *or* that Mary was the only one I kissed. (C)b on the other hand seems to have only the second of these three readings: it will normally be taken to mean that there was no more than kissing between me and Mary.

The scope of ‘merely’ tends to be the predicate or the verb, while the scope of ‘only’ may also be the object and sometimes even the subject of the clause in which it occurs.

Anyone who wishes to acquire a basic command of English needs to acquire a feeling for the differences between ‘only’, ‘merely’ and related words like ‘solely’, ‘exclusively’.

In this section I am concerned with some basic contrasts between Ancient Chinese words for ‘only’. Consider:

- (1)a 女獨未及也 ‘Only *you* have not reached it’
 b 志專在於宮 ‘His mind was only in *the palace*’

- | | | | |
|------------|---|--|--------------------|
| (2)a 女徒未及也 | } | 'It is only that <i>you</i> haven't
reached it' | Cf. HF 34(235.10). |
| b 女唯未及也 | | | |
| c 女直未及也 | | | |
| d 女特未及也 | | | |
| e 女嘗未及也 | | | |

I shall call the words for 'only' restrictive quantifiers, and among these I shall distinguish between *restrictive noun quantifiers* as in (1) and *restrictive predicate quantifiers* as in (2). (Surprisingly, this contrast does not seem to have been appreciated by grammarians of AC so far.)

I shall pay special attention to the restrictive object quantifier *zhuan* 專. Finally, there will be some brief remarks on the peculiarities of the restrictive quantifier *wei* 唯, 維, and a note on the special restrictive quantifier *jin* 僅 'only just'.

I. Restrictive object quantifiers

Zhuan 專

I classify *zhuan* 專 and *du* 獨 as restrictive object quantifiers because in sentences like those below they are *grammatically* constrained to refer to the objects of the clauses in which they occur:

(3) 威勢獨在於主

Authority and power rest only *with the ruler* (and are not shared with ministers). Guan 67 (3.54–10).

Not: 'Only authority and power rest with the ruler', and *not* 'Authority and power are only *placed with the ruler*'.

(4) 志專在於宮室

Their minds are only in the palaces ... HNT 9.16.

Not: 'Only their minds are in the palaces ...' etc.

However, both *zhuan* and *du* are very special restrictive quantifiers. Let us turn to *zhuan* first.

Zhuan is occasionally negated by *bu* 不:

(5) 體道者不專在於我亦有繫於世矣

Understanding the Way lies not only in *oneself*, it is also tied up with the contemporary world. HNT 2.

Indeed it is not always clear whether a given *zhuan* is to be taken as a grammaticalized ‘only’ or as a full verb:

(6) 許不專於楚

Xu is not limited in its relations to Chu. Zuo Zhao 18.5.

If we take *yu* 於 as a verb ‘be on the side of’ we could perhaps squeeze *zhuan* into the role of an object quantifier, although such a solution seems implausible. The point I wish to emphasize and try to illustrate with this example is that in AC *zhuan* seems to be *in the process* of grammaticalization. As a result *zhuan* has a much more limited distribution than *du*. There is, incidentally, nothing sinister about such limitations on a grammatical particle: compare the distribution of ‘only’ and ‘exclusively’ or ‘solely’ in English.

Let us first look at another borderline case where one wonders how grammaticalized *zhuan* really is:

(7) 專行教道

The only thing they practised was *teaching the Way*. HNT 9.31a.

If you think it absurd to take *zhuan* to be a grammaticalized ‘only’ in this sort of sentence, compare:

(8) 過而不聽於忠臣
獨行其意則滅其高名
為人笑之始

If you have made a mistake and you do not listen to loyal ministers, if you only practise *your own ideas*, then you destroy your high reputation and that is the beginning of being the laughing stock of the world. HF 10 (52.7) and HF 10 (40.7).

Also in the following lines from Chu Ci, *zhuan* seems to be well on its way towards meaning ‘only’:

(9) 專惟君而無他兮

“I thought of my prince alone, and of no other.” CC 199, Hawkes 1959:61.

Surely David Hawkes is right in not supposing the author to ‘think in a concentrated way’ of his ruler. While the restrictive predicate quantifiers are naturally reinforced by a final *er yi* 而已 or one of its variants, the restrictive object quantifiers may naturally be reinforced by *wu ta* 無他 ‘and no other object’.

(10) 專思君

“My thoughts were only of my lord.” CC 306, Hawkes 1959:61.
Again it would be absurd to imagine the author ‘concentrating on’ his lord.

The following passage from Zhuang Zi makes neat sense if we take *zhuan* as an object quantifier. The passage is syntactically unique because we seem to have *double* quantification of the object: ‘no object is such that ... only it’.

(11) 與時俱化而無肯專為

He evolves with the seasons and there is nothing which he is willing to do to the exclusion of all others. Zhuang 20.6.

Compare also the following special case:

(12) 故威不可無有而不足專恃

Thus one should not be without authority, but on the other hand one should not rely only on authority. LSCQ 19.4. Cf. ZGZHS 115.

Zhuan comes surprisingly often with certain verbs.

(13) 豈專在晉？

Why should this right belong only to Jin? Zuo Xiang 27.5.

(14) 是子將有焉，豈專在寡人？

Since there is going to be this fellow, how could things depend only on me? GY 10.8077.

(15) 秦王飲食不甘，遊觀不樂
意專在圖趙。

The King of Qin does not eat or drink well, does not take pleasure in tours of inspection, his mind is only on making plans against Zhao. HF 2 (13.13).

(16) 夫生殺之柄專在大臣
而主不危者未嘗有也

That power over life and death lies exclusively with the Chief Minister and that the ruler was not (as a result) in danger, has never happened. Guan 67 (3.52).

Like the other words for ‘only’ *zhuan* may be negated with *fei*:

(17) 非專為飲食也行禮也

This was not only for *drink and food*, it was in order to act according to ritual. Li Ji II.658.

Zhuan also comes before other prepositions like *yi* 以:

(18) 專以其心斷者中主也

... he who takes decisions using only *his own mind* is a mediocre ruler. Guan 45 (2.91–5) Cf. HF 7 (28.1).

I give one instance each of the other verbs which *zhuan* precedes:

(19) 毋專信一人

Do not trust only one person. HF 8 (33.14).

(20) 專聽其大臣者危主也

... he who listens only to his Chief Minister is a ruler who is in danger. Guan 45 (2.91).

(21) 於是王專任子之

Then the King relied solely on Zi Zhi. ZGC 451 (II.107).

(22) 亂主...專用己而不聽正諫

The ruler bound for disaster ... uses only his own advice and does not listen to corrections and representations. Guan 64 (3.36).

In a single instance *zhuan* refers to the indirect object of the verb it precedes:

(23) 西河之政專委之子

I entrust the administration of Xi to you alone. ZGC 298 (II.28).

The limited distribution of *zhuan* is clearly to be explained in terms of the original lexical meaning of the word.

Du 獨

The case of *du* 獨 is complicated by the fact that the word has lexical meanings closely related to 'only'. In this note I am not concerned with the interrogative *du*, which is sometimes equivalent to the German 'etwa' in sentences like

(24) 子獨不見狸狌乎

Have you never seen a weasel? Zhuang 1.44.
or like

(25) 獨往，獨來。

Alone he goes, alone he comes. Zhuang 11.63.

But in practice the line between grammaticalized ‘only’ and the other uses of *du* is often quite hard to draw.

When there is a quantifiable object, *du* tends not to quantify the subject:

(26) 民獨知兕虎之有爪角也
而莫知万物之盡有爪角也。

People only know *that rhinoceroses and tigers have claws and horns*, but no one knows that all things have claws and horns. HF 20(110.4). (Note that *wan wu* 万物 is the object of *zhi* 知. That seems to me to explain the presence of *jin* 盡 instead of a subject quantifier.)

(27) 亂主獨用其智而不任聖人之智
獨用其力而不任衆人之力。

The ruler doomed to disaster uses only *his own wisdom* and does not use the wisdom of sages; he uses only *his own strength* and does not use the masses’ strength, Guan 64 (3.42–2).

(28) 今諸侯獨知愛其國

Now the feudal lords only know to love *their own states*. Mo 15.4. (There are more relevant cases in the context.)

My claim is that the restrictive object quantifier *du* refers to the object if it is quantifiable. My claim is not that the word *du* always functions as a quantifier. It may be useful to illustrate this with an example:

(29) 獨樂樂與人樂樂孰樂

Which is more pleasant: enjoying music by yourself or enjoying it with others? Meng 1B1.

We clearly do not read this as: ‘Enjoying only music and enjoying music with others . . .’, but my claim is that if *du* was functioning as a quantifier ‘only’ here, we would have to.

Now one may be tempted to raise the following objection: *du* functions essentially as a restrictive subject quantifier in (29), for literally we should and could translate ‘Suppose only you enjoy pleasure or suppose you enjoy pleasure together with others, which is more pleasant?’ My reply is that Mencius is talking about enjoying pleasure by

oneself, on one's own, separate from others, and that is not the same as being the only one to enjoy pleasure. The 'literal' translation misinterprets the sentence. There is good semantic reason not to take *du* in (29) as a restrictive quantifier. (29) at least does not constitute counterevidence to the claim that the quantifier *du* refers to the object if that object is quantifiable.

Du tends to quantify the object of the verb it precedes:

(30) 然夫士欲獨修其身

The knights want to cultivate only their persons. Xun 2.26.

If *du* had preceded *yu* 欲 here, the quantification would have been over objects of desire.

When there is no quantifiable object, *du* (unlike *zhuan* 專) refers to the subject:

(31) 我獨安

Only *I* am at peace. Xun 10.115.

The decision about what a quantifiable object is, is often tricky:

(32) 曷為楚越獨不受制

Why is it that only Chu and Yue are not controlled? Xun 18.46.

Shou zhi 受制 is here apparently not felt to work quite like a verb/object construction.

When the direct object is not made explicit *du* does not quantify it:

(33) 先生獨以為非聖人

Only *you* consider them not to be sages. Zhuang 14.65. Cf. Meng 4B27.

When the object is pronominalized by *zhi* it cannot be quantified by *du*, possibly because *zhi* 之 cannot receive contrastive stress in AC.

(34) 他人不知己獨知之

Others do not know it, only he does . . . Mo 39.29.

Similarly, an object 'pronominalized' by *zi* 自 is not quantified by *du*:

(35) 今天下莫為義
子獨自苦為義。

Now no one in the world practises righteousness. Only *you* are inflicting pain on yourself and practising righteousness. Mo 47.4.

(Compare Mei 1929:222 "Nowadays none in the world practises any

righteousness. You are merely inflicting pain on yourself by trying to practise righteousness.” Clearly it matters for the comprehension of what AC authors say to sort out the various ‘onlys’ in the language. Mei’s reading of the sentence is ungrammatical.)

When one wishes *du* to quantify the subject of a sentence although there is a quantifiable object, the thing to do is to put *du* into adjectival position:

(36) 意獨子墨子有此
而先王無此其有邪

Could it be that only Mo Zi has this and the former kings didn’t have it? Mo 13.45.

II. Restrictive predicate quantifiers

Te 特

It appears that *te* 特 was a word for the number ‘one’ as applied to sacrificial animals.¹ I have found no less than eight occurrences of *te* before sacrificial animals in Guo Yu and Zuo Zhuan, and no cases of *te* meaning anything like ‘only’.

Zhuang Zi uses the adjectival *te* in a somewhat more generalized meaning:

(37) 築特室

The Yellow Emperor built a single hut. Zhuang 11.33.

For a nominalized use of this *te* see LSQ 3.4.

In ‘adverbial’ position *te* means ‘one-ly’, i.e. ‘only’. Its reference or scope is always to the predicate or to the verb, never just to the subject or the object of a sentence:

(38) 吾特以三城送之

I would just be *giving away* the three cities. HF (174.10).

Not: ‘Only I would be giving away the three cities’, and *not*: ‘I would be giving away only *the three cities*’.

The predicate may be nominal:

(39) 群臣之毀言非特一妾之口也

1. The old commentary to GY 6015 says: 特一也，凡牲一為特，二為牢。
‘*Te* means one. A single sacrificial animal is (called) *te*, two are called *lao*’.

Slanderous words of the various ministers are not just *a concubine's chatter*. HF 14 (74.13).

The scope cannot be *part* of such a nominal predicate. We could not read: '... are not just *a concubine's chatter*'. At least I have not found a clear example of that.

Given that *te* is a restrictive predicate quantifier we would expect it to be frequently reinforced by *er* 耳 or *er yi* 而已. The facts oblige:

(40) 特與嬰兒戲耳

I was only *joking with the child*. HF 32 (214.11).

Not: 'It was only with *the child* that I was joking.'

(41) 特為義耳

You are just *practising justice*. HF 32 (211.16).

(42) 有道者之不僂也
特帝王之璞未獻耳

If those who have the Way are not to be executed, it will only be because *their uncut jades for emperors and kings have not yet been presented*. HF 13 (67.4).

Here the scope of *te* is the whole sentential predicate. With such predicates *zhi* 直 is more common than *te*, and indeed the variant of this sentence in Xin Xu 5 (end) seems to have been *zhi* 直 for *te*. Cf. also Guan 76 (3.80).

(43) 故仁人之用國非特將持其有而已也
又將兼人

Thus when a good man uses a state, it isn't just *in order to hold on to his possession*, it is also in order to unite the people. Xun 10.116.

(44) 今子特草茅之人耳

Now you are just a commoner from an atap hut. SY 9.283.

The suspicion that *er* 耳 in this sort of construction just reinforces *te* is reinforced by a parallel like the following:

(45) 柳下惠特布衣韋帶之士也

Liu Xia Hui is just an ordinary knight wearing coarse cloth and a belt of reeds. Shuo Yuan 12.400.

The particle *te* is notoriously ill understood in the Zhuang Zi. Let us see if the present analysis helps. Consider first a special case:

(46) 彭祖乃今以久特聞

Up to our time Peng Zu was uniquely well known on account of his long life. Zhuang 1.12. Cf. Xun 27.12.

For another – theoretically more important – passage, our analysis makes perfect sense:

(47) 言者有言，其所言者特未定

In speech something is said. What it says just *is not quite fixed*. Zhuang 2.23. Cf. Zhuang 6.3.

The idea is that what is said does exist and has some sort of contours, but that it only *is not fixed*.

(48) 若有真宰而特不得其朕

It looks as if there is a real master, we just *cannot make out its shape*. Zhuang 2.15.

(49) 人特以有君為愈己而身猶死之

Man just *considers the incumbent ruler as his superior* (does not, for example, revere him as a deity) and is still willing to die for him. Zhuang 6.22.

(50) 特犯人之形而猶喜之

You have only *happened upon human form*, and still you rejoice in it. Zhuang 6.21.

(51) 吾特與汝其夢未始覺者邪

As for me, it is only that *together with you I am dreaming and have not yet woken up*. Zhuang 6.79.

(52) 孟孫氏特覺 人哭亦哭

It is just that Meng Sun *has woken up*, and when others cry he also cries. Zhuang 6.80.

(53) 惠施日以其知與人之辯
特與天下之辯者為怪

Every day Hui Shi used his knowledge to get involved in other people's disputations, he just *produced strange things together with the sophists of the world*. Zhuang 33.80. See also p. 135, footnote 2.

Tu 徒

Not all adverbial uses of *tu* 徒 involve restrictive quantification:

(54) 劍不徒斷

A sword does not break just like that. LSCQ 19.4.

The quantifier *tu* 徒 refers either to the whole predicate it precedes, or – very occasionally – to the object of the verb it precedes:

(55) 汝徒無為而物自化

You just *do nothing* and things will transform themselves. Zhuang 11.54. Cf. HF 34 (235.10).

Not: ‘Only you do nothing ...’

(56) 田常徒用德而簡公弑

Tian Chang used only *generosity*, and Duke Jian was killed. HF 7 (27.11). *Commentary*: 謂不兼刑也.

I have not managed to find further examples like (56). But it may be useful to mention at this point that the negation *fei* 非 seems to neutralize the differences between the various restrictive quantifiers: *fei du* 非獨, *fei te* 非特, *fei tu* 非徒, *fei zhi* 非直, and *fei wei* 非維 / 唯 / 惟 are, as far as I can make out, always interchangeable. Here is a typical example:

(57) 非徒危己也又且危父矣

You will not only endanger yourself, you will also endanger your father. HF 33 (230.1).

It would be easy to provide exactly parallel examples with *du*, *te*, *zhi* and *wei*.

Pre-nominal *tu* is not synonymous with prenominal *wei* or *du*:

(58) 徒善不足以為政
徒法不足以自行

Mere goodness is not sufficient for the exercise of government. Mere law cannot put itself into practice. Meng 4A1.

Note that we do not translate ‘Only goodness is insufficient for the exercise of government’ which is exactly what we would take the sentence to mean if we read: 唯善不足以為政, or 獨法不足以自行.

Again, in the following example, *tu* does not work like pre-nominal *wei* or *du* at all:

- (59) 徒術而無法
徒法而無術，其不可何哉

What is wrong with mere administrative skill without the rule of law, and with mere rule of law without administrative skill? HF 43 (304.8). It would be ungrammatical to take this on the lines of 'If only administrative skill lacks the rule of law . . .'.

The only other pre-nominal *tu* that looks as if it might work like pre-nominal *wei* or *du* that I have found is inconclusive:

- (60) 王如用予則豈徒齊民安
天下之民舉安

If the king were to use me, then how could it only be that *the people of Qi are at peace*? All the people of the world would be at peace. Meng 2B12.

Here I agree that it wouldn't make a difference *in the context*, if we had *wei* or *du* instead of *tu*. But until I find an *undisputable* case of pre-nominal *tu* being equivalent to pre-nominal *wei* I am inclined to insist that (60) should be construed roughly in the way indicated in the underlining of my translation. Compare:

- (61) 今之君子豈徒順之 又從為之辭

As for the gentlemen of nowadays, how should they merely go through with their errors? They even go on to make excuses. Meng 2B10.

- (62) 徒獻之

He merely handed it up. (And did nothing more about the matter.) HF 30 (117.12).

- (63) 毋擇行道失之徒獻空籠。

Wu Zhai lost it (the bird in the cage) on his way. He just *handed up the empty cage*. Shuo Yuan 12.416.

Tu may sometimes occur in nominal sentences:

- (64) 子之從於子敖來，徒鋪啜也。

Your following Zi Ao and coming here was merely for reasons of eating and drinking. Meng 4A26.

Here we could easily have *zhi* 直 for *tu*, but could we have *wei*? One thing at least is certain: we could not have *du* 獨 for *tu*. This is because the scope of *tu* is the whole predicate.

In this function *tu* may be reinforced by final *er* 耳:

(65) 徒用先生之故耳

This was only because I used you! Shuo Yuan 12.393.

Interestingly, *tu* can occur within nominalizations like the following:

(66) 徒取諸彼以與此然且仁者不為

If it is a matter of merely taking the place from one and giving it to another, then still the good man wouldn't do it. Meng 6B8.

Occasionally, *tu* can come to mean something like 'but the fact is simply that':

(67) 吾以夫子為無所不知
夫子徒有所不知

I used to think the Master was omniscient, but the fact simply is that there are things he doesn't know. Xun 29.20.

(68) 子謂夫子為有所不知乎?
夫子徒無所不知。

Didn't you say there were things the Master didn't know? But the fact is simply that the Master knows everything. Xun 29.22.

(69) 今徒不然

Now this simply isn't so. Zhuang 12.63.

Zhi 直

The restrictive predicate quantifier *zhi* 直 is regularly reinforced by the – nearly synonymous – final *er* 耳:

(70) 丘也直後而未往耳

It is only that I have been slow and have not yet gone to see him. Zhuang 5.3.

Not: 'Only I have been slow ...'.

(71) 吾直告之吾相狗馬耳

I only told him about my judging dogs and horses. Zhuang 24.10.

Not: 'Only I ...'. It is important to realize that the reading 'I told him only about my judging dogs and horses' is equally ungrammatical. Note that (71) could not be the reply to a question 'What did you tell him?'.

In fact the question was: “How did you persuade our ruler?” and the answer can be paraphrased: ‘I did not *persuade* him of anything, I just *told him about my judging dogs and horses.*’

Dobson 1959:57 and 113 calls *zhi* a restrictive copula. This not only fails to account for sentences like (70) and (71), it is also neatly refuted by the presence of the copula *wei* 為 after *zhi*, as in the following two examples:

(72) 夫魏直為我累耳

As for Wei, it only *constitutes an entanglement for me.* Zhuang 21.7.

(73) 世人直為物逆旅耳

The people of this generation only *are hostels for things.* Zhuang 22.82.

Zhi regularly comes before ordinary verbs, and the following sentence does *not* mean ‘I am only a joke’:

(74) 吾直戲耳

I was only *joking.* Shi Ji 99.

(75) 直匍匐而歸耳

Only by crawling did he get home again. Zhuang 17.80.

Zhi is common after a sentence with quasi-subordinate *fei* 非:

(76) 衍非有怨於儀直所以為國者不同耳

It is not as if I bore a grudge against Zhang Yi, it is only that the means by which we serve the state are not the same. ZGC.

(77) 寡人非能好先王之樂也直好世俗之樂耳

It isn’t as if I was able to appreciate the music of the former kings, I just love vulgar music. Meng 1B1.

Here, in (77), *zhi* comes dangerously close to quantifying the object of *hao* 好. If further cases of this sort were found, one would have to say that, like *tu* 徒, *zhi* can very occasionally refer to the object. Here is one such case:

(78) 直服人之口而已

These things only subdue *people’s mouths.* Zhuang 27.13.

In the context, Zhuang Zi is contrasting people’s mouths with people’s minds. So strictly speaking one should not even have underlined ‘people’s’ in the translation.

Nevertheless, cases of *zhi* quantifying the object are rare. For example in sentences like the following it seems that *zhi* cannot refer to the object although there is one:

(79) 是直用管闕天用錐指地也。

This is just peering at the sky through a tube, or pointing at the earth with an awl. Zhuang 17.78. Cf. Zhuang 24.42.

(80) 直寓六骸

He only *considers as a dwelling* the six parts of his body. Zhuang 5.12. *Not*: 'He considers only *the six parts of his body* as his dwelling.'

(81) 從者將論志意比類文學邪
直將差長短辨美惡而相欺傲邪

Should the followers discuss intentions and compare culture? Or should they only *distinguish size and beauty and thus cheat each other*? Xun 5.12.

Wei 唯維惟

Wei 唯 in adverbial position refers either to the whole predicate or in special cases to the object. It can never refer back to the subject.

(82) 吾唯不知務而輕用吾身

It was just that I *did not know what my business was and used my body lightly*. Zhuang 5.25.

Not: 'Only I did not know ...'

(83) 唯恐其不受

He was just afraid that *they wouldn't accept it*. Zhuang 5.42.

It is only in the apparently idiomatic combination *wei kong* 唯恐 that *wei* regularly quantifies the object of the verb it precedes.

Wei can be used adjectivally, *but only in front of the subject or topic*. A restrictive adjectival quantifier before the object, as in the English 'He smokes only cigars', is impossible in AC. We have the common pattern

(84) 唯聖人能之

Only a sage can do this.

If an object is to be quantified by *wei* it has to be topicalized first:

(85) 唯命之從

He followed only fate. Zhuang 6.56.

(86) 唯神是守

He kept only his spirit. Zhuang 15.20.

The reason for the restriction of adjectival *wei* to topic position seems to me to be because it retains something of its original copulative meaning. Suppose, for example, we took *wei* to mean ‘only if . . . is’ (compare *sui* 雖 ‘even if’ and then: ‘even’), then the last three sentences would read:

(84) Only if someone is a sage can he do this.

(85) Only if something was fate did he follow it.

(86) Only if something was his spirit did he guard it.

The otherwise unexplained fact that ‘adjectival’ *wei* always precedes the topic would then be subsumed under the general rule that subordinate sentences precede superordinate ones in AC. The occasional adjectival uses of *du* and their restriction to subject position could be explained in terms of analogy: the syntax of *wei* would have affected that of *du*.

These are, of course, only speculations. But the following examples suggest that they are not purely theoretical:

(87) 唯至人乃能遊於世而不僻

Only the perfect man can roam in the world and not get depraved. Zhuang 26.36. Cf. Guan 26 (2.15–12).

(88) 唯聖人然後可以踐形

‘Only a sage can give his body complete fulfilment. Meng 7A38.

(89) 唯君子然後兼有之

. . . only the gentleman has all these things. Xun 18.110.

The presence of sentence-connectives like *nai* 乃 and *ran hou* 然後 becomes explicable in a natural way if we construe such sentences literally as ‘Only if someone is a gentleman will he have all these things’. Compare also the following:

(90) 惟無為可以規(窺)之

Only if I practice non-action can I watch people. HF 34 (238.10).

(91) 唯有明君在上察相在下也

Only if there is an enlightened ruler on top will there be discriminating ministers below. Guan 20 (2.109).

Consider now the structural parallelism between the phonologically related *wei* and *fei*. Compare:

(92) 非聖人莫之能為

If someone is *not* a sage he cannot do it. Xun 8.10.

(93) 唯賢者不然

Only if someone is a worthy is he not like that. Xun 23.77.

We are not inclined to regard *fei* in (91) as anything but a copula in a special position, a subordinate copula. There is no need to assume that *fei* here is a special 'adjectival' particle roughly similar to the English 'non' in 'non-sage' and construe the sentence as 'non-sages cannot do it'. Similarly I am not inclined to take *wei* in (91) to be anything other than a copula in subordinate position.

The Gong Yang commentary preserves an instructive use of the copula *wei* in a non-subordinate position:

(94) 宜為君者唯魯侯爾

Only the Lord of Lu is fit to be ruler. Gong Yang Zhuang 12.4.

The parallel with *fei* is obvious when you consider the hypothetical

(95) 宜為君者非魯侯也

The one fit to be ruler is not the Lord of Lu.

In (94) *er* 爾 is in order because the scope of the restrictive quantifier is the whole predicate.

The parallelism is, of course, far from perfect. For a start we do not have inversion as in (85) and (86) with *fei*. Another important idiom with *wei* that has no parallel with *fei* involves the 'copula' *wei* 為:

(96) 唯士為能

Only a knight is capable (of this). Meng 1A7.20.

There are no less than eleven instances of this pattern in Mencius alone, and many more elsewhere. This is one of the many things about

the particle *wei* 惟 in AC that I still find puzzling and confusing. And if Uhle's monograph on pre-classical *wei* 惟 is anything to go by that particle was no less confusing at earlier stages of the language. (Cf. Uhle 1880).

Again the parallelism with *wei* 為 and *sui* 雖 in pre-subject position is instructive:

(97) 為天吏則可以伐之

If someone is an official of Heaven, then he may attack it. Meng 2B9.

(98) 為士師則可以殺之

If someone is the criminal judge, then he may kill him. Meng 2B9.

The relation between the subordinate and the main clause does not have to be a straightforward conditional one:

(99) 雖大國必畏之矣

... then even if something is a large state it is bound to fear him. Meng 2A4.

And the relation does not have to be made explicit at all:

(100) 為君不君為臣不臣亂之本也。

If, although someone is a ruler he does not rule, and, although someone is a minister he does not serve as a minister should, then that is the root of disaster. Guan 20 (1.107–10).

There is good empirical reason to construe prenominal *wei* 唯 'only' as a subordinate copula.

Zhi 祇

Zhi is the most specialized and idiomatically restricted restrictive quantifier of them all. *Zhi* always works exactly as in:

(101) 事不可知祇成惡名

The outcome cannot be predicted. This would only give me a bad name. Zuo Xiang 27.

In Zuo Zhuan *zhi* comes ten times, always in direct speech, and always introducing likely undesirable consequences of something.

Chi 啻

It may be useful at this point just to mention the earlier restrictive predicate quantifier *chi* 啻 which comes three times in Shu Jing, always negated by *bu* 不:

- (102) 爾不啻不有爾土
予亦致天之罰于爾躬。

You will not only not have your land, I shall also apply the punishments of Heaven to your persons. Shu 34.520. Cf. also GY 3435.

Jin 僅

The case of *jin* 僅 is special, but the word needs to be seen in relation and contrast to the other restrictive quantifiers.

- (103) 僅可以行耳

One could only just walk there (for all the water buffaloes). HF 30 (175.16).

- (104) 一日一夜僅能尅之

The struggle went on for one day and one night, and he was only just able to win against them. HF 30 (166.10).

- (105) 僅存之國富大夫

The states which only just survive are rich in senior officials. Xun 9.27.

- (106) 方今之時僅免刑焉

Nowadays one only just escapes penalty. Zhuang 4.88.

- (107) 楚不在諸侯矣其僅自完也以持其世而已

Chu is not thinking about the (other) feudal lords, she is only just managing to remain united in order to maintain the succession. Zuo Zhao 9.1.

(Incidentally: what is the force of the contrast between *yi* 矣 and *ye* 也 in sentences like these?)

- (108) 於是我僅得三士焉

... but now I have only just managed to get hold of three knights (of these thousands). Xun 32.16.

Amazingly, Shadick 1968 defines *jin* as ‘only’ and classifies it as a ‘predicate adjunct of scope that always refers to an object or a nominal predicate.’ Dobson 1959 does not mention *jin*. Even the very careful Gabelentz 1960 has apparently overlooked the particle.

Brief Notes on *er yi* 而已 and *er* 耳

1. While we occasionally get the combination *er yi er* 而已耳 (e.g. in Xun 13.35) the inverse combination *er er yi* 耳而已 is not attested in the indexed literature.
2. It seems significant that *er yi* 而已 and *er* 耳 can occasionally occur in sentences with restrictive noun quantifiers like *du* 獨, *but only when the object noun is quantified*. The break between object quantification and predicate quantification seems to be much less than that between subject predication and predicate quantification. This is also suggested by the fact that *zhi* 直, *tu* 徒, and perhaps also *wei* 維／唯／惟 can quantify both predicates and objects.
3. Essentially, *er yi* 而已 is a special way of saying ‘only’. This answers a question I have often asked myself as a student: why do the ancient Chinese keep going round and saying ‘and that is all’?

2. In Graham 1978 I find another very important example with *te*, this time from the dialectical chapters of the Mo Zi:

藉藏也死而天下害
吾特養藏也萬倍
吾愛藏也不加厚

If the death of Zang would mean harm to the world, then I would only *care for* Zang 10,000 times more, but my love for Zang would not increase. Mo 44.45. Contrast Graham 1978:249. “Supposing that the whole world be harmed if of all men Jack were to die, I would make a point of caring for Jack 10,000 times more, but would not love Jack more.” Obviously, I much prefer my own version, but the reader must make up his mind himself.

2.5.1 A Note on the Particles *yi* 亦 and *you* 又

A word like the English ‘also’ raises problems of scope similar to those raised by ‘only’. Consider:

(A) I also kissed Mary.

We have at least four distinct readings:

(B) a *I* too was someone who kissed Mary.

b *Mary* too was someone I kissed.

c *Kissing* too was something that happened between Mary and me.

d *Kissing Mary* was also something that I did.

By contrast, the sentence

(C) I too kissed Mary.

has only the reading (B)a: there appears to be not so much ambiguity of scope in (C).

Anyone who knows English has, in some way or other, grasped the semantic contrasts between words like ‘also’, ‘too’, ‘furthermore’ and the like.

Basic contrasts between *yi* and *you*

Let us now turn to AC and compare some uses of the words *yi* 亦 and *you* 又:

(1) 邦君樹塞門管氏亦樹塞門

The ruler of a state sets up a screen at the entrance; but *Guan Zi* too set up a screen at the entrance. LY 3.22.

Compare the hypothetical:

(2) 管氏又樹塞門

Guan Zi furthermore set up a screen at the entrance.

Again we have:

(3) 我悲人之自喪者
吾又悲夫悲人者
吾又悲夫悲人之悲者。

I grieved for those who lost themselves; I furthermore *grieved for people grieving for others*; I furthermore *grieved for people grieving for people grieving*. Zhuang 24.64.

and a non-synonymous hypothetical sentence like:

(4) 吾亦悲夫悲人者

I too grieve for people grieving for others.

When a sentence has an explicit topic, *yi* ‘too’ always refers to that topic (i.e. has it as its scope), and *you* never does. (Except in special cases like (77) and (78) below). That is a basic grammatical contrast between *yi* and *you*, but – of course – it is by no means the whole story about these two words. They each present very special difficulties and raise many questions only few of which can be answered in this section.

Consider the contrast between *yi yun* 亦云 and *you yue* 又曰:

(5) 其巷人亦云

A neighbour, too, said so. HF 23 (145.12) Cf. HF 12(65.1).

(6) 又曰

It also says . . . Mo 12.72 *et saepe*.

The phrase *you yue* 又曰 is very frequent and it always means something on the lines of ‘went on to say’, never ‘said so, too’.

Given the subject orientation of conjunctive *yi* it becomes clear why a phrase like *X yi ran* X 亦然 is ubiquitous in AC and always means something like ‘X is like that, too’, while it is hard to hunt down a single *you ran* 又然 in the indexed literature: conjunctive *you* emphasizes the predicate (or object), and it is unnatural to emphasize a pro-verb like *ran* 然 ‘be so’. Similarly, when *yun* 云 means ‘say so’, conjunctive *you* 又 is obviously inappropriate in front of it.

The contrast between *you* and *yi* is again nicely brought out by the following two examples:

(7) 非獨染絲然也國亦有染。

This is not only so for the dyeing of silk; there is also ‘dyeing’ *in states*. LSCQ 2.4.

(8) 非徒万物酌之也又損其生以資天下之人

Not only do the 10,000 things bite into him, he also *diminishes his life in order to help the people of the world*. LSCQ 2.3.

(Here, for once, *fei du* 非獨 and *fei tu* 非徒 seem to be in functional contrast. See the section on restrictive quantifiers.)

Two sentences connected by *you* tend to have the same subject, but even when they don't *you* is not normally interchangeable with *yi*:

- (9) 具器械三月而後成
距闈又三月而後已

The preparing of implements and gadgets takes three months to complete, and the piling up of mounds will take *another* three months to finish. Sun 3.4.

If we had *yi* instead of *you* in this passage, we might conclude that both jobs could be done and finished concurrently!

In front of degree-words (or phrases) *you* is sometimes translatable as 'even more':

- (10) 其不義又甚...

When his lack of righteousness is even greater . . . Mo 17.2 (The construction comes three times.)

Compare also the idiomatic *you kuang* 又况 'how much more?' *Yi* would, of course, be unthinkable in construction of this sort. Compare:

- (11) 愚亦甚矣

He surely was very stupid indeed! Zhuang 31.29.

'Adversative' *yi*

Typically, conjunctive *yi* is translatable by 'but also':

- (12) 車依輔輔亦依車

The cheek-bone relies on the jaw, *but* the jaw also relies on the cheek-bone. HF 10 (41.13).

- (13) 中者上不及堯舜而下亦不為桀紂

As for average people, the better ones do not reach Yao and Shun *but* on the other hand the worse ones are not Jies or Zhous. HF 40 (300.6).

This applies also to *yi* in the apodosis of conditionals:

- (14) 我得則利彼得亦利者為爭地

If a place is such that if we get it it is of advantage to us, *but* if they get it

it is also of advantage to them, then it counts as ‘disputed territory’. Sun 11.4.

Of course, the predicate does not have to be identical in two sentences that are connected by conjunctive *yi*:

- (15) 葉公子高未得其問
仲尼亦未得其所以對也

Ye Gongzi Gao did not ask a proper question, *but* Confucius didn’t find a proper answer either. Mo 46.32.

The appropriateness of *yi* comes out properly if we paraphrase like this: ‘In spite of the differences between Confucius and Gao they were alike in that they both did not find the proper thing to say.’

There is a common pattern with *yi* in the apodosis after *ze* 則:

- (16) 民不犯法則上亦不行刑

If the people do not offend the laws their superiors will not apply punishments either. HF 20 (104.15).

Occasionally the *ze* may be omitted:

- (17) 君好服百姓亦多服

If the ruler loves clothes, then the people too (in spite of their being different from the rulers) will have many clothes. HF 23 (213.1).

Very occasionally, even the second subject may be left out because it is clear from the context:

- (18) 公登亦登

When the Duke ascended a flight of stairs, Wei Sun Wen Zi also did (although he was not a duke). HF 39 (291.3).

Yi may well have come to mean ‘too’ on the basis of ‘nonetheless’, ‘in spite of the difference in subjects’, and this original adversative nuance is often helpful for a full appreciation of the force of *yi*:

- (19) 所入者變其色亦變

If what the silk enters changes, then the colour of the silk (although it is quite different from what it enters) also changes. Mo 3.1.

With conditionals introduced by *ruo* 若, *yi* can come to mean ‘also in that – *albeit different* – case’ or ‘also in that case, although it is different from the others mentioned before’:

- (20) 若見愛利國者必以告
 若見惡賊天下者亦必以告
 若見愛利天下者亦猶愛利國者也。

If you see someone who loves to benefit the world you must make sure to report him; if you see someone who hates to deprive the world of anything you must also make sure to report him. If anyone reports someone who loves to benefit the world, the informant too (in spite of the difference) will be treated like the person who loves to benefit the world. Mo 13.37.

Similar observations apply naturally to nominalized sentential subjects:

- (21) 其所以亡於吳越之間者亦以攻戰

The reason why he lost between Wu and Yue was also (*in spite of the differences between this case and the others discussed*) that he had an offensive strategy. Mo 18.24.

'Additive' *you*

To the adversative connotation of *yi* there is a corresponding *additive* connotation of *you*:

- (22) 天下既已治，天子又總天下之義

When the world is well-governed, the Son of Heaven goes on to unite the conceptions of 'righteousness' in the world. Mo 13.42.
Yi would be impossible in contexts like (22).

It would be easy to line up more examples where the contrast between *you* and *yi* is sharp and absolute. But the crucial things are apparent counterexamples where *you* seems at first sight to function exactly like *yi*:

- (23) 善言伐齊者亂人也
 善言勿伐齊者亦亂人也
 謂伐之與不伐亂人也者又亂人也

He who is good at saying 'attack Qi!' is a troublemaker, *but* he who is good at saying 'do not attack Qi!' is also a troublemaker. He who calls

‘attackers’ and ‘non-attackers’ troublemakers is himself *likewise* a troublemaker. Zhuang 25.25.

On close examination of this passage I find that in spite of appearances *yi* and *you* are not used synonymously here. I have tried to bring out the contrast in my translation.

- (24) 與子罕適晉不禮焉
 又與子豐適楚亦不禮焉
 子駟相又不禮焉。

He went to Jin together with Zi Han and behaved improperly there; and *again* he went to Chu together with Zi Feng, but he *also* behaved improperly there; . . . Zi Si was chief attendant, and to him, too, he was impolite. Zuo Xiang 7.9.

Occasionally, *you* seems to have not the whole predicate but the object as its scope:

- (25) 孫子又殺之

Him, too, Sun Zi killed. Zuo Xiang 14.4.

- (26) 余將殺帶也 . . . 又將殺段也

I shall kill Dai . . . I shall also kill *Duan*. Zuo Zhao 7 fu 6.

I have been unable to find any examples where *yi* ‘refers’ in this way to the object.

When there is no subject or topic, *yi* may be used interchangeably with *you*:

- (27) 楚子使申舟聘於齊
 亦使公子馮聘於晉

The Chu Zi ordered Shen Zhou to pay a visit to Qi, but he also ordered Gong Zi Feng to pay a visit to Jin. Zuo Xuan 14. Cf. Zuo Wen 15.4.

It does not seem grammatically feasible to read this as ‘. . . and it was he too who sent Prince Feng to pay a visit to Jin’. *Yi* is rare in contexts of this sort, but when it is so used, it is roughly synonymous with *you*, although one might suspect that *yi* adds a slightly more ‘adversative’ nuance to the two sentences.

- (28) 心以體全亦以體傷

The mind is held together by the body, but it may also be injured by the body! Li Ji II.527.

(29) 事君不敢忘君亦不敢遺祖

If someone serves his ruler he wouldn't dare to be oblivious of his ruler, but neither would he dare to dismiss his ancestors. Li Ji, Tan Gong I.247.

***Yi* and *you* in questions**

Both *you* and *yi* regularly co-occur with question-words like *he* 何, but also in that context their semantic contribution is distinct:

(30) 亦美以異乎牧馬哉

How should this be different from minding horses? Zhuang 24.32.

The function of *yi* seems to be rhetorical or emphatic. *You* often makes a much more specific semantic contribution to questions in which it occurs:

~~(31) 又將何為矣~~

~~What *else* could they be? Zhuang 13.49.~~

(32) 子又惡乎求之哉

Where *else* have you looked for it? Zhuang 14.46. Contrast Shi 222.

(33) 求仁而得仁又何怨

They sought goodness and achieved goodness! What *else* should they resent? LY 7.15.

Waley translates as if he read *yi* instead of *you*: “Why should they repine?” (Waley 1938: 126). *You* is indeed *sometimes* used simply rhetorically, and Waley's version is certainly not ungrammatical. I can't help feeling, though, that my version makes better sense. Compare in any case:

(34) 既庶矣又何加焉? 曰: 富之

曰既富矣又何加焉? 曰: 教之。

Since they are numerous, what more should one do for them?

Confucius said: ‘Enrich them!’

‘When they are rich, what more should one do for them?’

‘Instruct them!’ LY 13.9. Cf. the exact parallel in GY 6395 and also GY 5474; 8707; 13369.

(35) 擇可勞而勞之又誰怨

欲仁而得仁又焉貪。

If the gentleman rewards those worthy of rewards who else (among the unrewarded) will be angry resentful of him? If he desires goodness and achieves goodness, what else should he crave? LY 20.2.

Compare Waley's translation of the last clause: "who can say that he is covetous?" (Waley 1938:233). Here he simply mistranslates because he fails to understand the grammar of *you*. It gives me no satisfaction whatever to criticise a superb translator like Waley. But I am concerned to demonstrate that the grammatical points here under discussion are of much more than purely theoretical importance: they are essential if we are to understand what the ancient Chinese were saying.

Here is a puzzling passage from the *Book of Odes* in which we have both *you* and *yi* in the same question:

(36) 維莫之春亦又何求？

"It is the end of the spring; what do you then further (seek=) wait for?" Shi 276 tr. Karlgren 1950:244.

The force of *you* seems to be 'what *else* (apart from the end of spring) are you waiting for' and *yi* gives this question a rhetorical force 'what on earth else?'. The combination *you he qiu* 又何求 is quite current:

(37) 為我子又何求？

He is my son (and heir apparent): what more can he want? Zuo Xiang 26.9 *et passim*.

Keeping these observations in mind we can now approach the questions involving *you* the Zhuang Zi.

(38) 此二蟲又何知

What *else* do these two insects know about? Zhuang 1.10. Cf. Zhuang 11.50.

(39) 偉哉造化又將奚以汝為

How great the Creator is! What *else* is he going to make of you? Zhuang 6.55.

(40) 又將奚為矣

What *else* will he work for? Zhuang 13.49.

There is no need to give further examples. But it is clear that a

combination like *you he* 又何 can not always be taken in this way. Quite commonly we have to translate ‘why go on to?’ etc.; in this latter function *you* is again not replaceable by *yi*.

(41) 且夫物不勝天久矣吾又何惡焉。

For a long time things have not been able to get the better of Nature. Why should I go on to hate it? Zhuang 6.53.

Compare in this connection.

(42) 心中又有心

In the heart there is *another* heart. Guan 49 (2.101–14). Cf. Zhuang 2.82.

We cannot simply translate ‘In the heart there is also a heart’.

Idiomatic repetition of *yi*

Yi 亦, unlike *you* 又 may be repeated in a way that ‘too’ or ‘also’ only are in children’s speech or Pidgin English:

(43) 禍亦不至福亦不來

Neither does disaster arrive nor does good fortune come. Zhuang 23.42.

In this construction *yi* may come after *either* a noun phrase *or* a subordinate clause:

(44) 窮亦樂，通亦樂

He is glad both if he is in straits and if he achieves success. Zhuang 28.67.

(45) 乘亦不知，墜亦不知

When he rides he doesn’t know, and when he falls he doesn’t realize either. Zhuang 19.13. Cf. Zhuang 30.22.

(46) 君子能亦好，不能亦好。

When the gentleman is capable he is attractive, and when he is incapable he is also attractive. Xun 3.7.

(47) 我貴其見我亦從事不見我亦從事者

I value those who do their work whether they see me or not. Mo 46.21.

(48) 不說子亦欲殺子，說子亦欲殺子。

They want to kill you no matter whether they are pleased by you or not.
Mo 46.59.

***Yi* with extraposed subjects**

When there is an extraposed topic *and* a subject preceding *yi*, *yi* may refer to the extraposed topic:

(49) 善者吾善之 不善者吾亦善之

Those who are good I treat as good. Those who are not good I also (in spite of the difference) treat as good. Lao 49. Cf. Lao 42.

If there was no extraposed topic we would be forced to translate the remainder: 'I too treat them as good.'

(50) 雖執鞭之士 吾亦為之

Even if it was a matter of the office of the whip-holder, I would still work on it. LY 7.12.

As soon as something else intervenes between the subject and the extraposed topic, *yi* definitely has to refer to the subject:

(51) 巧言令色足恭
左丘明恥之丘亦恥之

"Clever talk, a pretentious manner and a reverence that is only of the feet – Tso Ch'iu Ming was incapable of stooping to them, and I too could never stoop to them." LY 5.25 tr. Waley 1938:113.

The extraposed object/topic may occasionally come *after* the subject:

(52) 小人不義亦諾

The petty man agrees even to improper things. Guan 64 (3.35–7).
The reading 'The petty man, too, agrees to improper things' seems ungrammatical.

Rhetorical *yi*

Sentences with *yi* 亦 often seem rhetorical or even exclamatory. A passage from Zhuang Zi illustrates this well:

(53) 其為形也亦愚哉

11/12/2 9.12 end: 4/4/100 makes or
or 2/7/10.

This is surely a stupid way to treat the body! Zhuang 18.4. Cf. HF 14(72.5).

Significantly, we have an exact parallel with *yi* 矣 instead of *zai* 哉:

(54) 其為形也亦外矣

This is surely an outward way of treating the body! Zhuang 18.5 (There are two more cases with *yi* 矣 in the context.)

It turns out that in the vast majority of cases a sentence-final *yi* 矣 turns what might otherwise be taken as a conjunctive *yi* 亦 into a rhetorical *yi* 亦 meaning something like 'surely':

(55) 日亦不足矣

Time would surely be insufficient! Meng 4B2.

Without *yi* 矣 one would be inclined to take the *yi* 亦 conjunctively:

(56) 日亦不足

Time too would be insufficient. (Hypothetical).

Similar considerations apply to the following pair of sentences:

(57) 君亦不仁矣

How unkind you are! HF 30 (173.2).

(58) 君亦不仁

You too are unkind. (hypothetical)

(59) 万乘之主見布衣之士

一日三至而弗得見亦可以止矣。

When a lord over 10,000 chariots visits a commoner, but he doesn't manage to see him although he calls three times on a single day, then it is surely proper for the ruler to desist! LSCQ 15.3.

(60) 死生亦大矣

Life and death are surely important matters! Zhuang 5.5. Cf. Mo 39.5. Without *yi* 矣 one would be inclined to translate: 'Life and death too are important.'

(61) 是亦近矣

This is surely close to the truth! Zhuang 2.15. Cf. Zuo Zhao 18.

The combination *yi yuan yi* 亦遠矣 'by a long shot!' is idiomatic in AC:

(62) 韓之輕於天下亦遠矣

Han is surely far less important than the empire! Zhuang 28.22. Cf. Zhuang 26.15 and HF 40 (300.7) etc.

Even more frequent is the idiomatic phrase *yi ming yi* 亦明矣 'is surely obvious!'

(63) 今水之勝火亦明矣

Now that water wins over fire is surely obvious! HF 17(84.14). Cf. Zhuang 26.33.

There are no less than seven examples of this in Han Fei Zi alone. Here is one from Zhan Guo Ce:

(64) 夫天下之不可一亦明矣

Clearly, the world could not be united! ZGC 237(I.225).

Apparently, the phrase *yi ming yi* 亦明矣 never means anything like 'that too is clear'.

Again, the combination *yi ... er yi (yi) 亦...而已 (矣)* is idiomatic in AC:

(65) 為人君仁義而已矣

Being a gentleman is surely just a matter of goodness! Meng 6B6. Cf. Shi Ji 44.22.

(66) 亦為之而已矣

This is surely just a matter of working at it! Meng 6B2. Cf. Meng 6A19.

(67) 王亦不好士耳

Surely it is just that your majesty does not love knights! ZGC, Qi Ce, Cf. HSWZ 6.27.

There is a grammatically fascinating passage involving our *yi* in Shi Ji:

- (68) 富貴者驕人乎且貧賤者驕人乎
子方曰：亦貧賤者驕人耳
夫諸侯而驕人則失其國…

'Do the rich and noble behave arrogantly towards people, or do the poor and humble behave arrogantly towards people?' Zi Fang replied: 'Surely it is just the poor and humble who behave arrogantly towards

others. When a feudal lord behaves arrogantly towards people he loses his state . . .’ Shi Ji 44.7.

Here *yi* has even been removed from its pre-verbal position, and it definitely does not have the force of ‘also’, in spite of the *qie* 且 in the preceding sentence. For *qie* 且 in alternative questions see

(69) 王以天下為尊秦乎且尊齊乎

Do you think the world honours Qin or do you think they honour Qi? ZGC Qi Ce, quoted here according to the *kao zheng* 考證 in Shi Ji 44.7).

(70) 立孤與死，孰難？
嬰曰：立孤亦難耳

‘Which is more difficult, establishing an orphan in his position or dying?’ Ying replied: ‘Establishing an orphan in his position is surely more difficult!’ Xin Xu 7.27.

The force of *er* 耳 in this sort of context is hard to be sure of. Apparently it is not interchangeable with *er yi* 而已. At least I have not found *er yi* in such contexts.

There is another important idiom involving rhetorical *yi*, where it is rarely followed by sentence-final *yi*:

(71) 此亦功之至厚者也

This is surely the greatest achievement! HF 14 (72.12).

(72) 此亦至矣

This surely is perfect! Zhuang 17.71.

(73) 此亦飛之至也

This surely is perfection in flying! Zhuang 1.16.

(74) 此亦秦之所短也

This is surely where Qin falls short! Xun 22.74.

The idiom *ci yi* 此亦 is quite common, and the only place I came across where the combination does not have its characteristic idiomatic meaning is in the context of a formalized and utterly uncolloquial logical discussion:

(75) 彼亦一是非，此亦一是非

Both ‘that’ and ‘this’ are each at the same time right and wrong. Zhuang 2.30.

In ordinary AC *ci yi* 此亦 has to be taken in its idiomatic meaning:

(76) 此亦天下之所謂亂也

This surely is what mankind calls chaos! Mo 14.7.

Not: ‘This too is something that mankind calls chaos’.

How, one may ask, do you say that ‘this too is a disaster’ using the pronoun *ci* 此? The following passage answers this question:

(77) 此又天下之害也

This, too, is a disaster for the world. Mo 16.4.

Here, it seems, *you* is used to avoid confusion with the emphatic or rhetorical *yi*.

But much commoner than the combination *ci you* 此又 is *shi you* 是又

(78) 是又人之所生而有也

This again is something that men have from birth. Xun 4.46. Cf. also Xun 4.45; 12.53; 17.20; 17.21 where quite anomalously *you* refers back to the subject. The origin of this usage in Xun Zi might well be a desire to avoid confusion with rhetorical *yi*.

Also outside special idioms and without final *yi* 矣, *yi* often seems to have the force of something like ‘surely!’:

(79) 為宋役亦其職也

Surely it is her duty to act as a servant to Song. Zuo Ding 1.

(80) 子分室以與獵也而獨卑雉亦有頗焉

That you divided your household property and gave something to Lie which humiliating only Tui was surely somewhat partial! Zuo Ding 10.9.

Idiomatic *yi* in questions

In construction with sentence-final *hu* 乎, *yi* 亦 turns what would otherwise be an ordinary question into a rhetorical or doubting question:

(81) 其以為異於穀音亦有辯乎其無辯乎。

If you think that talking is different from the twitter of fledgelings, is there really a distinction? (*Expected answer: No!*) Or is there no distinction? Zhuang 2.24. (Graham 1970: 151 misses the subtle distinction between the two questions.)

In questions with unnegated *yi* 亦 one is often tempted to take it as conjunctive:

(82) 吾聞子北方之賢者也子亦得道乎

I hear you are a talented man from the North. Have you really achieved the Way? Zhuang 14.45. But it seems to me that the reading 'Have you, too, achieved the Way?' would make Lao Zi excessively impolite: (82) is the first thing he says to Confucius when the latter pays him a visit.

(83) 子之知道亦有道乎

Is there by any chance a method to your knowledge of the Way? Zhuang 22.58.

Consider next the following furious question of a ruler to his disobedient minister:

(84) 違君命者女亦聞之乎

Do you really know what it means to go against a ruler's order? GY 4.3432.

It seems pitifully inadequate to construe this on the lines of 'have you too heard of what it means to go against a ruler's order?' Clearly *yi* 亦 serves to mark doubtful and sarcastic questions in contexts like these.

But it is important to remember that the rhetorical force of this sort of *yi* 亦 is not always exactly the same. Here is a tricky example:

(85) 子亦聞夫魯語乎

Have you by any chance heard the following story from Lu? Mo 48.63.

(86) 君子亦黨乎

Does the gentleman really join cliques? LY 7.31.

Expected answer: No!

(87) 不亦樂乎

Isn't that really pleasant? LY 1.1.

Expected answer: Yes!

Since we do not take *yi* conjunctively as ‘too’ in (87), is it really plausible *always* to do so in cases like (86)?

There is a passage in Mencius which actually turns on the use of *yi* 亦 to form doubtful questions:

- (88) 孟子曰：子亦來見我乎
 曰：先生何為出此言也？
 曰：子來幾日矣

Mencius said: ‘Have you really come in order to see me?’

‘Why, master, do you ask that question?’

‘How many days ago did you arrive?’ Meng 4A24.

The dubitative and conjunctive meanings of *yi* 亦 are beautifully combined in sentences like the following:

- (89) 盜亦有道乎

Does even a robber have the Way? Zhuang 10.11.

One could make the semantic complexity in this sort of ‘even’ explicit by translating: ‘Does a robber too really have the Way?’ (Unfortunately, ‘really’ is ambiguous in questions of this sort: here – as elsewhere in this section – I want it to be taken as a marker of doubtful questions.)

Note, incidentally, that a declarative version of (89) would normally have a *sui* 雖:

- (90) 雖我亦成也

Then even I would be perfect. Zhuang 2.46.

***Yi* and *you* in concessive clauses**

The adversative connotation comes out more fully in

- (91) 雖不識義亦不阿惑

Even if I do not know of righteousness, nonetheless I am not deluded. GY 7.5455.

The rhetorical or suggestive function of *yi* may also be combined with the adversative:

- (92) 心誠求之雖不中亦不遠矣

If the mind really seeks to do it you may not succeed entirely *but* you will *surely* get close to it! Da Xue 9.

Just as we regularly have *yi* after a clause or noun phrase introduced by *sui* 雖, we sometimes have *you* after a clause introduced by *zong* 縱 ‘although’:

(93) 縱無大討而又求賞

Disregarding the fact that he wasn’t severely punished he even goes on to demand a reward. Zuo Xiang 27 fu2

(94) 縱弗死又美言

Leaving aside that I have not died for them, what can I go on to say? Zuo Zhuang 14.3.

I have not come across *yi* after *zong* 縱 – clauses.

The semantic coherence of *yi*

I have described and illustrated some important uses of *yi* in AC. Let me now speculate briefly on the unifying principle underlying the various uses of the word.

Suppose the basic force of *yi* is rhetorical, perhaps somewhat weaker than that of the English ‘surely!’ (in questions: ‘really?’) From there it would not be far to ‘irrespective of what was said before, surely!’, and ‘nonetheless, surely!’. Hence *yi* can naturally come to mean ‘nonetheless!’, ‘nonetheless’. Then more specifically: ‘in spite of the difference’, ‘but also’, and finally: ‘too’.

It seems to me that what emerges from a detailed study of the various uses of *yi* is a fairly coherent picture of the semantics of the word.

2.6 The So-called Adjectival Quantifier *fan* 凡

In this section I wish to show *first* that the scope of *fan* does not have to be nominal but can be a subordinate sentence. This is particularly interesting in connection with the evidence provided elsewhere that the ‘nominalizers’ *zhi* 之, *zhe* 者 and *qi* 其 mark both nominalizations and subordinate sentences. (Cf. Harbsmeier 1979: 219–256).

Secondly, I wish to illustrate that the scope of *fan* is never less than the complete topic of the sentence at the beginning of which it stands, i.e. *fan* can never quantify an initial noun phrase of a larger topic. This is an important additional reason for not taking *fan* to be an ‘adjectival quantifier’ like *all* or *every* in English.

Dobson 1959:240 defines *fan* as follows: “(plerematic) everyone, everything; (grammaticalized) all”. We shall see that as a lexical item *fan* never means ‘everyone’ or ‘everything’. And I shall also demonstrate that as a grammatical particle *fan* does not begin to work like the adjectival quantifier ‘all’.

Lexical meanings of *fan*

First of all I want to illustrate the non-quantifying nominal, adjectival and adverbial uses of the word. We may after all expect that the ‘quantifier’ *fan* has evolved by a process of grammaticalization from earlier ‘full’ uses of the word.

The nominal uses of *fan* are so rare that I can simply quote all the examples I found:

(1) 喪禮之凡

(Now to) the general rule governing the ritual of mourning. Xun 19.60.

(2) 是強弱之凡也

This is the pattern of strength and weakness. Xun 15.23.

(3) 禮之大凡事生飾驩

The great pattern of ritual is to serve life and to embellish joy. Xun 27.18.

(4) 請略舉凡

Please tell us roughly the main meaning. Han Shu, Yang Xiong Zhuan, Xia.

An important early meaning of *fan* is ‘total sum’:

(5) 計凡付終，務本飭末則富。

If you calculate your overall results and pay off at the end (of your life), if you concentrate on what is basic and also look after the less essential things you will get rich. Guan 8 (1.29–12) and 9 (1.36–13).

This meaning must be the source for the adverbial use of *fan* meaning ‘altogether’ in connection with numbers noted below.

(6) 何況其凡乎

How much more is this true for an ordinary person? Zhuang 2.54.

(7) 凡者獨舉其大事

The ‘general’ is that which alone expresses a large affair. Chun Qiu Fan Lu, Shen cha ming hao.

(8) 背而不得，不知凡要。

They may learn by heart, but they do not get it: they do not know the main meaning, the important point. HNT Shuo Shan

(9) 是固未免凡俗也

This is certainly not to avoid vulgarity and meanness. Kong Cong Zi, Da wen

(10) 凡以為不信 邊竟有人焉其名曰竊。

The common people would consider you as not trustworthy. If one found (such a) man in the (wild) border country one would call him a thief. Zhuang 13.60.

The adjectival function of *fan* meaning ‘ordinary, common, vulgar’ is well attested:

(11) 待文王而後興者凡民也

“Those who make the effort only when there is a King Wen are ordinary men.” Meng 7A10 tr. Lao 1970:183.

(12) 何以異於凡母？

How would I differ from an ordinary mother? Lie Nü Zhuan, 1.13, cf. O'Hara 1945:45.

In Gong Yang we have a unique 'adverbial' use of *fan*:

- (13) 獻公怒曰：黜我者非甯氏與孫氏
凡在爾。

Duke Xian got angry and said: 'It was not Ning and Song who degraded me, the fault is all yours!' Gong Yang Xiang 27.4.

- (14) 先君之所以不與子國而與弟者
凡為季子故也

The reason why the former ruler did not give the state to you but gave it to your younger brother is all because of Ji Zi. Gong Yang 29.8. Cf. Xin Xu 7.219.

The grammatical particle *fan*

Turning now to the grammaticalized particle *fan*, we must note first that this *fan* can never occur in object position like *all* in 'He killed all the robbers'. This is why there is some reason for saying that *fan* is a topic marker. By contrast the words *zhu* 諸 'all the various' and *qun* 群 'the whole crowd of' do appear in object position. This observation may sound obvious, but it is important: for, if *fan* really was just an adjectival quantifier its position before the subject or before an object noun phrase shouldn't really make any difference.

Now one might be tempted to say that *fan* can only occur immediately before the topic of a sentence. But the facts turn out to be more complicated. Let us take the example from Dobson 1959: 32: "凡諸侯 'all of the feudal lords'." The full text in Zuo Zhuan is as follows: 凡諸侯即位小國朝之. *Whenever* a feudal lord ascends the throne, the small states pay formal visits to his court. (Zuo Xiang 1.8). My claim is that this sentence does not mean and *could never begin to mean* 'When all of the feudal lords ascend their thrones...'.
 That *fan* can function like *mei* 每 'whenever' becomes especially clear when it is followed by *ze*:

- (15) 凡足以奉給民用者則止

Whenever it is sufficient for the needs of the people to have been satisfied, then stop. Mo 21.4.

(16) 凡法令更則利害易

Whenever laws and orders are changed, then what is profitable and harmful also changes. HF 20 (103.15).

Not: ‘When all the laws and orders are changed . . .’

Apparently that use of *fan* is quite old:

(17) 凡民有喪匍匐救之

“When people met with disaster I crawled on my knees to succour them.” Shi 35.4 tr. Karlgren.

Now if we take *fan* to mean ‘speaking in general of’ then such sentences present no problem. ‘Speaking in general of’ plus explicit or implicit ‘when’/‘if’ then naturally comes to mean ‘whenever’. Note the important logical ambiguity of the English ‘whenever’. The meaning of that word is not always temporal.

(18) 凡人之取也所欲未嘗粹而來

Whenever people choose, what they desire never comes to them purely. Xun 22.71.

(19) 凡人之盜也必以有為不以備不足

Whenever people take to robbery they are bound to have their purpose, they are not just supplying their needs. Xun 18.81. Cf. 18.95.

(20) 凡人之患偏傷之也

Whenever people get into trouble it is one-sidedness that harms them. Xun 3.47.

(21) 凡人之患蔽於一曲而闇於大理

Whenever people get into trouble their horizons are limited to one area and they are ignorant of the great underlying principles. Xun 21.1.

In none of the above examples can *fan ren* be taken to mean ‘every person’. It is quite irrelevant to these sentences whether all people in fact make choices, take to robbery or get into trouble.

On the other hand one could translate: ‘As to people’s choosing in general, what they desire never comes to them purely’ and ‘Talking about people taking to robbery in general, . . .’ etc. The absence of *也* after the topic in (20) and (21) might perhaps be taken to make such a way of taking these examples more plausible.

(22) 凡將舉事令必先出

Whenever one is about to start on an enterprise, the orders have to be out beforehand. Guan 4(1.14–11).

(23) 凡入國必擇務而從事焉

Whenever one enters a state one must choose what to aim for and work at it. Mo 49.62.

(24) 凡人之為外物動也不知其為身之禮

Whenever a person acts with a view to external things he is ignorant of the proper way of treating one's person. HF 20 (96.13).

(25) 凡慮事欲熟

Whenever one makes plans for an enterprise one wants to be careful. Xun 15.50.

(26) 凡將立國制度不可不察也

Whenever one is about to establish a state, one must carefully examine standards and measures . . . SJ 8.81.

(27) 凡君即位卿出並聘

Whenever a ruler is enthroned, the ministers go out on a range of friendly missions . . . Zuo Wen 1.11.

(28) 凡君即位好舅男修婚姻

Whenever a ruler is enthroned he cultivates his relatives and his in-laws. Zuo Wen 2.8. Cf. Zuo Xiang 1.8.

(29) 凡諸侯會公不與

Whenever the feudal lords held meetings, the Duke did not attend. Zuo Wen 15.10.

Definitely *not*: 'When all the feudal lords . . .'!

(30) 凡君不道於其民諸侯討而執之

Whenever a ruler does not follow the Way in treating his people the feudal lords punish and apprehend him. Zuo Cheng 15.3.

Not: 'When every ruler . . .'.

(31) 凡諸侯之喪異姓臨於外，同姓於宗廟。

Whenever a feudal lord died, if he is of a different surname from the

duke he is wailed for on the outside, if he is of the same surname he is wailed for in the ancestral temple . . . Zuo Xiang 12.4.

Not: ‘When every feudal lord . . .’. But of course we might translate: ‘As for the mourning for a feudal lord . . .’ The systematic availability of such alternative translations is symptomatic.

(32) 是故凡將舉事必先乎意清神

Therefore, whenever you are about to undertake something you must first balance out your mind and clean out your spirit. HNT 11.7a.

Note the idiomaticity of *fan jiang* 凡將 ‘whenever you want to, are about to’. The idiom turns out to be quite common.

The scope of *fan*

If *fan* was an adjectival quantifier we should expect it to be able to quantify just the initial noun phrase of a larger topic. In fact, the scope of *fan* is always the *whole* topic of the sentence at the beginning of which it occurs, never just the initial noun phrase of that topic.

(33) 凡人之姓者堯舜之與桀跖其性一也

Speaking of human nature in general, and comparing Yao and Shun with Jie and Zhi, their nature is one and the same. Xun 23.53.

The translation ‘As for all human natures . . .’ is impossible because of the context; the translation ‘As for every person’s nature . . .’ is excluded for grammatical reasons.

(34) 凡君之所以安者何也

How, in general, is it that a ruler can live in peace? Mo 3.12.

We do not translate ‘How can every ruler live in peace?’ My claim is that the reason for this is grammatical: *fan* regularly refers to the whole subject.

(35) 凡人主之國小而家大
權輕而臣重者可亡也。

Whenever a ruler’s state is small but his clan large, whenever his power is slight and his ministers carry great weight, he can be ruined. HF 15 (78.3).

We cannot, for grammatical reasons, translate: ‘When every ruler’s

state is small but his clan large . . .'. And again for grammatical reasons we cannot translate: 'When everybody's ruler's state is small but his clan large . . .'.

(36) 夫凡國博君尊者

未嘗非法重而可以至于令行禁止於天下者也

Now whenever a state is well-off and its ruler is honoured, the reason invariably is that its laws are severe and can lead to orders being carried out and prohibitions being obeyed in the world. HF 55.(366.15). Again we cannot translate: 'Now when every state is well-off . . .'

(37) 凡國之重也必待兵之勝也而國乃重

Whenever a state has authority, that is bound to depend on military victories. Guan 15(1.68–6).

(38) 凡兵之勝也必待民之用也而兵乃勝

Whenever military victory is achieved, that is bound to depend on the use of people. *Ibidem*.

We *could*, of course, also translate: 'Speaking of the authority of a state in general, it certainly depends on military victories' and 'Speaking of military victory in general, it certainly depends on the use of the people.' But the translations 'That every state has authority certainly depends on military victories' and 'That every army is victorious certainly depends on the use of the people' are grammatically impossible.

(39) 凡聖人之動作也必察其所以之與其所以為

Whenever the sage acts he is sure to have carefully investigated what he is going for and what his purpose is. Zhuang 28.29.

Not: 'When every sage acts . . .'

(40) 凡人有此一德者足以南面稱孤矣

Whenever a person has one of these virtues he is qualified to face south and call himself The Lonely One. Zhuang 21.19. Cf. Watson 1968: 326.

Not: 'When every person has one of these virtues . . .'

(41) 是故凡大國之所以不攻小國者

積委多城郭修上下調和

是故大國不肯攻之

Therefore in general the reason why a great state does not attack a small state is that the latter's supplies are ample, its walls well kept, and that rulers and subjects are in harmony: that is why a large state does not like to attack such a state! Mo 25.46.

Not: 'Therefore the reason why every large state does not attack a small state ...'

- (42) 凡馬之所以大用者
外供甲兵而內給淫奢也

Generally, the great usefulness of horses lies in the fact that on the one hand they carry armour and weapons and on the other are items of indulgence and luxury. HF 20(105.12).

We cannot translate: 'The great usefulness of all horses lies in the fact ...'

- (43) 凡人君所以尊安者賢佐

Generally, the reason for a ruler's honour and peace lies in his competent helpers. Guan 66 (3.50–5).

Not: 'The reason for every ruler's honour and peace ...' or: 'The reason for everybody's ruler's honour and peace ...'.

- (44) 凡君所以有衆者以愛施之德也

Generally, the means by which the ruler controls the masses is by the virtue of love and generosity. Guan 66 (3.49–13).

- (45) 凡國之亡也以其長者也

Whenever a state is ruined, it is because of its strong points. Guan 12 (1.56–10).

We cannot construe (44) as a statement about all rulers, or (45) as a statement about all states.

- (46) 凡大國之君尊小國之君卑。

Generally, the ruler of a large state is highly honoured, the ruler of a small state is less highly honoured. Guan 16 (1.73–7).

Not: 'The ruler over all large states ...'. Note incidentally that the scope of *fan* is clearly felt to cover also 小國之君. This is a frequent feature of *fan*. If we had translated: 'Every ruler of a large state is highly honoured ...' we would have got the semantics of the first part

right but we would have missed out on this crucial feature of *fan*. *Fan* does *not* work like *every* and *all* although translating it by these words is sometimes harmless.

(47) 凡世主之患用兵者不量力治草萊者不度地。

“The disasters of the rulers of the world, generally, come from their not measuring their strength in the use of armies, and from their not measuring their territory, in managing the grass-fields and uncultivated lands.” SJ 6.61, tr. Duyvendak 1928:214. (Incidentally, *shi* 世 here means ‘of our time’, not ‘of the world’.) Cf. Gao 1975:62 and *Shangjun Shu ping zhu*, Peking 1976:95 where the implication seems to be that *all* current rulers are faced with disaster. But that does not seem to me to be the point: the text tries to explain the source of disaster where it occurs, not universal disaster.

(48) 凡民之所疾戰不避死者以求爵祿也

In general, the reason why people are eager to fight and do not avoid mortal danger is that they seek appointments and emoluments. SJ 23.169.

Not: ‘The reason why every commoner is eager to fight . . .’.

Fan is common at the head of the *definiens* of a definition:

(49) 凡民逃其上曰潰

Whenever people run away from their superiors that is called *kui*. Zuo, Wen 3.1.

Not: ‘When all people run away from their superiors . . .’.

Consider now the current translations of:

(50) 凡道不欲壅

“In all things the Way does not want to be obstructed.” Zhuang 26.38, tr. Watson 1969:300.

The early commentators seem to be no help on *fan* here, the translators seem in trouble. Yet the following translation is quite in line with the context and with what we know about the functions of *fan*: ‘Speaking of the Way in general, it does not like being obstructed.’ Or, if you prefer, ‘Speaking of the Way in general, one does not want to obstruct it.’ (See the end of I.2).

Since *fan* is a topic marker we expect to find only one *fan* in a given sentence in so far as we expect any given sentence to have one topic.

But it is possible to have two topics marked by *fan*, and that seems to be an important contrast between the topic marker *fu* 夫 and *fan*: the topic-marker *fu* never, so far as I know, occurs twice in a given sentence.

(51) 凡言凡動利於天鬼百姓者為之

Considering speech in general and considering action in general, if these were useful to Heaven, the spirits or the people, they would perform them. Mo 47.16.

We cannot translate: ‘When all speeches and all actions were useful to Heaven, the spirits, or the people, . . .’ or anything of that sort.

The evidence is that very often *fan* can definitely *not* be taken to quantify an initial noun phrase smaller than the topic. On the other hand there are examples where the context seems *consistent* with an interpretation of *fan* as quantifying such an initial noun phrase. Consider the continuation of (36) and (37):

(52) 凡令之行也必待近者之勝也

Whenever orders are carried out, that is bound to depend on one’s having won over those who are close to one. Guan 15(1.68–7).

Here one might indeed be tempted to translate: ‘When all one’s orders are obeyed . . .’, but is one grammatically entitled to? The evidence so far surveyed seems to suggest that one is not.

Of course, there are cases where my claim on *fan* seems simply insubstantial, where the readings ‘speaking in general of the subject’ and ‘all subjects’ are only artificially distinguishable:

(53) 凡天下強國非秦而楚，非楚而秦。

Speaking in general of the strong states of the empire, they stand on the side of Qin or on the side of Chu. ZGC nr. 244 SBCK 5.18b.

It seems we might just as well translate: ‘For all strong states, if they are not on the side of Qin they are on the side of Chu, and if they are not on the side of Chu they are on the side of Qin.’ But the crucial observation is that in many cases when *fan* precedes topics of this sort other quantifiers are added to make the quantification explicit:

(54) 凡民者莫不惡罰而畏罪

Every commoner hates punishment and fears crime. Guan 66 (3.48–9). Cf. Xun 22.67 etc.

If *fan* really meant strictly ‘all’ why is this so common? Compare also the following text of a law:

(55) 凡天下群百工…

Speaking in general of the crowd of all the various craftsmen in the empire ... Mo 21.3.

And, even more importantly, compare all the non-universal quantifiers that can be used after topics introduced by *fan*:

(56) 凡人臣之事君也多以主所好事君

Speaking in general of ministers serving their lords: in most cases they pander to the likes of their lords. SJ 14.113.

We cannot translate: ‘Everybody’s minister ...’ or: ‘As for every minister’s serving his ruler ...’.

(57) 凡今之人莫如兄弟

As for contemporaries in general, none are like brothers. Shi 16.41.

(58) 凡此飲酒或醉或否。

“Of all these who drink wine, some are drunk, some are not.” Shi 220.5, tr. Karlgren.

(Incidentally, the combination *fan ci* 凡此 is remarkably frequent. I do not know why.)

If we took *fan* to mean ‘every’ or ‘all’ in sentences like these they would express contradictory propositions.

(59) 凡君國之重器莫重於令

Speaking in general of the important tools for ruling a country, none is more important than one’s orders. Guan 15 (1.66–7).

The use of *fan* with number phrases

So far, I have spoken as if *fan* always refers to the topic of a sentence or to a subordinate clause. But in connection with number phrases there are in fact a number of idiomatic usages where this does not seem to apply:

(60) 凡一年之中十二月

Altogether one year has twelve months. Guan 58 (3.20–2). Cf. Meng 5B2.

(61) 凡天下有三德

Altogether there are three virtues in the world. Zhuang 29.17.

(62) 凡兼人者有三術

Altogether there are three skills involved in making people work together. Xun 15.104. (We might of course also translate: “speaking of ‘getting people to work together’ in general, there are three skills involved’ but I prefer the first way of taking it.)

(63) 凡火攻有五

Altogether there are five ways of attacking with fire. Sun 12.1.

(64) 凡先王治國之器三

Altogether there were three tools with the former kings governed their states. Guan 15 (1.69–5).

(65) 凡不守者有五

Altogether there are five untenable situations. Mo 71.53.

(66) 凡劫有三

Altogether there are three kinds of robbery. HF 16 (82.4).

(67) 凡國有三制

In a state there are altogether three (theoretically possible) constellations of mutual control. Guan 12 (1.54–9).

Fan can function adverbially before a verbal number phrase as in

(68) 丈夫千人下女子二千人老小千人凡四千人

The able-bodied were one thousand men; inferior women and children numbered two thousand; old people and babies numbered one thousand; altogether they numbered four thousand people. Mo 52.87.

It can also come before a number that we are inclined to take as part of an ‘indication of time’:

(69) 陳勝王凡六月

For altogether six months Chen Sheng was king. Shi Ji, Chen She shi jia.

But *fan* is not always to be taken in this way when it immediately precedes numbers:

(70) 凡五穀者民之所仰也，君之所以為養也

Generally, the Five Grains are what the people are looking forward to and what the ruler derives his sustenance from. Mo 5.7.

In any case, the scope of *fan*, also in such cases, tends to be the whole topic of the sentence:

(71) 凡五霸所以能成功名於天下者
以君臣俱有力焉

“On the whole, the Five Hegemons could accomplish their achievements and reputations in the empire because in every case both ruler and minister had abilities.” HF 37:826.

2.7 The Definite Quantifiers *zhu* 諸, *qun* 群 and *zhong* 衆

In English one may try to distinguish between definite and indefinite quantification. Compare:

- (A) All planets of the earth contain metals.
 (B) All the planets of the earth contain metals.

In indefinite quantification like (A) one talks about *anything* that falls under a certain description (e.g. the description ‘planet of the earth’), while in definite universal quantification we have a well-defined set of known items over which we quantify (e.g. *the* known planets). If you say (A) you commit yourself to a certain view on any future planets of the earth that might be discovered. If you say (B) you will not normally be taken to enter any such commitment. (The observation that you would not go on to use the form (B) to state your original view after the discovery of a new planet is *not* to the point!)

The main point that I want to illustrate briefly in this section is that the apparent ‘adjectival quantifiers’ *zhu* 諸 ‘all’, *qun* 群 ‘hosts of’ and *zhong* 衆 ‘crowds of’ have one crucial thing in common: they are used in AC to articulate something one might be tempted to call definite quantification. Semantically they incorporate something like a definite article. And I shall begin with *zhu* which even etymologically contains an element *zhi* 之 that can mean ‘this’.

Zhu 諸

There is an interesting syntactic contrast between *fan* 凡 and *zhu* which comes out in sentences like these:

- (1) 王之諸臣皆足以供之

Your majesty’s ministers are all able to supply these things. Meng 1A7.16.

First note that this could never mean: ‘All royal ministers are able to supply these things.’ And note furthermore that the position of *zhu* in front of *chen* 臣 is significant. A hypothetical construction like:

(2) 諸王之臣

would come to mean something like: ‘ministers of the various kings’: there would have to be a contextually determinate set of kings for such a construction to become usable.

Fan 凡 cannot possibly replace *zhu* in contexts like (1). And the important thing is that when it is used in constructions like

(3) 凡王之臣皆足以供之

it refers to ‘ministers’ and not just to ‘kings’: i.e. we come to translate on the lines of ‘In general, ministers of kings are able to supply these things.’

Here is another *zhu* embedded into a noun phrase:

(4) 楚王諸弟皆諫王赦之

All the King of Chu’s younger brothers made representations that he should pardon the man. SY 12.391.

In Mo Zi, *zhu* 諸 is used much like *fan*:

(5) 凡費財勞力不加利者不為也

Generally, what drained resources and strength but did not provide anything useful they did not do. Mo 6.3.

(6) 諸加費不加于民利者聖王弗為

The things that added to the expenditures without being useful to the people the Sage Kings did not do. Mo 21.4.¹

If I understand the situation correctly, we have vague indefinite quantification in (5) and definite quantification in (6). This is confirmed by the following:

(7) 諸從天子封於大山禪於梁父者…

All you (feudal lords) who have followed me, the emperor, have been enfeoffed at Tai Shan and have sacrificed at Liang Fu ... Guan 82 (3.107–14).

The fact that we do not naturally use ‘the’ to translate *zhu* 諸 here makes no difference: the crucial point is that by using *zhu* 諸 the emperor is referring to *the* members of a definite well-defined set.

1. In section 3.4 I argue that the pronoun *zhe* after the subject implies ‘indefiniteness’. This effect is overridden by the presence of *zhu* in the rare cases like (6).

(8) 自是以來諸用秦者皆應穰之類也

From this time onwards those who have sided with Qin have all been of the type of Ying and Rang. HF 43 (305.8).

Unlike *fan* 凡, *zhu* regularly occurs in object position:

(9) 畏我諸兄

I am afraid of my elder brothers. Shi 76.2.

Note the position of *zhu* after the personal pronoun *wo* 我. This is regular in Shi Jing: compare Shi 39.2; 187.2. Such a position is quite unthinkable for *fan* 凡.

(10) 凡我父兄昆弟…

Speaking in general of you my parents, brothers, etc. GY 14 245. Cf. also Guan 58 (3.22–12).

(For *zhu fu* 諸父 = ‘parents’ cf. Shi 165.3).

Zhu can easily occur within the scope of *fan* 凡 but not vice versa:

(11) 凡諸侯之臣有諫其君而善者…

As for ministers to feudal lords, who made good representations . . . Guan 18 (1.91–6).

Even when large number of items are involved, *zhu* is not simply equivalent to *wan* 萬 or *bai* 百. It is not by chance that Zhuang Zi uses *zhu wu* 諸物 instead of the more current *wan wu* 萬物 in the following passage:

(12) 能辯諸物此中德也

When someone can distinguish between the (well-known classes of the) various things, he is a man of medium virtue. Zhuang 29.18.

Zhu always refers to a set that is supposed to be well-defined and often sub-classified. *Wan* typically refers to an infinite, unclassified ‘open’ set of things, when it does not have its specific numeric meaning. There is a passage in Han Fei Zi which illustrates my point superbly:

(13) 兕虎有域而万害有原

避其域塞其原則免於諸害矣

Rhinoceroses and tigers have their haunts, and all sorts of injury have their sources. If you keep clear of the haunts, block up the sources, you will avoid the injuries. HF 20(110.8). For a similar construction with

qun hai 群害 see HF 49 (339.4). For *zhong hai* 衆害 see Zhuang 26.39.

(14) 竽唱則諸樂皆和

When the *yu*-pipe goes, the musical instruments (or: voices) all stay in tune with it. HF 20 (113.6).

(15) 地者万物之本原 諸生之根苑也

Earth is the source of all things, it is the basic pasture of all the living creatures. Guan 38 (2.74–4).

As far as I can see, there is no way of quantifying over ‘things’ or ‘living creatures’ in this sort of construction with an adverbial quantifier. An English sentence like “Merete is the mother of all my brother’s children” expresses a proposition the expression of which requires an adjectival quantifier also in AC.

It is important to emphasize that *zhu* can *never* simply quantify what it precedes. *Zhu hou* 諸侯 can *never* mean ‘all feudal lords, past, present and future’, and similarly for *zhu daifu* 諸大夫 *zhuchen* 諸臣, *zhu qing* 諸卿, *zhu gong zi* 諸公子, *zhu yu* 諸御: these have to mean ‘the grandees’, ‘the ministers’, ‘the senior ministers’, ‘the ducal offspring’, ‘the attendants’; they *never* mean ‘all grandees’ etc..

Adjectival *zhu* is regularly followed by adverbial quantifiers like *jie* 皆. For example, in Mencius we have six ‘quantificational’ uses of *zhu* and in each case *jie* 皆 is added:

(16) 諸君子皆與驩言

All the gentlemen have spoken to me. Meng 4B27.

Never: ‘All gentlemen have spoken to me.’

No doubt the original meaning of the idiom *zhu hou* 諸侯 was – as my account predicts – something like ‘the feudal lords’. It referred to a well-defined set of people, just like the German ‘die Kurfürsten’. Dobson 1959:32 analyses the idiom as “/various/marquises” and then surreptitiously introduces a ‘the’ into his translation “the Feudatory”. Dobson adds: “*Zhu* is used for nobles, feudal lords and the like.” *Ibidem*.

There are plenty of examples that refute Dobson’s claim that *zhu* is restricted to people of high status. Nonetheless the preponderance of *zhu* in front of animate nouns is striking. It reminds one of the restriction of the plural morpheme *men* 們 to animate nouns.

But even the more plausible claim that *zhu hou* 諸侯 always refers to

the feudal lords as a group turns out to be incorrect. And the recognition of this makes all the difference to a correct interpretation of the following passages from Zhuang Zi:

(17) 彼窃鈎者誅窃國者為諸侯

He who steals a belt buckle gets executed; but he who steals a state becomes a feudal lord. Zhuang 10.19.

I would love to be able to translate ‘but those who steal states are the ones who become feudal lords’, but unfortunately that does not seem to be what Zhuang Zi had in mind. Similarly for:

(18) 小盜者拘大盜者為諸侯

Small thieves get detained, great robbers become feudal lords. Zhuang 29.64. Cf. Xun 18.106; Mo 13.43; HF 20 (107.3).

In any case, there are quite indisputable examples like this:

(19) 伯成子高立為諸侯

Bo Cheng Zi Gao was established as a feudal lord. Zhuang 12.33.

(20) 前時五諸侯嘗相與共伐韓

At an earlier time five feudal lords together attacked Han. HF 2 (12.1). Cf. Shuo Yuan 9.284 and Shuo Yuan 14.477.

And even an innocent-looking familiar passage from Zuo Zhuan turns out to be a case in point:

(21) 信讒慝而棄忠良若諸侯何。

Believing slanderers, rejecting loyal servants, how does that tally with being a feudal lord? Zuo Cheng 16.12.

(22) 臣窃慮小諸侯之未服者…

I have taken the liberty to consider the minor feudal lords that have not yet submitted . . . Shuo Yuan 13.424.

On the one hand you couldn’t possibly have *zhu xiao hou* 諸小侯 meaning ‘the minor feudal lords’, but on the other hand there is nothing similarly outrageous about a construction like *zhu da chen* 諸大臣 ‘the chief ministers’, or even *zhu xiao chen* 諸小臣.

The important general point is that the standard idioms like *zhu daifu* 諸大夫 etc. cannot enter constructions like those in (17) to (22). It turns out to be profoundly misleading to follow the current practise

and treat *zhu hou* 諸侯 as the paradigm case of *zhu* meaning ‘the various’.

Qun 群

Qun 群 has a well attested concrete lexical meaning:

(23) 夫獸三為群，人三為衆

Three animals make a flock. Three people make a group. GY 1.114. The old commentary adds: 自三以上為群 ‘Any number above three is called a flock.’

As a main verb *qun* comes to mean ‘gather in flocks, live in flocks etc.’:

(24) 禽獸群焉

Birds and animals gather there. Xun 1.15.

Even as a transitive verb we find *qun*:

(25) 群天下之英傑…

… gathering the heroes of the world . . . Xun 6.14.

Sometimes *qun* looks like a count-word:

(26) 若驅群羊

… as if he was driving a flock of sheep. Sun 11.39.

Now while *zhu sheng* 諸生 always has to mean something like ‘the various living things’, *qun sheng* 群生 is systematically ambiguous:

(27) 万物群生

The ten thousand creatures live in groups. Zhuang 9.8.

Grammatically, this *could* mean ‘the ten thousand things and the flock of living creatures’, but in fact it does not.

(28) 万物不傷群生不夭

The ten thousand things do not suffer injury, the living things do not die early. Zhuang 16.6.

For *zhong sheng* 衆生 ‘the world of living creatures’ see Zhuang 5.11.

In spite of Dobson 1959:32 *qun* is restricted neither to humans nor to humans of inferior position. Expressions like *qun guo* 群國 ‘the

various states' Guan 20(1.99–14), *qun ling* 群靈 'the host of spirits' (CC 328), *qun shen* 群神 'the host of spirits' (GY 12 715; GY 4253), *Qun hou* 群后 'the flock(!) of feudal lords' (Mo 9.63) may be old-fashioned in AC, but they do exist. In Shu Jing *qun* applied to humans of high position is extremely common. The use of *qun* was in no way discriminating. It looks as if people at this earlier stage didn't mind being likened to a flock of animals.

In certain formal contexts it was still not felt to be discriminating in AC times to be addressed as a 'flock of gentlemen':

(29) 唯群子能

Only you, gentlemen, are able to. Zuo Xuan 12.3. Cf. Zuo Zhao 22.4.

But referring to the grandees as *qun daifu* 群大夫 was, I suspect, almost abusive:

(30) 欲盡去群大夫

He wanted to get rid of the whole bunch of grandees. Zuo Cheng 17.13. Cf. GY 14. 10141 盡逐群賊 'drive away all thieves'.

It is, in this connection, instructive to notice that phrases like *zhu Xia* 諸夏 and *zhu Hua* 諸華 are quite current ways of referring to the Chinese, whereas I have not found a single instance of *qun Xia* 群夏 or *qun Hua* 群華 in the indexed literature. Here, I think, we have grammatical racial discrimination. For consider:

(31) 群蠻聚焉

The crowds of barbarians assembled there. Zuo Wen 16.6 and similarly in Zuo Zhao 1.6 as well as Ai 17 fu 4. I am sure the barbarians did not like being talked about in this way.

Here is another derogatory use of *qun*:

(32) 鞏氏之群子弟賊簡公

The bunch of sons and younger brothers of the Gong clan killed Duke Jian. Zuo Ding 2 fu 1. Cf. Mo 9.63.

With people of inferior status the use of *qun* is not derogatory any more, it is just a customary way of discriminating against them. The common *qun tu* 群徒 'the followers', *qun xia* 群下 'the subordinates' (Zhuang 31.16; Hf 14 (69.1)) imply no special disapproval of the people thus referred to. Even less so the ubiquitous *qun chen* 群臣 'the flock of ministers', which seems to me to be a more humble idiom than *zhu chen* 諸臣 which – *pace* Dobson – does regularly occur.

Zhong 衆

The basic function of *zhong* 衆 seems again to be nominal: ‘crowd, the masses’. Cf. ex. (23) above. But by contrast with *zhu* 諸 and *qun* 群, *zhong* can work as a main verb like the relative quantifiers do:

(33) 凡有首有趾無心無耳者衆

In general those who have heads and feet but lack hearts and ears are many. Zhuang 12.43.

Zhong ren 衆人 like the ancient Greek ‘οί πολλοί, is a pejorative term meaning something like ‘the ignorant crowd’, while *zhong* 衆 ‘the masses’ by itself can have a positive connotation:

(34) 今子之言大而無用衆所同去也

Now your words are large and useless. The masses all reject them. Zhuang 1.44.

Hui Zi could not have said *zhong ren* 衆人 for *zhong* in this context. Compare for example:

(35) 衆人匹之不亦悲乎

If the crowds emulate Peng Zu, that surely is depressing! Zhuang 1.12.

In fact *zhong ren* 衆人 can even lose its plural meaning:

(36) 而不自謂衆人愚之至也

... and not to consider himself as an ignorant common person, that is utter stupidity! Zhuang 12.88. Cf. the English word *hoi polloi*!

Like *zhu hou* 諸侯, *zhong ren* 衆人 is very common, but for that very reason the combination could develop a special idiomatic meaning.

And the first part of the following passage from Han Fei is *not* simply an inane tautology:

(37) 衆人多而聖人寡

The ordinary simpletons are many, the sages few. HF 20 (100.15).

Apart from this special idiom, pre-nominal *zhong* may also function as a transitive verb. Thus in *zhong nongfu* 衆農夫 (Xun 12.48) it has a causative meaning on the lines of ‘cause the peasants to be many’. Obviously, neither *qun* 群 nor *zhu* 諸 could begin to be used in this way. And I have a strong feeling that it is by some sort of double take that a

speaker of AC interprets the construction *zhong nongfu* 衆農夫 in this way.

In general, ‘adjectival’ *zhong* means something like ‘the many, the crowd of’ without any positive or negative connotation:

(38) 衆狙皆悅

The crowd of monkeys were all pleased . . . Zhuang 2.39.

(39) 而衆星拱之

The crowd of stars worship it. LY 2.1.

(40) 厲風濟則衆竅虛

When the storm subsides the many holes are empty. Zhuang 2.7.

It would be *ungrammatical* to translate: ‘Many stars worship it’ or ‘many holes are empty’. Similar observations apply when *zhong* precedes the object:

(41) 方且應衆宜

Then he will do *the* many things that it is fitting to do. Zhuang 12.24.

(42) 刻彫衆形

He carves out *the* many shapes. Zhuang 6.89. Cf. Zhuang 5.11.

Thus even in its standard adjectival uses *zhong* is *not* simply an adjectival relative quantifier doing roughly the same job as adverbial *duo* 多, no more than *zhu* 諸 is in any sense an adjectival version of the quantifier *jie* 皆.

(43) 衆車入自純門

The vast number of chariots entered from the Chun Men. Zuo Zhuang 28.4. Cf. Zuo Wen 6 fu.

Definitely *not*: ‘A whole lot of chariots entered . . .’ In fact we happen to know from the context that the number of chariots was 600!

Similarly, *zhong di* 衆狄 in Zuo Xuan 11.4 could never be ‘a lot of the barbarians’ but has to mean ‘the lot of them’, or more precisely ‘the large group of the many barbarians’.

I am inclined to insist that you cannot, in AC, claim that the number of white horses is large by saying anything like:

(44) ?? 衆馬白矣

(??) Many horses are white.

But the situation is not quite as neat as I have so far made it appear. There are a few cases when *zhong* refers to an assembled numerous group of things but is translatable not by 'the crowd of' but by 'a crowd of':

(45) 曹人或夢衆君子立於社宮而謀亡曹

A man from Cao dreamt that a large number of officials were standing in the palace of the altar of the land and plotting the ruin of Cao. Zuo Ai 7.6. Cf. Zuo Ai 6.6.

Zhong, like *qun* 群 has these marginal idiomatic uses, but I do not feel this affects my main point: a sentence like (44) could not under any circumstances mean 'of horses a large number are white' or 'of horses a large group are white'. My account commits me to saying that the following sentence is not good AC:

(46) 雖有博地衆民

Even if you have a large territory and a numerous population . . . Da Dai Li Ji 39.3. Cf. Guan 14(1.64–4).

The proper idiomatic AC version of this should be:

(47) 雖地大民衆...

Even if his territory was large and his people were numerous . . . Guan 64 (3.40–11). Cf. Xun 11.137 地雖廣...

The Guan Zi example in (46) is isolated in AC, and it certainly is puzzling. But remember that *zhong min* 衆民 here means something like 'a large set of people' it could never begin to mean 'many (of a given set of) people'. An important contrast with the adverbial quantifiers remains. And the contrast is often crucial for comprehension:

(48) ...而衆美從之

The many attributes of beauty follow him. Zhuang 15.7.

Compare the hypothetical

(49) 美多從之

Many of the attributes of beauty follow him.

Pronominalization

3.1 The Reflexive Pronoun *ji* 己

In simple sentences, it may look as if *ji* can do the same job as *zi* 自:

(1) 故君子之度己則以繩

Thus the gentleman measures himself with a measuring line. Xun 5.48.

(2) 知者自知

The knowing man knows himself. Xun 29.31.

I propose to show that there is a significant semantic difference between reflexivization with *zi* 自 and reflexivization with *ji* in simple sentences.¹

Given sentences like (1) one might expect the following complex sentence to be ambiguous:

(3) 知者使人知己

A. The knowing man causes others to know themselves.

B. The knowing man causes others to know himself. Xun 29.29.

I shall argue that the reading A is ungrammatical, and that the meaning A would have to be expressed by a sentence like

(4) 使主迷惑而不自知也

They cause the ruler to be confused and not to know himself. Guan SBBY 21.14a²

Since *ji* turns out to be far more common in embedded sentences than in simple sentences, the sharp contrast between (3) and (4) is of great practical importance.

1. Gabelentz 1960:416 and Dobson 1959:85 speculate on the contrast between *zi* 自 and *ji* 衆民己. Jachontov 1965:69 is much more reliable and precise.
2. As is well known, *zi* cannot here refer back to the main subject, so we can obviously not translate '... and not to know themselves'. But now compare:

(a) 美多從之

This would be helping Qin to attack oneself. ZGC 265, II.4. I consider 凡足以奉給民用則止 as a grammatical mistake for 凡. It is important to realize that such mistakes do occasionally occur in AC texts.

Nominal *ji* 己

It is important at the outset to distinguish carefully between pronominal *ji* 己 and the noun *ji* 己 'self, the Self'. Consider:

- (5) 不以智累心
不以私累己

He does not tie up his mind with wisdom; he does not tie up his Self with private desires. HF 29(156.9).

Here it seems to me *ji* is a noun on equal terms with *xin* 心 'heart'. Often, our distinction between pronominal and nominal *ji* makes a striking semantic difference:

- (6) 至人無己

The perfect man has no Self. Zhuang 1.22. Cf. Zhuang 11.66. Zhuang 17.28.

Not: 'The perfect man lacks himself'.

The noun *ji* is a Taoist technical term. This is not the place to give a detailed account of it. Nonetheless, we shall have to return to the question of nominal *ji* at the end of this section.

***Ji* 己 in simple sentences**

In practise one may often be doubtful whether a given *ji* has to be taken as a noun or as a pronoun. But there is no doubt about cases like this:

- (7) 如此則慎己而闕彼

In this way people will watch their own steps carefully and they will keep an eye on others. HF 55(367.15).

The reason why we don't tend to have *zi* 自 in contexts like these is the sharp stylistic contrast with *bi* 彼 'others'. This contrast may sometimes be implicit:

- (8) 聖人不愛己

The sage does not love himself. Xun 22.30. Cf. Zhuang 33.22.

The contrast may also be not with other people but with other things in general:

- (9) 夫是之謂重己役物

This is called setting great store by oneself and making slaves of things. Xun 22.88.

It is useful to think of *ji* as a *contrastive* reflexive pronoun even in cases like

- (10) 下君盡己之能
中君盡人之力

The lowly ruler exhausts *his own* ability. The mediocre ruler exhausts other people's strength. HF 48(331.11). Cf. Xun 3.13, Xun 3.26.

The reason why we don't have the familiar construction *zi* ... *qi* 自 ... 其 here seems to be that there is a sharp stylistic contrast between *ji* and *ren* 人 'others'.

- (11) 不可勝在己
可勝在敵

Invincibility lies with oneself; defeatability with the enemy. Sun 4.2.

The contrast involved does not have to be with things or people in general:

- (12) 非徒危己也又危父矣

You would not only endanger yourself, you would also endanger your father. HF 33 (230.1).

Of course, pronominal *ji* can be used both as a subject and as an object. This is conveniently illustrated in

- (13) 明於人之為己者
不如己之自為也

Rather than understanding how other people will do things for oneself, it is better to *oneself* work for oneself. HF 25(255.11).

If I am right then we have *wei jo* 為己 in the first clause because this is in clear opposition to 'working for others', i.e. *themselves*. In the second clause we have *ji* because this is in clear contrast with the others working for one. On the other hand we have *zi wei* 自為 because there is no question of the ruler himself working for others. At this stage I am, strictly speaking, only concerned with the second *ji* because the first is part of an embedded clause and as such will be dealt with in the second part of this section.

Note the contrast between *fan ji* 反己 and *zi fan* 自反:

- (14) 不以物易己也 反己而不窮

He does not barter himself (or: his Self) for things. He returns to himself and is inexhaustible. Zhuang 24.73.

(15) 唯聖人能遺物而反己

Only the sage is able to reject things and return to himself. HNT 12.

In contexts like (14) and (15) *ji* 'self' or 'the Self' is seen in clear stylistic opposition to *wu* 物 'things'. But 'turning in upon oneself' does not normally or necessarily involve such an explicit contrast.

Consider:

(16) 計子之德不足以自反也

Assess your virtue! Does it not give cause for self-reflection? Zhuang 5.19.

(17) 夫子何故見之變容失色終日不自反邪

Master, why did you change your facial expression and get pale at the sight and did not return to yourself for the rest of the day? Zhuang 12.61.

(18) 是故學然後知不足
知不足然後能自反也。

Therefore only after study does one know one's insufficiency. Only after one knows one's insufficiency can one turn back on oneself (for self-reflection). Li Ji, Xue Ji, II.29. Cf. Meng 4B28,2A2.

I suppose in some cases syntactic parallelism plays a part in the choice of reflexive *zi* 自 or *ji*:

(19) 博學而不自反必有邪矣

If one studies widely and does not turn back on oneself there is bound to be wickedness. Guan 26 (2.16–11).

If we assume that *ji* in simple sentences like those I have quoted above is essentially contrastive in nature a number of otherwise unexplained facts find a natural explanation. The reason why we have phrases like *zhuan yong ji* 專用己 'use only oneself' (Guan 64(3.36–7)) and not *zhuan zi yong* 專自用 turns out, then, to be the very simple one that this phrase is used in explicit or implicit opposition to 'using others'. The reason why suicide tends to be described in terms of *zi sha* 自殺 turns out, then, to be the plain one that suicide is not normally seen in direct opposition to murder. The reason why 'correcting oneself' tends to be described in terms of *zheng ji* 正己 and not

zi zheng turns out to be the obvious one that the duty to correct oneself was seen, in ancient China, in obvious opposition to the natural tendency to try to correct others first.

In simple sentences, then, *ji* can be used not only in subject position but also in object position, and in both these cases there is something strongly contrastive about it. And in the context of the argument I shall now present it is crucial to remember that *ji* is used regularly to make verbs reflexive, i.e. to indicate that the subject and the object of a verb are the same.

Ji 己 in embedded sentences

The contrastive *ji* in simple sentences turns out to be comparatively rare. Much more commonly *ji* is used in embedded sentences, and in these embedded sentences *ji* seems to lose much of its contrastive force. In these contexts post-verbal *ji* is never even remotely synonymous with pre-verbal *zi* all the same. The difference is now not in 'contrastiveness' but in the reference:

- (20) 君子能為可貴不能使人必貴己
 能為可信不能使人必信己
 能為可用不能使人必用己

The gentleman can do something about being worthy of appreciation but he cannot bring it about that others are certain to appreciate him (*not*: themselves); he can do something about being worthy of trust but he cannot bring it about that people are certain to trust him; he can do something about being worthy of employment but he cannot bring it about that others are certain to employ him. Xun 6.39. Cf. Xun 27.134.

- (21) 志不免於曲私而冀人之以己為公也
 行不免於汙漫而冀人之以己為修也
 其愚陋溝壑而冀人之以己為知也
 是衆人也

The *hoi polloi* are like this: although their intentions are not free from provincialism and bias they hope people will find them (*not*: themselves) even-handed; although their demeanour is not free from dirty dealings they hope people will find them civilized; although they are stupid, vulgar and as dumb as a plank they hope people will find them knowledgeable. Xun 8.119.

(22) 不患莫己知

I do not worry about no one knowing me. LY 4.14. Cf. LY 14.39.

(23) 不患人之不己知

I do not worry about people not knowing me. LY 1.16. Cf. LY 14.30.

(24) 不病人之不己知

I do not take a serious view of the fact that others do not know me. LY 15.19.

(25) 及昭公即位懼其殺己也

When Duke Zhao ascended to the throne Gao Ju-mi feared that the Duke would kill him. HF 39.(293.11). Cf. Zuo Huan 17 fu.

(26) 濟陽君因僞令人矯王命而謀攻己

Making use of fraud, the ruler of Ji Yang ordered people to forge royal orders and to plan to attack himself. HF 30.(186.1).

(27) 用民者將至之此極也而民毋可與慮害己者

When in employing people you are about to get them to this point, they are impossible to plot with against you (i.e. they will not join any plot against you). Guan SBBY 6.5a.

(28) 皆喜人之同乎己

They all are pleased when others are in agreement with them. Zhuang 11.57.

(29) 卒有寇難之事又望百姓之為己死
不可得

Then in the end when there are problems with robbers he goes on to hope that the people will die for him. That is a vain hope! Xun 11.130.

(30) 而惡人之異於己

... and they hate it when people differ from them. Zhuang 11.57.

(31) 致亂而惡人之非己也

They are extremely unruly but hate people to criticize them. Xun 2.4.

(32) 心如虎狼行如禽獸而又惡人之賊己也

They have the mentality of tigers and wolves and behave like wild animals, and on top of that they go on to hate it when others regard them as robbers. Xun 2.4.

(33) 是故江河不惡小谷之滿己也

Therefore streams and rivers do not hate small brooks to fill them up. Mo 1.16.

(34) 人主安能不欲民之衆為己用也
使民衆為己用奈何？

How can a ruler of men fail to want people in large numbers to be at his disposal. How (then) can one bring it about that people in large numbers are at one's disposal? Guan SBBY 6.4b.

(35) 故欲民之懷樂己者必服道德而勿厭也

Thus, if you wish the people to rejoice in yourself you must submit to the Way and its Power and not get tired of it. Guan SBBY 20.7b.

(36) 致不肖而欲人之賢己

They are extremely incompetent and want people to consider them as competent. Xun 2.4.

(37) 故君子者信矣而亦欲人之信己也
忠矣而亦欲人之親己也
修正治辨矣而亦欲人之善己

The gentleman therefore is trustworthy and he also wants others to believe him (be faithful towards him), he is loyal and also wants others to feel close to him, he cultivates correctness and discrimination and also wants others to approve of him. Xun 4.35, cf. also Xun 4.34.

(38) 下怨上令不行而求敵之勿謀己不可得也

When one's subjects hate their superiors, and when one's orders are not carried out, then to demand that the enemy not plot against one is an impossible demand. Guan SBBY 1.8b.

(39) 不能利民而求民之親愛己不可得也
民不親不愛而求其為己用為己死不可得也

To be unable to do anything useful for people and to demand that they feel close to one and love one is an impossible demand. If the people do

not feel close to one and do not love one then to demand that they be at one's disposal (lit.: be used by one) and die for one, that is an impossible demand. Xun 12.32 (Note the treacherous parallelism between 為己用 and 為己死)

- (40) 伯有聞鄭人之盟己也怒
聞子皮之甲不與攻己也喜

When the Earl heard of the people of Zheng making a covenant with reference to him he got angry; when he heard that Zi Pi's forces had not joined the attack on him he was glad. Zuo Xiang 30.7. Cf. Legge 557.

- (41) 使公孫言己

He made Gong Sun speak on his behalf. Zuo Ai 14.3.

- (42) 羿工乎中微而拙乎使人無譽己

Yi's achievement was hitting small targets; he was hopeless when it came to making people not praise him. Zhuang 23.72.

- (43) 使人授己國

(Ai Tuo) makes people give him their states. Zhuang 5.42.

- (44) 莫危乎使下畏己

Nothing is more dangerous than bringing it about that one's subordinates are afraid of one. Xun 18.9.

- (45) 思人衆兵彊能害己者必齊也

I am concerned that Qi certainly is the state that with its large population and its strong army can harm me. Guan SBBY 9.3b.

- (46) 知其入而已己疾也

He knows that if he takes it in (eats it) it will stop his disease. HF 32.(199.13).

- (47) 王不知客之欺己

The King did not know that his retainers were cheating him. HF 32(201.14).

- (48) 不知至人之以是為己桎梏邪

He does not know that the accomplished man considers these things as his (the accomplished man's) fetters and handcuffs. Zhuang 5.30. (We might also translate 'fetters of the Self'. But there is no need to do so.)

(49) 於是天下之諸侯知桓公之為己勤也

At that point the feudal lords of the empire knew (realized) that Duke Huan was doing his best for them. Guan SBBY 8.16.

If the reference of this *ji* was grammatically ambiguous and this could refer to Huan's selfishness, this surely would not have been a very good sentence to use.

(50) 桓公知諸侯之歸己也

Duke Huan realized that the feudal lords were turning to him. Guan SBBY 8.16a.

(51) 桓公知天下小國諸侯多與己

Duke Huan realized that the majority of the small states and the feudal lords of the empire were siding with him. Guan SBBY 8.16a.

(52) 夢河神謂己曰...

He dreamt that the Spirit of the River told him . . . Zuo Xi 28.6.

(53) 夢天使與己蘭

She dreamt that a messenger from Heaven gave her an orchid. Zuo Xuan 3.9. For closely parallel examples see Zuo Cheng 2.4, Cheng 5 fu, Zhao 2.2: if the object of the main clause of a report about a dream is the dreamer himself, he is regularly referred to by *ji*:

(54) 得夢啓北首而寢於盧門之外
己為鳥而集於其上。

"Tih dreamt that K'e was lying outside the Loo gate with his head to the north, and that he himself was a bird which was settled upon him." Zuo Ai 26 fu 2, tr. Legge 859.

(55) 以為不知己者詬厲也

He considers that those who do not know him carp and criticize (him). Zhuang 4.74.

(56) 以天下之美為盡在己

He considered that all the beauty of the world was in him. Zhuang 17.2.
Not: 'in itself'.

(57) 使人以為己節

He makes others consider himself modest. Zhuang 23.64. (More common is: 以己為)

(58) 以此求治譬猶使人三裊而毋負己

Seeking orderly government in this way is like making a person perform three complete turns and never turn his back on oneself (in the process). Mo 25.43. (Mei 1929: 128 translates differently.)

(59) 夫去所愛而用所賢未免使一人場己也

Now if one dismisses those one loves and employs those one considers as competent one inescapably causes one man to pull wool over one's eyes. HF 39(259.9) (Liao II.197 is inadequate.) Chen Qi-tian 1973: 374 is instructive: "This *ji* 己 stands for *zhi* 之," he says, commenting on the following passage:

(60) 不加知而使賢者場己則必危

Now if you do not increase your knowledge but cause competent men to pull wool over your eyes, then you are sure to be in danger. HF 39. *Ibidem.*

(61) 非神也夫唯能使人之耳目助己視聽

使人之吻助己言談，
 使人之心助己之思慮
 使人之股肱助己動作

It was no spirit but only the ability to cause others' ears and eyes to help one's own sight and hearing, to cause others' lips to help one's own talking, to cause others' minds to help one's own thinking and planning, to cause others' limbs to help one's own work. Mo 12.65.

Fascinatingly, complex object noun phrases involving *ji* behave essentially like embedded sentences:

(62) 射者正己而後發發而不中不怨勝己者

The archer only lets off the arrow after he has corrected himself. When his arrow has failed to hit the target, he bears no grudge against the person who has won the better of him. Meng 2A7. (*zhi sheng* 自勝 in contexts like these would mean 'the man who conquered himself'.)

(63) 故人主不可以不加心於利己死者

Therefore the ruler must keep an eye on those who would profit from his death. HF 17(84.3).

(64) 虎之與人異類而媚養己者

A tiger is different from a man, but he fawns upon those who nourish him. Zhuang 4.62.

Never: ‘those who nourish themselves’.

That our point on the reference of *ji* in embedded clauses matters for the comprehension of AC sentences is illustrated by the following:

(65) 秦知王以己之故歸燕城也秦必德王

When Qin learns that you have returned Yan’s ten cities for her sake, she will be sure to consider you as generous. ZGC 445 (II.99) SBCK 9.3b.

Crump 1970: 509 takes *ji* to refer to the subject of the embedded clause: “When Ch’in learns that you have returned Yen’s ten cities of your own accord she will be beholden to your majesty.” We have seen that such a reading is simply ungrammatical.

It seems clear that the contrast between *zi* and *ji* in embedded sentences reduces the ambiguity that would otherwise be involved in such complex sentences.

Consider now *ji* in sentences embedded in embedded sentences:

(66) 彼知丘之著於己也，知丘之適楚也
以丘為必使楚王之召己。

He knows that I am clear about him. He knows that I am going to Chu. And he considers that I am bound to make the King of Chu summon him. Zhuang 25.36.

(67) 夫人知王之不以己為妒也

The wife knew that the king did not think that she was jealous. HF 31.589.

(Incidentally: from the context it is explicitly clear that the wife knew the king thought (had seen the evidence for) *that she was not jealous!* I wish I had found more examples of this sort.)

Ji seems to refer back to the subject of *the main* clause, not as one might think, necessarily *the next higher* clause. Moreover, reflexivization in sentences like the last two seems *obligatory*.

(68) 不識舜不知象之將殺己與

I do not know whether Shun knew that Xiang was about to kill him. Meng 5A2. Cf. Xin Xu 5.163, LSCQ 16.2.

Here *ji* definitely does not refer to the subject of the highest clause in the given context. But grammatically speaking I suspect we have an ambiguity of reference: it seems to me the reasons why we do not translate ‘... was about to kill me’ are not grammatical reasons.

(69) 儆真所以使人遺物反己

In Chapter Two people (readers) are made to dismiss things and turn back to the Self. HNT 21.2a. Cf. HNT 11.7a.

The idiomatic phrase *fan ji* 反己 in contexts like these could also be construed as a counterexample to the thesis that embedded *ji* refers to a noun phrase outside its own clause. We could translate: ‘Chapter Two is that by which people are made to dismiss outside things and turn back on themselves.’ But on the other hand there is no doubt whatsoever 1. that Huai Nan Zi in general and the Postface HNT 21 are strongly influenced by Taoism, and 2. that *ji* 己 is a well-established nominal philosophical term meaning ‘Self’ in Taoist texts, particularly in Zhuang Zi which has close links with HNT. Of course, also in HNT itself it is a nominal technical term; the following example seems especially instructive in this connection:

(70) 許由重己

Xu You set great store by his Self. HNT 1. 14a SBCK.

The idea is *not at all* that Xu You thought highly of himself; the point is that he valued his Self higher than external ‘things’ like political achievements.

The phrases *fan ji* 反己 and *fan qiu zhi yu ji* 反求之於(諸)己 often acquire a deeper metaphysical significance in Taoist texts than they have in LY and Meng.

3.2 Reflexive *zi* 自

Compare the following:

- (A) a 身勝
b 身自勝
c 親勝
d 親自勝
e 躬勝
f 躬自勝
- } He himself was victorious
- (B) 自勝 He won over himself

I call the reflexives in (A) subject reflexives, and I call *zi* 自 an object reflexive.

I shall first show that *zi* can under special syntactic conditions refer to the subject of the verb it precedes.

I then demonstrate in detail that in the pattern *zi* 自 VERB *qi* 其 OBJECT the *zi* always refers to the object so that the idiom is regularly translatable by something like ‘the subject verbs its own object’ and not by anything like ‘the subject itself verbs its object’.

Finally, I derive the ‘adverbial’ use of *zi*, where it is usually translated by ‘of itself, naturally, etc.’, from its function as an object reflexive. This derivation is used to explain the peculiar distribution of ‘adverbial’ *zi* in AC-sentences.

It may be useful at the outset to mention that the object reflexive *zi* regularly refers to the subject of a sentential complement:

- (1) 自以為不如

He believed himself not to be as handsome. ZGC. Shadick 1968: 753 translates this passage: “(He) independantly formed the opinion that (he) was not as handsome (as Mr. Hsü).” But in fact the construction *zi yiwei* 自以為 is very frequent in AC and is always synonymous with the also current *yi ji wei* 以己為. (Compare the idiom *zi cheng* 自稱

which regularly means ‘call oneself something’ and never anything like ‘oneself call something by a certain name’).

By contrast the subject reflexive *qin* 親 can only refer to the embedded clause by adverb-raising:

- (2) 寡人親使郎中視事
有罪者赦之貧窮不足者與之，其足以戰民乎。

If I order officials to personally look into matters, to pardon the guilty and make presents to the poor, would that be sufficient to cause the people to fight? HF 34 (246.15).

Grammatically, we could of course translate: ‘If I personally order etc.’, but that does not seem to me to make very good sense. The point seems to be that officials are to look personally into individual problems. (For the phenomenon of adverb-raising, compare Chapter I, Neg-raising in AC.)

- (3) 知狗而自謂不知犬過也

To know what a dog is and to say of oneself that one does not know what a *quan* is, is a mistake. Mo 41.27.

Cikoski 1976:106 gives the following interesting example, unfortunately without indicating his source:

- (4) 臣好以事自為功

“The minister was fond of considering (state) affairs as his own accomplishment.”

I myself have never come across *zi* in this sort of construction. But compare

- (5) 天下之人各為其所欲焉以自為方

The people of the world each work for what they desire and take that as their own guiding principle. Zhuang 33.14.

It looks as if *yi zi wei X* 以自為 X is an idiom for ‘consider as one’s own X’. But one would need more evidence to be sure.

Zi 自 referring to the subject

When there is an object pronoun *zhi* 之 *zi* will quite regularly refer to the subject. I suppose one might say that this is because the object is then ‘unreflexivizable’:

(6) 自為之與

Does he make them himself? Meng 3A4.6.

(7) 如必自為而後用之是率天下而露也

If one must make things oneself and only then can use them, then this will lead the whole world to poverty. Meng 3A4.6. Cf. Yang Bo-jun 1960:132.

(8) 魯君之使者至嚴闔自對之

When the messenger from the ruler of Lu arrived, Yan He himself answered the call. Zhuang 28.25.

(9) 君自行之

Your majesty should administer these things yourself. HF 7(27.15). Cf. HF 35(252.2).

(10) 是名傳之而實令天子自取之也

This is nominally to abdicate in favour of him, but in fact to cause the heir apparent to take the position himself. HF 35(257.8). Two examples. Cf. Xun 10.42 and Guan 54(3.32–2).

(11) 鄭自城之

Zheng herself has fortified the place. Guan 23(2.4–6).

(12) 何故自為之？為之者役夫之道也。

Why should he do it himself? Doing these things is the way of the slave. Xun 11.60.

(*Wei zhi zhe* 為之者 is *not* ‘he who does it’. *Zhe* does *not* always ‘substitute’ for the subject of the ‘nucleus’ that precedes it.)

In view of the preceding examples it becomes possible to understand properly the following passage from Mencius:

(13) 故君子欲自得之也

Therefore the gentleman wants to achieve the Way *himself*. Meng 4B14.

Lau 1963:130 translates: “This is why a gentleman wishes to find the Way in himself.” But there is no evidence that *zi* functions this way in AC. Yang Bo-jun translates *zi* as 自覺地. But that is not something *zi* is ordinarily taken to mean, (Yang 1960:189). Zhu Xi paraphrases *zi*

as *ziran* 自然 but *zi* rarely means anything of that sort in front of a verb-object phrase.

It seems to me that my ‘mechanical’ way of taking the sentence makes perfectly straightforward sense: Mencius is pointing out that the gentleman cultivates *himself*, and only as a result of that is he able to do things for others.

One exception to our generalization that I found is itself of special interest:

(14) 鞶繫解因自結

The shoestrings got untied. So he tied them up himself. HF 33 (222.4). Chen Qi-you 1958:687 thinks that the context is corrupt and quotes Taiping yulan’s ‘quotation’ from Han Fei: 視左右而自結之. As if this was not enough we also have a recapitulation of this story from presumably a different source which reads: 因自結之 on the same page of HF.

Another exception that I am aware of is this:

(15) 自織之與
 曰否以粟易之
 曰許矣為不自織
 曰害於耕。

Has he woven it himself?

No, he has bartered for it with grain.

Why did he not weave *it* himself?

That would do damage to his agriculture. Meng 3A4.4.

It is clear that the question is ‘why did he not weave the cap himself?’ The *zhi* 之 is left out because of the negation *bu* 不, a frequent phenomenon in AC.

Note, incidentally, that there is no danger of understanding *zi jie* 自結 or *zi zhi* 自織 reflexively.

It is clear that in the pattern *zi* 自 VERB *zhi* 之, *zi* regularly refers to the subject. And moreover in none of the examples of this pattern that I found can *zi* be taken ‘adverbially’ so that we would translate ‘the subject of itself verbed the object’.

I conclude that reflexive *zi* can definitely refer to the subject of the verb it precedes. But *zi* tends to function in this way only¹ when the verb is transitive and when the object is *zhi* 之.

1. I have in fact come across exceptions:

(a) 魏自將過宋外黃

The current view that reflexive *zi* always refers to the object (Cf. e.g. Cikoski 1976:97) needs to be amended also in view of examples like

(16) 君非自知我也以人之言而遣我粟也

It isn't as if the ruler knew me personally. He has on the basis of other people's talk let me have grain. LSCQ 16.2.

But cases like this seem to be rare in AC.

The idiom *zi* ... *qi* 自...其

The following two sentences have clearly different meanings:

(C) He himself was mowing his lawn.

(D) He was mowing his own lawn.

Even assuming that *his* in (C) refers to the subject of the sentence, there is a semantic contrast between (C) and (D) which becomes clear in the following paraphrases:

(C) It was he himself who was mowing his lawn.

(D) It was his own lawn that he was mowing.

Mastery of the English language must involve recognition of relatively subtle semantic differences of this kind. We use sentences like (C) and (D) under different circumstances. Somehow we have to learn the principles underlying such different use. A good grammar must try to make such principles explicit.

Now AC makes a closely related distinction which needs attention if we are to understand the language properly. Compare the following:

Ca 身自殺其父

b 身殺其父

c 親自殺其父

d 親殺其父

e 躬自殺其父

f 躬殺其父

} He himself killed his father

The heir apparent of Wei was himself leading his army and passing through Wai Huang in Song. ZGC 305 (II.139).

I would have expected *qin* 親 instead of *zi* 自 here. And I have no good explanation for this example. Could one take *jiang* 將 causatively here 'making himself the leader'? I do not know. Our restriction on the use of *zi* does not apply to Han compilations like Shuo Yuan, perhaps it does not apply to ZGC either.

D 自殺其父 He killed his own father

It seems clear that subject reflexives do not affect any *qi* 其 in the object, and this is just what one would predict:

(17) 越王親自鼓其士而進之

The King of Yue himself drummed his soldiers on and led them forward. Mo 15.24.

(18) 內索外圍必身自執其度量。

“In ferreting out evil within the palace and controlling it outside, you yourself must hold fast to your standards and measurements.” HF 8 (35.1) tr. Watson 1964:41. The point Han Fei Zi is making is *not* that the ruler must necessarily have special standards of his own and hold on to them. The point is that he himself must remain in charge of whatever standards he has and must not allow others to take control of their application.

(19) 吾非與之並世同時親聞其聲見其色也…

It isn't as if I was of the same generation or contemporary with them and had myself heard their voices and seen their faces . . . Mo 16.49. Cf. Zhuang 25.37.

Not: ‘ . . . and had heard my own voice and seen my own face.’

(20) 武王親釋其縛

King Wu himself took off the man's fetters. Zuo Xi 6.

But now see what happens when we have the object reflexive *zi* instead of one of the subject reflexives:

(21) 介子推至忠也自割其股以食文公

Jie Zi Tui was extremely loyal. He carved out (a piece of flesh from) *his own* thigh in order to give it Duke Wen to eat. Zhuang 29.43. Cf. Zuo Zhuang 30 fu 2.

(22) 是猶使人之子孫自賊其父母也

This is like making children and grandchildren rob *their own* parents. Xun 15.17. Cf. Li Ji II, 347.

(23) 為醫不能自治其病

A doctor cannot cure *his own* disease. HNT 16.16b.

(24) 凡自虐其君曰戕

Generally, if one commits violence against *one's own* ruler that is called *shi*. Zuo Xuan 18.4. Cf. Shuo Yuan 7.203 自攻其主 'attack one's own ruler'.

(25) 見雄雞自斷其尾

He saw a cock break *its own* tail. GY 3.2755.

(26) 自恃其不可侵則強與弱奚其擇焉

If he relies on his own unassailability, then what difference does it make to him whether the enemy is strong or weak? HF 38 (289.8).
Not: 'If he himself relies on his unassailability ...' The question whether the enemy relies on his unassailability, for example, does not arise in the context. (Here again I suspect that the reading *yue* 曰 for *zi* 自 got into some editions because the editors were unaware of the idiom *zi* 自 ... *qi* 其. Cf. Zuo Xuan 18.4 for a similar case).

(27) 因自傷其身以視君

So she injured her own body to show it to the ruler. HF 14. (73.3). Cf. *Ibidem* 73.8.

Not: 'She herself injured her body ...' There is no question whatever of anyone else injuring her.

(28) 自智其計則無以其敗窮之

If he considers his own plans as wise, then don't put him at a loss for words by mentioning his defeats. HF 12 (63.15). There are two more exactly parallel examples in this passage.

(29) 能見百步之外而不能自見其睫

The eye can see further than a hundred paces, but it cannot see its own eyelashes. HF 22 (124.4).

Not: '... but it itself cannot see its eyelashes.' Such an interpretation would make sense, but it appears to be ungrammatical.

(30) 暴國之君素自不能用其兵矣

The rulers of cruel states are unable to employ their own armies. Xun 9.109.

Not: 'The rulers of cruel states themselves ...' The point is that these rulers lose control over *their own* army. (Unfortunately, I do not un-

derstand the use of *an* 案 as a particle in Xun Zi generally, and in this sentence, particularly. The word precedes *zi* 自 several times in Xun).

(31) 雖有國士之力不能自舉其身

Even the strongest man in the state cannot lift his own body. Xun 29.17.

Not: ‘... cannot himself lift his body.’ The question is not who can lift him but what he can lift.

(32) 不自尚其事不自尊其身

He does not hold his own services in high esteem, nor does he honour his own person. Li Ji II.494. Cf. *ibidem* II.495.

The most difficult example for my interpretation of the idiom *zi* ... *qi* that I have come across is this:

(33) 故人主自用其刑德則群臣畏其威而歸其利矣

“Hence, if the ruler wields his punishments and favours, the ministers will fear his sternness and flock to receive his benefits.” HF 7 (26.16) tr. Watson 1964:30.

One is sorely tempted to read the AC as ‘if the ruler himself wields...’ in the context. But cases like this are rare.

The pattern in question may even be expanded:

(34) 自恃其力伐其功譽其智

He relied on his own strength, bragged about his own achievements and praised his own wisdom. Mo 18.31.

We definitely cannot translate ‘He himself relied on his strength...’ Cf. ZGZHJS 115: 無自恃計專恃楚之救 ‘If one does not rely on one’s own plans and solely relies on help from Chu...’)

(35) 自事其心者哀樂不易施乎前

For the man who serves his own heart grief and pleasure do not shift places in front of him. Zhuang 4.42. Further clear examples are in Zhuang 5.19; 6.14; 8.31. My point is not that any really competent translator would get sentences of this sort wrong, but that he is constrained by a grammatical rule that *forces* him to get them right. It is not an intelligent perception of the contexts that allows us to get these sentences right, it is a linguistic rule. If the rule looks excessively subtle to some, this is because we are so used to an unfocused way of looking at the semantics of AC sentences.

Our principle seems to apply also to embeddings with *qi* 其:

- (36) 且人之所急無如其身
不能自使其無死安能使王長生哉

Moreover people are more urgently concerned about their own person than about anything else. If he cannot cause himself to be immortal how can he make your majesty have a long life? HF 22 (201.15).

For *grammatical* reasons we cannot take a sentence like this to mean anything like ‘... If she herself cannot cause him to be immortal ...’

Adverbial *zi* 自

Especially in Taoist texts *zi* is often translated by expressions like ‘of itself’, ‘naturally’ etc. Let us call this use of *zi* the *adverbial* use of the word as opposed to the more common *reflexive* uses.

It seems plausible to say that the adverbial use of *zi* is derived from the reflexive use. Consider the examples of adverbial *zi* in Lao Zi:

- (37) 万物將自化

A. The myriad things will transform *themselves*.

B. “The myriad creatures will be transformed of their own accord.”

Lao 37 (tr. Lau 1963:96). Cf. Zhuang 11.54.

- (38) 天下將自定

A. The empire will put *itself* at peace.

B. “The empire will be at peace of its own accord.”

Lao 37 (tr. Lau 1963:96).

- (39) 夫莫之命而常自然

A. Now nothing decrees this, they regularly cause *themselves* to be so.

B. Nothing decrees this, they are always thus of themselves.

Lao 51.

- (40) 我無為而民自化

我好靜而民自正

我無事而民自富

我無欲而民自樸

I take no action and the people transform themselves; I prefer stillness and the people rectify themselves; I am not meddlesome and the

people make themselves prosperous; I am free from desire and they make themselves simple. Lao 57.

(41) 不召而自來

It does not summon, but things cause *themselves* to come. Lao 73.

(42) 形將自正

Shapes will correct *themselves*. Zhuang 11.36.

(43) 若天之自高地之自厚日月之自明夫何脩焉。

As for Heaven's causing *itself* to be high, Earth's causing *itself* to be deep and the sun's and moon's causing *themselves* to be bright, why should they cultivate these attributes? Zhuang 21.37. This example suggests that my derivation of adverbial *zi* is essentially *etymological*:

(44) 人不能自止於足而亡 (忘) 其富之涯

- A. People cannot stop *themselves* at the point of contentment, and they forget the limits of wealth.
- B. People cannot of their own accord stop at the point of contentment, and they forget the limits of wealth.

(45) 車不自行或使之

Carts do not cause *themselves* to go, somebody brings that about. LSCQ 19.4.

(46) 多行不義必自斃于姑待之

He has done many unjust things. He is sure to cause *himself* to die a violent death. You just wait a little while! Zuo Yin 1.4.

If my derivation of the adverbial function of *zi* is correct, one might expect that adverbial *zi* is very rare before verb/object phrases. For example, we would expect that a hypothetical sentence like 自 verb object would tend to mean something like 自 verb 其 object if it occurred at all.

The facts turn out to be as predicted. When the verb preceded by *zi* has an object, this object is in the vast majority of cases preceded by *qi*. In the few cases where there is no *qi* before the object, *zi* does not tend to function adverbially:

(46) 是自求禍也

This is to seek one's own disaster. Meng 2A4 (archaic!)

Not: 'This is naturally to seek disaster.'

(47) 苴布之衣而自飯牛

Wearing clothes of coarse hemp he was himself feeding his water buffaloes. Zhuang 28.24. Cf. LSCQ 9.3. and ZGZ HJS 115 in ex. (34) above.

Not: 'He was naturally feeding buffaloes.'

The explanatory power of my derivation of 'adverbial' *zi* lies in the fact that it accounts for the otherwise strange absence (or in any case extreme rarity) of adverbial *zi* in front of verb/object phrases.

There is an illuminating example in Shu:

(48) 天作孽猶可違自作孽不可活

(The Tai Jia says:) When Heaven produces calamities they can still be avoided. When one produces *one's own* calamities they cannot be survived. Meng 4A8. Cf. Shu 14.320.

(*Bu ke huo* 不可活 is hard to understand precisely, but the general meaning is clear.)

I have a distinct intuition that if we had *ji zuo nie* 己作孽 that would leave open the question whose disaster it is that one causes oneself, while with *zi* 自 we are entitled to 'understand' a *qi*: 自作其孽. But the story of *zi* in the Shu Jing is too involved to be told here.

3.3 Interrogative Pronouns

Just as pre-verbal quantifiers may be divided into subject quantifiers and object quantifiers, interrogative pronouns may be divided into interrogative subject-pronouns and interrogative object-pronouns. The point is not worth labouring, but I find it worth making.

The pronouns to be discussed here are *shui* 誰 *shu* 孰, *he* 何, *he* 曷 and *xi* 奚. But I am aware that for example *an* 安 'where' could possibly also be analysed as an interrogative object-pronoun with the scope restricted to 'directives' or places.

Shui

I call *shui* an interrogative subject-pronoun because it most often occurs in subject position, and because it regularly refers to the subject in sentences like the following:

(1) 夫誰與王敵

Who will be a match for your Majesty? Meng 1A5.

(2) 誰竊

Who will steal? Mo 14.14.

Not: 'Who will they steal from?'

(3) 誰賊

Who will become a robber? Mo 14.15.

Not: 'Whom will they rob?'

(4) 誰亂

Who will create chaos? *Ibidem*.

Not: 'What will they wreck?'

(5) 誰攻

Who will attack people? *Ibidem*.

Not: 'Whom will they attack?'

(6) 誰勝

Who wins? Mo 43.80.

Not: 'Whom does one win over?'

(7) 又誰怨

Who else will be resentful? LY 20.2 Cf. Zuo Zhao 1.3.

Not: 'Whom will one resent?'

(8) 誰溺於是

Who has drowned here? HF 31 (185.14).

Not: 'Whom have you drowned here?'

(9) 又誰咎也

"Who will blame him?" Yi Jing 13, tr. Legge p. 64.

Moreover, in sentences with a generic subject at the beginning, *shui* (like *jie* 'all') regularly refers to that subject:

(10) 人誰無過

What man is without fault? Zuo Xuan 2.4.

(11) 百姓誰敢敖

Who of the people will dare to be extravagant? Guan 35 (2.49).

(12) 人誰不死

Who is immortal? Zuo Zhao 2.3, Zhao 25.8, Ding fu 1.

Often you find *qi* behind the 'topic' of *shui*:

(13) 國內之民其誰不為臣

Who of the people in the state will fail to be subservient? Zuo Zhuang 14 fu 1.

(14) 晉大夫其誰先亡

Who of the grandees of Jin will be ruined first? Zuo Xiang 14.3.

(15) 諸侯其誰不欣焉望楚而歸之?

Who of the feudal lords will fail to look gladly towards Chu and become its follower? Zuo Zhao 1.3.

When the object is topicalized and preposed, *shui* may refer to it:

(16) 鄉人長於伯兄一歲則誰敬

Suppose a villager is one year older than your elder brother, then whom would you give the place of honour? Meng 6A5.

But I have not found many cases of this sort.

When the noun phrase preceding *shui* is non-generic, for example a pronoun, *shui* regularly asks for the object: (Compare the similar behaviour of *jie* 皆 in sentences with unquantifiable subjects.)

(17) 公誰欲與

Whom, my Duke, do you want to give it to? Zhuang 24.52.

In this example *shui* refers, strictly speaking, even to the object of an embedded verb *yu* 'give'.

I also found an interesting case of *shui* as a 'pivot':

(18) 若其王在陽翟君主將令誰往

If a real king were at Yang Di, whom would you order to go there? Zhan Guo Ce No. 25 SBCK 2.5a.

(19) 公子誰恃

Who is the prince relying on? Zuo Xi 9 fu 2.

(20) 吾誰欺

Whom do I cheat? LY 9.12.

(21) 子行三軍則誰與

If you were running the armed forces of a large state, whom would you associate with? LY 7.11.

(22) 吾非斯人之徒與而誰與

If I do not associate with people of this sort, then who am I to associate with? LY 18.6.

(23) 駕驥與羊子將誰馭

If the alternative is between putting thoroughbreds or sheep under the yoke, which would you drive? Mo 46.1.

(24) 寡人將誰朝而可

"Whom should I bring to court to accomplish this?" ZGC 456 (II.109) SBCK 9.16a.

(25) 其子之肉尚食之其誰不食

If he even eats his own son's flesh, whom would he not eat? ZGC 294 (I.26) SBCK 7.2a.

The pronomina nature of *shui* is neatly illustrated by the following:

(26) 於誰責而可乎

On whom is it right to put the blame? Zhuang 25.50.

(27) 是誰之過與

Whose fault is this? LY 16.1 Cf. Lao 4.

The preponderance of *ye* after predicative *shui* is another symptom:

(28) 追我者誰也

Who is it that is pursuing me? Meng 4B24.

(29) 怒者其誰耶

Who is it that does the blowing? Zhuang 2.9.

Perhaps one should rather say that *shui* is *pattern-free*. By contrast, *shu* 孰 appears *pattern-bound*. Its distribution and phonology remind us of quantifiers. *mo* 莫, *huo* 或, *ge* 各.

Shu 孰

Shu must count as interrogative subject-pronoun because in AC it always refers to the subject, never to an object.¹ Nevertheless, *shu* contrasts in many interesting ways with the interrogative subject-pronoun *shui*. For a start, of course, *shu*, unlike *shui*, is not restricted to persons. Also, *shu*, unlike *shui*, is never followed by *zhi* 之 or preceded by *yu* 於. And naturally, there are some idiomatic constructions into which only *shu*, but never *shui* can enter, e.g. *shu yu* 孰與 '(or) should one rather'. Finally, *shu* is very often used to mean 'which of them' in a way that *shui* rarely is.

All this is well-trodden grammatical ground. But there is a further contrast between *shui* and *shu* that has, so far, received little – if any – attention. Consider:

1. There is a puzzling exception to this in Xun 5.28 聖王有百吾孰法焉 'There are hundreds of sages, whom should one take as a model?' Here *shu* behaves as an ordinary subject-interrogative that can under certain conditions refer to the object. There is another tricky case in LY 19.12. Cf. Shuo Yan 2.50.

(30) 哀公問弟子孰好學

Duke Ai asked who of the disciples was the most ardent learner. LY 6.3.

Duke Ai is here asking a polite question. My claim is that if he had said 弟子誰好學, he would have asked a less polite question, namely 'Who among your disciples likes to study?' *Shu* quite regularly precedes verb phrases that must be translated into English in the 'comparative' or even the 'superlative' degree. *Shui* hardly ever does. The point seems worth documenting in some detail since it is important for the comprehension of many AC-sentences.

Consider the uses of *shu* in Lao Zi: six times it occurs in sentence-initial position as in

(31) 孰知其故

Who knows the reason? Lao 73.

The only other use of *shu* is in Lao 44

(32) 名與身孰親
身與貨孰多
得與亡孰病

"Your name or your person,

Which is dearer?

Your person or your goods,

Which is worth more?

Gain or loss,

Which is a greater bane?" Lao 44, tr. D. C. Lau 1963: 105.

As far as I know it has not been noticed so far, that *shu* in this latter pattern nearly *always* precedes a verb phrase that has to be interpreted in the 'comparative degree'. I have only found a single, late instance of *shu* in sentences like: *Of X and Y, who is your husband?*² On the other hand there are plenty of examples like the following:

(33) 木與夜孰長

Which is longer, a night or a tree? Mo 43.8. There are six exactly parallel examples in Mo 43.

2. Xin Xu 4.5 成與黃孰可 'Who is the right man, Cheng or Huang?' Of course, I am not suggesting that outside this precise pattern, *shu* 孰 cannot precede a non-comparative verb. Compare Zhuang 22.60 孰是而孰非 'Which (of the two) is right, which is wrong?'

(34) 吾子與子路孰賢

Who is *more* talented, you or Zi Lu? Meng 2A1 Cf. LY 11.16.
The pattern also occurs in dependent clauses:

(35) 王自以為與周公孰仁且智

Who does your majesty think is *more* humane and *more* wise: yourself or the Duke of Zhou? Meng 2B9.

(36) 禮與食孰重

Which is *more* important, ritual or food? Meng 6B1.

(37) 膾炙與羊棗孰美

Which is *more* tasty, mince and roast or jujubes?
Meng 7B36.

(38) 女與回也孰愈

Who is *more* advanced, Hui or yourself? LY 5.9.

(39) 父與夫孰親

Who is *closer*, father or husband? Zuo Huan 15.4.
The *yu* in the pattern may be left out:

(40) 趙衰趙盾孰賢

Who is *more* talented, Zhao Shuai or Zhao Dun? Zuo Wen 7.7.

Finally, another kind of ellipsis in the pattern:

(41) 晉大夫與楚孰賢

Which are *more* talented, the grandees of Jin or of Chu? Zuo Xiang 26 fu 6.

(42) 万物一齊孰長孰短

All things are one and the same! Which should be *more* important?
Which *less* important? Zhuang 17.44.

(43) 申不害公孫鞅此二家之言孰急於國

Speaking of Shen Bu-hai and Gong-sun Yang: which of the speeches of these two gentlemen are of *more* urgent importance to the state? HF 43. (304.2) Cf. Guan 35 (2.45–14).

(44) 教人耕與不教人耕而獨耕者其功孰多

Who achieves *more*: a person who teaches others to till the fields or the person who without teaching others to till the field, tills it himself? Mo 49.51. Cf. Guo Yu 19.219–13.

Remarkably often the verb phrase after *shu* has to be rendered in the comparative even when there are no two candidates mentioned explicitly in the topic:

- (45) 主孰有道
將孰有能
天地孰得
法令孰行
兵衆孰強
士卒孰練
賞罰孰明

Which of the rulers has *more* of the Way?

Which of the generals has *more* ability?

Who has the *better* climate and terrain?

Whose orders are *more* reliably carried out?

Which military force is *stronger*?

Whose soldiers are *better* exercised?

Whose rewards and punishments are clearer? Sun 1.13.

- (46) 凡有季孫與無季孫於我孰利

Which, in the end, is *more* advantageous to me, the presence or the absence of the Ji Sun? HF 31. (184.2).

Note that *shu li* 孰利 cannot be taken to mean ‘what advantage’.

- (47) 其戰不知孰善勝之惡乎在

In the struggle I do not know who is better and where victory will lie. Zhuang 24.23.

When the ‘topic’ of *shu* is not a set of two alternative candidates but a more vague, larger class, we very often have to translate the verb phrase after *shu* in the ‘superlative degree’:

- (48) 季康子問弟子孰好學

Ji Kang Zi asked who of the disciples was the most ardent learner. LY 11.7 (Note incidentally how the line between direct and indirect discourse is not easy to draw in passages like these.)

(49) 群臣孰賢

Who of the various ministers is the most talented? HF 33 (228.16).

(50) 在於身者孰為利

Of the things that pertain to the body, which is the most useful? Guan 32 (2.38).

(51) 天下之害孰為大

Which is the most harmful thing in the world? Mo 16.2

Now contrast the following most instructive AC examples with *shui* where there is a choice between explicit alternatives. Such examples are rare, but those that I have come across behave as predicted: they do not involve a comparative or superlative in the English translation:

(52) 駕驥與羊子將誰馭

If the alternative is between putting thoroughbreds or sheep under the yoke, which would you drive? Mo 46.1.

(53) 子誰貴於此二人

“Of these two men which will you honour?” Mo 46. tr. Graham 1971:98.

There is an interesting later example in the Ai Gong Wen section of Li Ji:

(54) 敢問人道誰為大

May I ask, what is the important thing in the Way of man? Li Ji II.365. It is hard to be sure how to take *ren dao* 人道, but there is no question of translating ‘Which is more important, man or the Way?’ In any case examples like this and the following do not represent typical AC usage:

(55) 當今之時君子誰為賢

Who at present is the most talented gentleman? Shuo Yuan 8.253

***Xi* 奚 and *he* 何**

Xi does not occur in Shi at all, and only once in Shu. The distribution of *xi* in AC texts is remarkably uneven. The Gu Liang and Gong Yang commentaries which are full of questions never use it, and Zuo Zhuan has only four occurrences. The word occurs only once in the whole of

Chu Ci, not at all in Lao Zi, but over sixty times in Zhuang Zi, where it is a favourite interrogative word.

Why do so many texts manage without *xi*? The reason is simple: there is nothing that *xi* can do which *he* 何 cannot also do.³ Apparently, no AC-sentence changes meaning if a *xi* in it is replaced by *he*. On the other hand *he* is more flexible and cannot always be replaced by *xi*, for example not in phrases like *ru zhi he* 如之何 ‘how about that?’ and *he ye* 何也 ‘why is that?’ (Meng 1A3) etc.

Xi like *he* is clearly an interrogative object pronoun: it regularly asks for the object of the verb it precedes. A few examples will suffice to show this.

(56) 余奚能為

What can I do? Zuo Zhao 3 fu 6.

(57) 奚夢

What did you dream? HF 39 (295.1).

Not: ‘Who was dreaming?’

(58) 奚喪

What does one lose? Xun 22.77.

Not: ‘Who is losing?’

(59) 奚得

What does one gain? Xun 22.77.

(60) 奚之 (子將奚之)

Where are you going? Zhuang 4.1 Cf. Zhuang 12.70.

Not: ‘Who is going?’

(61) 請奚殺

3. Cikoski 1976:6 states the following principle: “An interrogative pronoun as object is always preposed before the factor.” This principle is invalidated by such phrases as *ru he* 如何 ‘be like what’, which is a common variant for *he ru* 何如. Compare also:

我將謂子何

What shall I say to you then? HF 23 (140.11).

立何而可?

What should one establish so that things will be all right? Guan 80 (3.92).

May I ask which of the two I should kill? Zhuang 20.3.

Not: 'May I ask who is to do the killing?'

(62) 美冠

What does he wear on his head? Meng 3A4.

Not: 'Who wears a hat?'

(63) 美而不知也

How could he fail to know? Meng 5A2.

Not: 'Who wouldn't know?'

(Incidentally, are we dealing with an 'adverbial' *er* 而 in this last example? In any case, *er* 而 serves to make it clear that *xi* 奚 does not here ask for the object of *zhi* 知.)

It seems to be significant that the interrogative subject pronouns may all refer to persons while the interrogative object pronouns all tend to refer to things. The reasons for this are interesting to speculate about.

Equally, it does not seem to be incidental that object interrogative pronouns like *xi* 奚 and *he* 何 regularly mean 'why', while subject pronouns almost never do. Significantly, the one case of *shui* 誰 meaning 'why' has a non-generic subject:

(64) 太師誰撞

Why, music master, did you smash it? HF 36 (269.2).

However, there is no excuse for the following exceptions: They are simply things we have to live with:

(65) 孰肯以物為事

Why should he be willing to consider things his business. Zhuang 1.34. Cf. Zhuang 1.32.

Finally, it seems to be significant that *xi* 奚 and *he* 何 occur adjectivally (*he* 何 X 'what X'), while *shu* 孰 and *shui* 誰 almost never do. Consider

(66) 誰人不親

Who will fail to feel attached to him? LSCQ 19.7.

Here, already the commentator Gao You felt there was something fishy about *shui* 誰 and bothered to comment it away: 誰，何也。

(67) 驂馬誰馬也

"Whose horses are those on the outside?" ZGC 488 (II.143).

Shui X means 'whose X?' not 'what X?'.

所善者吾則行之，其所惡者吾則改之 Tso Kiang

3.4 The So-called Pronoun *zhe* 者 and Subordinating *suo* 所

Compare the following two sentences:

- (A) His death was a disaster.
 (B) His death would be a disaster.

We note that (A) presupposes that he died while (B) just assumes for the sake of the argument that he dies. Both the shared presupposition and the stipulated assumption or hypothesis are expressed in English by the same nominalization: *his death*. A simple paraphrase brings out the difference:

- (A') *The fact that he died* was a disaster.
 (B') *If he died*, that would be a disaster.

I suggest that there is a similar difference between the following AC sentences:

- (1) 曲士不可以語於道者 束於教也

The fact that the parochial scholars should not be talked to about the Way is because they are bound up by dogma. Zhuang 17.6.

- (2) 軍擾者將不重也

If the army is restless, the general has slight authority. Sun 9.33.

Nonetheless I find it deeply significant that we *can* say, 'If parochial scholars cannot talk about the Way that is because they are bound up by dogma' for (1).

Subordinating *zhe*

Let me begin by demonstrating in some detail that *zhe* is regularly used as a subordinating particle in AC. This usage will supply an important clue for the other functions of that particle.

First, notice the frequent co-occurrence of *zhe* with *ze* 則

- (3) 我不以貨事上而求遷者
 則如以狸餌鼠爾必不冀矣

If I were to seek promotion by other means than by serving my superior with goods (bribery), then that is as if I were to bait a mouse with a weasel. There certainly is no hope. SJ 3.33 (2 parallels).

Of course, one might think of this as ‘my seeking promotion by other means . . . would be like . . .’, but in that case one has a problem with *ze* 則. Saying that *ze* 則 sometimes seems to occur between subject and predicate will *not* do: we want an *explanation* for these kinds of *ze* 則.

Take this sentence:

(4) 是故任一人之力者則烏獲不足恃

Therefore, if one relies on the strength of one man, then even (the strongman) Wu Huo is not sufficient to rely on. HNT 9.11b.

And if you find Huai Nan Zi a suspiciously late text, how about Han Fei Zi:

(5) 戰士怠於行陳者則兵弱也
農夫惰於田者則國貧也

When the soldiers are lazy about their military exercises then the army will be weak. When the peasants are lazy with their agricultural work, then the state will be poor. HF 32 (210.10).

(6) 試於軍而有功者則擢之

If after a military trial they turned out to have achievements, he elevated them. Guan 67 (3.58–14).

(7) 若不得者則憂以懼

If they do not get these things they are greatly worried, and as a result, frightened. Zhuang 18.4.

In view of examples like those above it is interesting to note that by Han times what I call ‘subordinating *zhe*’ was sometimes replaced by *ze* 則:

(8) 故居不隱者思不遠，身不佚者志不廣

Thus when one does not live in an obscure place, one’s thoughts do not range wide; when one’s person is not at ease, the perspective of one’s will is not broad. Xun 28.42.

The Shuo Yuan version of this runs as follows:

(8a) 故居不幽則思不遠…

I suspect that in (8) Xun Zi could easily have added a *ze* 則: 居不隱者則思不遠.

Consider next the *sentence* connective *er hou* 而後:

(9) 不順者而後誅之

Only when they were disobedient, did he execute them. Xun 16.59.

And given (9), what about

(10) 順者錯之

Those who obeyed, he left alone. Xun 16.59.

Why not translate literally 'if anyone obeyed, he left them alone'?

In any case, we have sentences like

(11) 賢者則貴而敬之

If someone is talented, he will respect him out of genuine esteem. Xun 13.39 (Two examples!).

And subordination of sentences often goes unmarked by any grammatical particle in AC. Thus, if there was no *ze* in (11) this would not necessarily make a difference to the grammatical structure of the sentence.

Zhe often accompanies *gou* 苟-clauses:

(12) 苟能禮者從之

If someone really understood ritual, he would follow him. Zuo Zhao 7.6.

(13) 苟無之中者必求於外

If he really lacks these things inside, he is bound to seek them outside. Xun 23.33. (Two examples!)

(14) 周之子孫苟不狂惑者，莫不為天下之顯諸侯

The sons of the Zhou, if they were not really mad or confused, all became distinguished feudal lords. Xun 8.73 Cf. Xun 12.92.

(15) 人苟不狂惑戇陋者其誰能睦是而不樂也哉

Who, if he is not really mad, confused, stupid or vulgar, could look at this without joy? Xun 11.81. Cf. Guan 76 (3.81–10).

We also find it with *bi* 比 'by the time when'

(16) 願比死者一洒之

By the time I die, I want to have wiped it all out. Meng 1A5.

(17) 且比化者無使土親膚，於人心獨無悔乎

Furthermore, does it not give some solace to be able to prevent the earth from coming into contact with the dead who is about to decompose? Meng 2B7 tr. Lau 1970:90.

I know this is not the traditional way of taking the above two passages. It has become customary to take these two passages as evidence that *bi* sometimes means 'for'. (Cf. Yang Shu-da, *Ci Quan* p. 9.) But I submit my translations above to explain how *bi* can come to look as if it means 'for'. There is a deep connection between 'when somebody is...' and 'for' in examples like (17). But I agree (16) is more problematic.

Again, we have *zhe* with *ruo* 若 'if':

(18) 若犯令者罪死不赦

If anyone fails to obey, condemn them to death without pardon. Guan 77 (3.84–1).

(19) 若宿者令人養其馬

If they spend a night (under way), one must order a man to feed their horses. Guan 18 (1.93–10).

Similarly, there are examples with *sui* 雖:

(20) 雖問道者亦未聞道

Even if he asks about the Way, he still will not hear about the Way. Zhuang 22.50.

Definitely *not*: 'Even those who ask about the Way will still not hear about it.'

***Zhe* after unmarked subordinate clauses**

We have seen that *zhe* regularly combines with other particles to mark off conditionals. It seems clear that in all these cases *zhe* is not a straightforward nominalizer. But can *zhe* by itself mark off subordination of sentences, without the aid of further particles? There is ample evidence that it can. Try taking *zhe* as a nominalizer in the following sentence:

(21) 故從山上望牛者若羊

Thus when you look at an ox from a hill, that ox looks (small) like a sheep. Xun 21.79. (Two parallels!)

I suppose those who wish to maintain the traditional view on *zhe* would have to translate, ‘Those who look at a water buffalo from a hill are sheepish (resemble sheep)’, and that would be an asinine mistake.

I do not know of any plausible way of taking *zhe* in any traditional way in (21). On first sight one might think that the following case is different:

- (22) 吾非不說子之道力不足也
力不足者中道而廢

It wasn’t as if I didn’t like your Way. My strength was insufficient . . . If your strength had been insufficient you would have given up mid-way. LY 6.12.

But it seems to me that Confucius is not here making the *general* point, ‘Someone whose strength is insufficient will give up mid-way’, and in any case I suspect he would have had to say 其力不足者中道而廢 if he *had* wanted to make that general point.

It turns out that *zhe* quite often forms the kind of ‘resumptive’ conditionals we have seen in (22):

- (23) 不刑而民善刑重也
刑重者民不敢犯

If one does not punish, and people are (nonetheless) good, that is because the punishments are severe. When punishments are severe the people dare not offend. SJ 18.140.

- (24) 野無荒草則國富，國富者強。

If in the countryside there are no wild weeds, then the state will be rich. When the state is rich it is strong. SJ 4.48.

- (25) 則國力摶，國力摶者強。

. . . then the strength of the state will be united. When the strength of the state is united, the state is strong. SJ 2.35.

Note that *the state* is strong, not its strength is strong.

- (26) 田墾則粟多，粟多則國富。
國富者兵強，兵強者戰勝，戰勝者地廣。

When fields are opened up, then grain is ample. When grain is ample,

then the state is rich. When the state is rich, the army is strong. When the army is strong, battles are won. When battles are won, the territory is expanded. Guan 48 (2.97–10).

(27) 國無三年之食者國非其國也

When a state does not have food supplies for three years, then that state is not a proper state. Mo 5.27.

(28) 四戰之國好舉兵以距鄰者國危

When a state surrounded by enemy states likes to take military action to keep the four neighbours away, then that state is in danger. SJ 12.99.

Even when the subject is not repeated in the main clause, it is not always easy to take *zhe* to be a nominalizer:

(29) 國蹶者可亡也

And if a state is in panic it can be destroyed. HF 15 (80.8).

Note that ‘a panicky state’ would be *zao guo* 蹶國. Nonetheless, of course, the paraphrase ‘A state in panic can be destroyed’ is semantically roughly adequate. But that is because the semantics of this English paraphrase involves a conditional, ‘If something is a state and in panic, then it can be destroyed’!

One might be tempted to think that the nominalizing function of *zhe* only becomes problematic when there is a subject in the clause that precedes *zhe*, but even when there is no such subject, the problem arises:

(30) 入人之地而不深者為輕地

When one enters foreign territory, but not deeply, then that is easy territory. Sun 11.3.

Consider now a sentence like this:

(31) 馬不出者助之鞭之

When the horses wouldn’t go out, he urged them on, whipped them. Zuo Ai 27 fu 3.

In view of the preceding examples, there is no need to assume that we have a *zhi* 之 missing after 馬. I suppose one *could* possibly say in AC 馬之不出者 and mean ‘those horses that did not go out’, but there is no strong reason to suppose that the first part of (31) is short for that. Similar considerations apply to a few of the other examples above,

where one might suspect a *zhi* 之 is missing in the *zhe* 者 -clause.

Compare:

(32) 庶物失之者死得之者生

When the various creatures lose this they die, when they get it they are born. Zhuang 31.50.

The question in this text is not *which* creatures die but *when* they die.

(33) 君賢者其國治，君不能者其國亂。

When the ruler is capable his state is well-ordered. When he is incapable his state is in chaos. Xun 15.20.

(34) 言不信者行不果

When the words are not truthful, the actions are not effective. Mo 2.9. (Two examples)

(35) 原濁者流不清

When the spring is dirty the stream is not clean. Mo 2.10. Cf. Xun 12.11: 原濁則流濁.

(36) 故其樂逾繁者其治逾寡

Thus the more elaborate the music the less (proper) government there is. Mo 7.8.

(37) 城域大而人民寡者其民不足以守其城

When the territory of the city is large and the people are few, then the people are not enough to defend the city. Guan 13 (1.59–6). (There are several precise parallels in the context. Guan 77 (3.83–4) has no less than nine relevant examples.)

(38) 刑不能去奸而賞不能止過者必亂

When punishments cannot banish wickedness and rewards cannot stop transgressions, then there is bound to be chaos. SJ 7.78.

(39) 能壹民于戰者民勇

不能壹民于戰者民不勇

If one can unite the people in a struggle, then the people will be courageous. If one cannot unite the people in a struggle they will not be courageous. SJ 17.130.

(40) 德不形者物不能離也

Although Virtue does not take any external form, the creatures (of the world) cannot separate themselves from it. Zhuang 5.47.

Subordinating *suo*

The combination *suo* ... *zhe* 所...者 provides further fascinating evidence on subordination in AC.

(41) 所愛其母者非愛其形愛使其形者

If they loved their mothers it wasn't that they loved her shape, they loved that which governed her shape. Zhuang 5.39.

(42) 所學夫子之道者足以自樂也

If I learn your Way, that is sufficient to give me joy. Zhuang 28.53.

(43) 予所否者天厭之，天厭之。

If I do wrong, may Heaven reject me. LY 6.28.

I do not want to pretend that I understand this last example very well. My translation follows Yang Bo-jun's *baihua* version, and apparently it is the traditional way of taking the passage.

(44) 所有玉帛之使者則告，不然則否。

If there was an envoy with jade and silk, it was (thus) announced. Otherwise not. Zuo Xuan 10.6.

And apparently it is the same *suo* that nominalizes and subordinates. Does not the *suo* in the following passage almost look as if it is subordinating?

(45) 一之所起，有一而未形。

When the One comes into existence, there is the One, but it has no form. Zhuang 12.38.

Two more examples illustrate the link between 'pronominal' and 'conditional' *suo*:

(46) 天之所欲則為之，天所不欲則止。

If Heaven wanted something they did it; if Heaven disliked something they refrained from it. Mo 4.10.

- (47) 所不安於上則不以使下
所惡於下則不以事上

If one is uneasy about something in one's superiors, one does not practise it in one's dealings with inferiors. If one hates something in inferiors, one does not practise it in serving one's superiors. Li Ji II.333. (Note incidentally that *zhe* is sometimes omitted as in Shu 22.239: "If you are not thus energetic, you will bring destruction on yourselves." Legge p. 304).

Against the background of these examples we can take a fresh look at sentences like:

- (47a) 君之所為百姓之所從也
君所不為百姓何從

What the ruler does is what the people follow.

When the ruler does not perform his job, what can the people follow? Da Dai Li Ji 41.31.

Zheng Xuan comments: 言君當務於政 'This means that the ruler must attend to the government'. But I suppose one could translate (47a) as 'what the ruler does not do, how can the people follow that?'

- (48) 所不掩子之惡揚子之美者
使其身無終沒於越國

If anyone fails to cover up your bad points and spread about your good points, may he be prevented from living out his days in Yue! GY 21.14975.

It will be noticed that (48), like (43) above, is an oath. And subordinating *suo* turns out to be strikingly common in oaths. (Cf. Zhou Fa-gao 1962, vol III, p. 399).

- (49) 余所有濟漢而南者有若大川

'If I again cross the Han River and go South, may things be as the great stream decides!' Zuo Ding 3.

(The first *you* 有 is difficult to understand here. Perhaps one should take it to stand for *you* 又 as Zhou Fa-gao suggests. (*Ibidem*)).

- (50) 所不殺子者有如陳宗

If I do not kill you, may things be as the ancestry of the Chen decide. Zuo Ai 14.

There are structurally similar oaths in Zuo Zhao 31, Zuo Xiang 25,

Zuo Wen 13, Zuo Xiang 23.7, Zuo Xi 24, Zuo Ding 6. But the crucial point is that the apodosis in this sort of conditional does not *have to* involve the formula *you ru* 有如 ‘may things be as . . . decides’. Consider:

(51) 所不此報無能涉河

If I do not avenge this, may I be unable to cross the river! Zuo Xuan 17.

It is a well-known fact that prayers, oaths, liturgies and the like often preserve old linguistic forms. My suspicion is that the use of *suo* as a subordinating particle may have been more common at earlier stages of the language than it is in AC.

Nominalizing *者* reconsidered

Assuming that *者* may function as a subordinating particle we can now take a fresh look at the following familiar ‘nominalized subjects’:

(52) 言者有言

When one speaks there are words. Zhuang 2.23.

(53) 言者不知

If someone speaks he does not know. Zhuang 13.68;22.7.

(54) 若然者人謂之童子

If someone is like this people call him a child. Zhuang 4.19.

Essentially these standard uses are close to pattern (B) above.

With ‘pre-posed, topicalized object’ the situation is particularly interesting:

(55) 愛人利人者天必福之
惡人賊人者天必禍之

If *anyone* loves others and benefits them, Heaven will certainly cause him to be fortunate. If *anyone* hates others and defrauds them, Heaven will certainly cause him to be unfortunate. Mo 4.16. Cf. Xun 28.34. This could *never* mean: ‘Heaven is bound to cause the (contextually determinate) person who loved others and benefitted them to be fortunate . . .’.

Similar observations apply to:

(56) 處官久者士妒之

When someone has occupied an official position for a long time the knights will envy him. Xun 32.21.

Compare now:

(57) 殺不能鳴者

Kill the one that cannot sing! Zhung 20.3. Cf. Zhuang 6.96 and 24.64. Could this meaning also be expressed by saying:

(58) 不能鳴者殺之

If any of them cannot sing, kill them!?

It seems to me that (57) presupposes that some cannot sing while (58) leaves this question open.

Again I wonder whether the contrast between the following two sentences does not involve more than just questions of topicalization:

(59) 是故選擇賢者

Therefore they selected the most competent people. Mo 13.12.

(60) 賢者選擇之

If someone was competent they selected him. (Hypothetical).

Lao Zi said:

(61) 善者吾善之，不善者吾亦善之。

If someone counts as good, I consider him as good; if someone does not count as good, I still consider him as good. Lao 49.

I suspect this is not at all close in meaning to

(62) 吾善(夫)善者，又善(夫)不善者。

(62) would presuppose that some things are 'good' or 'the best', while (61) – quite properly – leaves this question open.

I have a hunch that there is something hypothetical about preposed objects nominalized by *zhe*, but that this hypothetical quality is occasionally neutralized by the addition of the topic-marker *fu* 夫.

It seems significant that the following sentence presupposes in the main clause that there are those who disturb the people:

(63) 凡誅非誅其百姓也，誅其亂百姓者也。

Whenever he punishes he punishes those who disturb the people, not the people. Xun 15.60. Cf. also Xun 17.26 and examples (62) and in section 3.1.

I suspect that

(64) 亂百姓者誅之

would tend to mean ‘if anybody created havoc among the people he punished him’ and is therefore inappropriate in a context like (63). (But things change if you add sentence-initial *fu* 夫.)

One could give more examples supporting my generalization on object nominalizations. But I find it more useful to mention an obvious counterexample:

(65) 吾未見力不足者
蓋有之矣，我未之見也。

I have never seen anyone whose strength was insufficient. Probably they exist. But I have not seen any. LY 4.6.

The context ‘I have never heard of . . .’ ‘I have never seen . . .’ etc. creates a clear set of isolated counterexamples to the general pattern. But does this invalidate the general rule?

Towards a unified account of *zhe*

Obviously, there are plenty of examples where *zhe* cannot possibly be taken as a subordinating particle:

(66) 不遇時者多矣

Those who come at the wrong time are many. Xun 28.37.

In this sentence 不遇時者 identifies a set of people, and 多矣 says that the set thus identified has many members. One cannot possibly get away with a paraphrase on the lines of ‘If anyone comes at the wrong time . . .’

The all-important question that arises at this point is this: What is the connection between nominalizing *zhe* and subordinating *zhe*? What is the unifying principle that underlies these different uses of the particle *zhe*? In my view this is a central question of AC syntax.

The answer to this question becomes easier if we consider for a moment the negations of the sentences we have been looking at so far. Note that if you want to deny (66) you have to say something like

(67) 不遇時者不多矣

Not:

(68) 遇時者多矣

In fact, the truth of (68) is quite compatible with (66).

The generalization I am getting at is this: the negation of a sentence with the nominalizer *zhe* never involves introducing a negation into the scope of *zhe*. For example, the negation of

(69) 二者凶器

These two are inauspicious tools. Zhuang 4.6.

does not involve a denial that there are two things involved. Or again the negation of

(70) 愛使其形者

They loved that which governed her shape. Zhuang 5.39.

is nothing like

(71) 愛不使其形者

They loved that which did not govern her shape. but rather:

(72) 不愛使其形者

They did not like that which governed her shape.

I must leave it to the patient reader to look at further sentences involving the nominalizer *zhe* and convince himself that their negation does not lead to the negation of the phrase nominalized by *zhe*.

Now it turns out that exactly the same rule applies to subordinating *zhe*: the negation of a conditional does not involve the negation of its antecedent. For example, the negation of 'If I get rich I will buy a house' is quite definitely not 'If I do not get rich I will buy a house'. Similarly, the negation of 'When I get depressed I drink a lot of coffee' is certainly not 'When I do not get depressed I drink a lot of coffee'. And again, the negation of 'Even if he asks about the way, he will not hear about the Way' is obviously not 'Even if he does not ask about the Way he will not hear about the Way'.

Now, turning to the Chinese sentences involving subordinating *zhe* that I have presented in this section, it will be clear that similar observations apply. The negation of the sentences presented never involves a negation of the subordinate clause. Rather, the main clause would have to be modified by something like *wei bi* 未必, just as in English we negate 'If I get rich I will buy a house' by saying 'If I get rich I will not necessarily buy a house', or something of the sort.

Many will find the logic-chopping of the last few paragraphs offensive, but I found it unavoidable. The important preliminary result that emerges from the exercise is this: it appears that in general *zhe* marks off elements of a sentence that seem to remain constant when that sentence is negated. To put it still more loosely: *zhe* marks semantic material that seems somehow uncontroversial in the sentence, material that seems assumed or presupposed, and in any case not at issue.

With this preliminary result in hand we can now turn to those awkward idioms involving *zhe* that seem to be quite unconnected *both* with nominalization *and* with subordination. Since we have discovered that clauses translatable by English when-clauses are often marked by *zhe* in AC, we can now *explain* the presence of *zhe* in idioms like *xi zhe* 昔者, *gu zhe* 古者, 'formerly', 'in ancient times,' etc., we don't just have to list them as idiomatic curiosities. For, clearly, the negation of a sentence like:

(73) 古者人寡

In ancient times men were few . . . HF 47 (327.3).

does not involve negating *gu* 古. *Gu zhe* 古者 would remain constant if the sentence were to be negated. *Gu zhe* 古者 is not controversial in (73), it seems assumed as the background to what is to be said. *Gu zhe* 古者 sets the stage for a sentence rather like a when-clause ending in *zhe* would.

Nominal predicates in *zhe*

One might object that nominal predicates ending in *zhe* are surely straightforward counterevidence to my generalization on *zhe*. It looks as if the main point in these sentences is marked by *zhe*.

But let us apply our criterion of negation:

(74) 狂喬天下賢者也

Kuang Yu is the most talented man in the world. HF 34 (237.3).

By our criterion the negation of this sentence must turn out not to be

(75) 狂喬天下不賢者也

He is the least talented man in the world.

but rather:

(76) 狂喬非天下賢者也

He is not the most talented man in the world.

And indeed, a moment's reflection will show that the negation of (74) is (76) and not (75). The sentential negation *fei* 非 does not get into the scope of *zhe*.

When a nominal predicate ends in *zhe* it is regularly followed by *ye* 也. Now it is very plausible to assume that sentences ending in *ye* 也 are negatable always by the (sentential, not verbal!) negative *fei* 非. And this *fei* 非 – unlike *bu* 不 – does not enter into the scope of *zhe*, it 'goes with' the final *ye* 也.

Another example might make my point clearer:

(77) 臣相劍者也

I am an expert on swords. HF 22 (131.16).

When we negate this sentence

(78) 臣非相劍者也

I am not an expert on swords.

we are still talking about experts on swords, and the sentence denies that the *chen* 臣 is one of these. The situation would be entirely different in

(79) 臣不相劍者也

I am one who does not judge swords.

Here we would be talking about the set of those who do not judge swords, and the sentence – if it is acceptable – would presumably claim that the subject is a member of this set. In any case, the crucial point is that (79) is not the negation of (77).

Thus the predicate nominals in *zhe* do not invalidate our generalization on *zhe*. On the other hand they do raise interesting questions. For example: what is the semantic difference between a sentence with a nominalized predicate in *zhe* and the corresponding verbal sentence, when there is one. Compare (77) with

(80) 臣相劍

I adjudicate swords.

So far I have followed current practise and have taken e.g. *bu xiang jian zhe ye* 不相劍者也 to mean 'be one who does not adjudicate swords'. But in fact I wish to suggest that this current practise misses the characteristic force of the nominalized predicates ending with *zhe ye* 者也.

Compare the following English sentences:

(C) He was someone who became a high court judge under the Nixon administration.

(D) He was the sort of person who became a high court judge under the Nixon administration.

Of course, both these sentences involve the claim.

(E) He became a high court judge under the Nixon administration.

But anyone who knows his English is aware that they are far from synonymous. The person described in (C) may have been a *completely atypical* choice, he may be someone who is *not at all* the sort of person that became a high court judge under Nixon.

My contention is that the characteristic force of the sentences with predicates nominalized by *zhe* is not so much like that of (C) but rather like that of (D). And I want to maintain that the distinction makes an important difference.

(81) 仁者慈惠而輕財者也

The humane person is the sort of person who is loving, generous and thinks little of wealth. HF 47 (328.11).

(82) 此危吾位者也

This is the sort of person who endangers my position. HF 34 (233.1).

(83) 皆違其情者也

Both these were the sort of things that go against nature. HF 34 (232.7).

Thus Zi Gong wonders:

(84) 管仲非仁者與

Was Guan Zhong not really humane, literally: a typical example of someone humane? LY 14.17.

He is not wondering:

(85) 管仲不仁乎

Was Guan Zhong inhumane?

This usage may be connected with the current idioms like *wang zhe* 王者 ‘one who is a king worthy of his title’.

(86) 管仲為政者也，未及修禮也。

Guan Zhong was the sort of person who ran his government (properly),

but he did not get to the point of cultivating ritual. Xun 9.26.
If I am right this tells us not what Guan Zi did but what sort of a man he was. Similarly in:

- (87) 故儒者將使人兩得之者也
墨者將使人兩喪之者也

Thus the Confucians are the sort of people who make people gain both these things. The Mohists are the sort of people who make people lose both these things. Xun 19.13.

The point of the nominalization is that the Confucians do not just incidentally happen to bring it about that the people gain both these things: it is by virtue of their very nature that they have this effect on the people. And if you want to deny that (87) is true, you have to say that the Confucians are not *of this sort*, that they are *essentially* different.

One would expect this kind of construction to be useful in polemics. And indeed in *Against the Twelve Philosophers* Xun Zi makes profuse use of it. The construction comes over 20 times in Xun 6.34–37 alone!

I find it very significant that the verbal predicate is nominalized in

- (88) 彼何人者邪
孔子曰：彼遊方之外者也。

What kind of a man is he?

Confucius said: He is the sort of man who roves beyond the pale of things. Zhuang 6.66.

And it is gratifying to note that in the continuation the predicate is again nominalized:

- (89) 而丘遊方之內者也

Qiu is the sort of man who roves within the pale of things. Zhuang 6.67. In Zhuang Zi alone I have counted no less than 16 instances of the pattern PRONOUN . . . *zhe ye* 'This is the sort of . . . who . . .'.

- (90) 非求益者也，欲速成者也。

He is not the sort of person who seeks to improve himself. He is the sort of person who wants to get on quickly. LY 14.44.

- (91) 回也非助我者也

Hui is not the sort of person who helps me. LY 11.4.

But the sentence continues:

(92) 於吾言無所不說

He is pleased about everything I say. *Ibidem*.

My contention is that (91) could never have meant anything like ‘Hui was not the one who gave me a hand’, although it could of course be taken to mean ‘Hui was not the sort of person who helped me.’

The nominalized predicate ending in *zhe* tends to involve a *general* characterization of the subject. I feel that we have to take semantic nuances like this seriously if we want to do justice to the subtlety of AC texts.

(93) 我待賈者也

I am the sort of person who waits for (the right) price. LY 9.13.

Legge 1861, I:221 mistranslates “But I would wait for one to offer the price.” This shows how my suggestion on *zhe ye* 者也 makes a decisive practical difference for comprehension. If my suggestion is correct, then Confucius *could* never have used (93) to express the meaning attributed to him by Legge. Moreover, if Confucius had wanted to comment on a past episode and say that on a given occasion he was *the one* who waited for the right price. I suggest he would never have used (93), but rather

(94) 待賈者我也

I was the one who waited for the right price.

Conversely, my suggestion is that instead of

(95) 為湯武敗民者桀與紂也

Jie and Zhou were the ones that drove the people into the arms of Tang and Wu. Meng 4A10.

we could not possibly have had

(96) 桀與紂為湯武敗民者也

Concluding remarks

Some readers, I fear, may still find my distinction between ‘someone who’ and ‘the sort of person who’ insubstantial, and I am not in a position to *prove* that they are wrong. But in the context of my argument it is important to remember that the crucial issue is whether the negation of sentences in *zhe ye* 者也 involves introducing a negation

into the scope of *zhe*. And *here* the situation seems clear: the negation of a sentence like 善者也 'he is the best' is definitely not 不善者也 'he is the worst', but rather 非(其)善者也 'he is not the best'. And *fei* 非 does not here enter into the scope of *zhe*.

Finally, let us apply our criterion to the sort of *zhe* that regularly accompanies existential sentences with *you* 有 or *wu* 無.

(97) 魯人有請見之者

A certain man from Lu asked to see him. Zhuang 21.7

The negation of this is definitely not:

(98) 魯人有不請見之者

Certain people from Lu failed to ask to see him.

but rather

(99) 魯人無請見之者

No one from Lou asked to see him.

Note that in (98) *bu* 不 would be inside the scope of *zhe*.

Again the negation of

(100) 形不離而生亡者有之矣

But there are those whose form has not disintegrated but whose life has gone. Zhuang 19.2.

is

(101) 形不離而生亡者未之有也

and not anything like

(102) 形不離而生不亡者有之矣

And my distinct suspicion is that (100) is not just the topicalized version of

(103) …有形不離而生亡者

There was someone (a certain person) whose form had not disintegrated but whose life was gone . . .

Conditionals

4.1 Concessive Clauses in AC

Compare:

- (A) Although Bob holds a degree he is in trouble.
 (B) Even if Bob holds a degree he is in trouble.

Sentence (A) presupposes that Bob holds a degree, while (B) just assumes that Bob *may* hold a degree.

Keeping this logical distinction in mind consider:

- (1) 雖晉伐齊楚必救之

Jin may attack Qi, but in that case Chu is bound to come to its rescue.
 Zuo Cheng 1 fu.

- (2) 縱有共其外莫共其內

Although someone supplies his external needs, no one supplies his internal needs. Zuo Xiang 26.

In this section I propose to show first that there is a fundamental logical difference in AC between sentences like (1) and sentences like (2). I then proceed to give a unified account of the particle *sui* as a *modal* particle closely related to pre-verbal *fei* ‘it is not as if...’, the main point is ...’. The basic force of *sui* 雖 X turns out to be ‘maybe X is true, but ...’. And this interpretation is shown to have important advantages over the traditional way of taking *sui* to mean ‘although’.

Zong 縱 ‘although’

The original lexical meaning of *zong* 縱 ‘give rein, let loose’ is close to ‘leave aside’. Again from ‘leave aside’ it is not far to a grammaticalized ‘leaving aside that’ and then ‘although’.

The paraphrase ‘leaving aside that’ (rather than ‘conceding that’, cf. Dobson 1959:251) turns out to be helpful in many contexts. It is suggestive even in the cases where I choose to translate by ‘although’.

- (3) 縱不說而行又從而非毀之

Leaving aside that they do not practise this with pleasure, they even go on to slander it. Mo 47.45. Cf. GY 10584.

I add a neat example from Shi Ji:

(4) 今縱弗忍殺之又聽其邪說不可

Now quite apart from the fact that you cannot bear to kill him you go on to listen to his evil explanations. That is wrong. Shi Ji 70.27.

(5) 從(縱)其有皮丹漆若何

Although the skins are left, what about the red varnish? Zuo Xuan 2.1.

(6) 今縱無法以遺後嗣

Now although the duke had no such model to hand down to his successors... Zuo Wen 6.

(7) 縱吾子為政而可...

Although this is all right as long as you run the government... Zuo Zhao 7.

(8) 縱子忍之後必或耻之

Although you can (now) bear to do it, later there are bound to be those who are ashamed of it. Zuo Ding 1.

There is an exciting case in Xun Zi:

(9) 縱不能用使無去其疆域則國終身無故

If, although one cannot use him, one causes him not to leave one's realm, then the state will be without trouble for the rest of one's life. Xun 12.41.

If one did not know about the precise meaning of *zong* one would be sorely tempted to muddle oneself through this passage with 'even if by any chance'.

Very occasionally, *zong* can come after the subject:

(10) 且予縱不得大葬，予死於道路乎。

Moreover, although I will not get a large funeral, will I die on the roads? LY 9.12.

(11) 吾縱生無益於人，吾可以死害於人乎。

Although I am alive I am no use to people: can my death do any damage to people? Li Ji, Tan Gong.

In all the above examples I claim that there is a presupposition that

the clause introduced by *zong* is true. We could in fact have made this more palpable by translating ‘leaving aside *the fact* that’, ‘in spite of *the fact* that’.

But what about:

(12) 縱子忘之山川鬼神其忘

Surely this must mean ‘Even if you, Sir, forget it will the spirits of the hills and streams forget it?’ as Dobson 1959:134 translates. And since the attested cases of *zong* meaning ‘although’ are so few in AC it would be embarrassing if one of these passages turned out to be a neat exception to the grammatical pattern established on the basis of the others. Fortunately, the context makes it clear that Dobson’s translation is wrong. The relevant part of the story is this: Shi Mi-mou suggests that Zhong Ji should go on a certain mission which is in breach of a contract and Shi-mou promises he will look up the contract in the archives once Zhong Ji has completed his mission. Zhong Ji knows perfectly well that Shi Mi-mou would forget all about the contract in the archives once the whole thing was over: it would in any case have been pointless to look up the contract only *after* it had been broken. It is in this situation that Zhong Ji says: ‘Although you are (surely!, obviously!) going to forget about the contract, will the spirits of the mountains and streams forget about it?’ It turns out that Dobson’s reading does not fit the context. In fact (12) turns out to be strong evidence in favour of my hypothesis that by using *zong* as a sentence connective in AC one presupposes the truth of the clause introduced by *zong*. There may still be counterevidence against this hypothesis, but I have not come across any in the indexed literature.

The only two examples there are in Shi Jing bear out my generalization:

(13) 縱我不往子寧不來

Although (admittedly) I have not gone to see you, why do you not come to me? Shi 91 (two examples).

There is only one example in *Lüshi chunqiu*:

(14) 縱夫子驚祿爵 吾庸敢驚霸王乎

Although you arrogantly disregard emoluments and rank, how could I dare to arrogantly disregard hegemony and kingship? LSCQ 15.3.

By current accounts of *zong* we could translate ‘even supposing that...’. I submit the current accounts are wrong on this point.

Sui 雖 'even if'**1. Counterfactual sui**

It is clear that *sui* does not in general presuppose the truth of the clause it introduces. On the contrary it is often used to make concessive counterfactuals:

(15) 雖得十越，吾不為也。

Even if I got ten states of Yue I would not do it. LSCQ 14.5.

(16) 雖堯舜禹湯復生弗能改己

Even if Yao, Shun, Yu, and Tang were born again they could not change this. ZGC I. 61.

(17) 齊雖隆薛之城到於天，猶之無益也。

Even if Qi raised the walls of Xue so high that they reached Heaven, that still would not improve the situation. ZGC I.93/4.

But note that not all concessive counterfactuals are in this way rhetorical:

(18) 丘雖不吾譽，吾獨不自知邪。

Even if you little man, Confucius, had not praised me, do you imagine I would not know myself? Zhuang 29.24.

(19) 雖天地覆墜亦將不與之遺

Even if Heaven and Earth collapsed, he still would not go down with them. Zhuang 5.5.

By contrast, counterfactuals with *ruo* 若 seem to be rare, to say the least. AC-texts tend to use *shi* 使 in such contexts. Note that *sui* adds a concessive nuance to a counterfactual, while a counterfactual *ruo* would simply be synonymous with counterfactual *shi* 使.

Consider next the counterfactual combination *sui wei* 雖大 as in:

(20) 雖微先大夫有之
大夫命側側敢不義

Even if it had not been for this case of the former official, if you order me, how could I refuse to obey? Zuo Cheng 16.7.

(21) 雖微秦國天下孰弗志

Even if it had not been a case of Qin (doing this), who in the world would not get angry at this? GY 8.7159.

(22) 雖微楚國諸侯莫不譽

Even if it had not been Chu that was involved, all the feudal lords would be full of praise. GY 17.11969.

(23) 雖微晉而已天下其孰能當之

Even if it had not been a case of Jin at all that was involved, who in the world would be able to match Zi Han? Li Ji, Tan Gong, I.255 (Contrast Yan 1977:471).

One may say that *sui wei* is pre-nominal, but the presence of *er yi* 而已 in the last example seems to suggest that *sui wei* is pre-predicate-nominal. Nonetheless the precise force of *er yi* 而已 is difficult to be sure of in the context.

2. Hypothetical *sui*

In the section on pre-verbal *fei* (1.1 examples (33)–(42)) we have seen that what we called ‘conditional *fei*’ is normally pre-verbal but may also be pre-clausal. Strikingly similar observations apply to hypothetical *sui*:

(24) 雖聖人不在山林之中其德隱矣

Even if the sage does not live in the mountain forest his virtue is hidden. Zhuang 16.12.

It seems profoundly significant that we may paraphrase this as ‘the sage may not live in the forest, but his virtue is hidden.’ (See the section on concessive *sui*.)

Pre-clausal *sui* turns out to be not uncommon:

(25) 雖其君親皆在不問不言

But even if his ruler and his parents are all present he does not speak up without being asked. Mo 39.40.

Sui may serve as the subordinating conjunction for several clauses:

(26) 雖珠玉滿體。文繡充棺。黃金充椁。
 加之以丹斨。重之以曾毒。犀象以為楨。
 琅玕龍茲華觀以為寶。人猶且莫之相也。

Even if the bodies are covered with pearls and jade, the inner coffins

with embroideries, and the outer coffin with golden inlay, and even though one applies indigo and cinnabar and adds fine copper, even if one plants rhinoceros-horns and ivory like trees and hung (valuables like) *lang-gan*, *long-zi* and *hua-qin* like fruits on them, none of the people will dig these things up. Xun 18.84.

Like *ruo*, then, *sui* regularly precedes the subject of the clause it subordinates. Shadick 1968:235 needs to be amended at least in this respect. And when *sui* thus precedes the subject it does not, *pace* Cikoski 1976, always mean ‘although it is’. In any case, the position of *sui* does *not* make a semantic difference:

(27) 雖父母沒

Even if the parents are dead . . . Li Ji I.633.

(28) 父母雖沒

Even if the parents are dead . . . Li Ji I.634.

There can be no doubt whatever that (27) and (28) are synonymous.

Dobson 1959:133 provides the following interesting case where he claims *sui* has to mean ‘though’ and not ‘even if’:

(29) 不賢者雖有此不樂也 Meng 1A2.

Dobson translates: “One who is not worthy, though he possesses these things does not enjoy them.” But unfortunately Dobson does not understand the pitfalls of English grammar. For ‘though’ in sentences like that just quoted from Dobson is roughly equivalent to ‘even if’! Mencius’ point is *not* that unworthy people possess these things but on the other hand do not enjoy them. Mencius is surely saying that *even if* an unworthy person possesses these things he does not enjoy them. The important issue – here as elsewhere – is *not* what English words we happen to use when translating the Chinese but what semantic structures the Chinese sentence articulates. The case of (29) illustrates well how a good grammatical analysis has to be based ultimately on a sound *logical* analysis and not just on translation.

(30) 不責其師不愛其資雖智大迷

If one does not value the teacher and does not love the material, one may be clever, but one is greatly misguided. Lao 27.

Compare Lau 1963:84 “Not to value the teacher/Nor to love the material/ Though it seems clever, betrays great bewilderment.” This illustrates the *practical* importance of my modal analysis of *sui* for the comprehension of AC texts.

(31) 故說雖強談雖辯文學雖博猶不見聽

Their explanations may be strong, their rhetorics may be advanced, their learning may be wide, but still no one will listen to them. LSCQ 7.2.

(32) 故強哭者雖悲不哀

A. Therefore a person who cries in a forced manner may feel sadness but will not feel grief.

B. Therefore a person who cries in a forced manner, even if he feels sadness, he will not feel grief. Zhuang 31.33 (3 examples).

By considering these competing translations, A. and B., one may come to understand *how* the hypothetical force of *sui* could be connected with or derived from a modal meaning for that word. We shall now explore this possibility.

3. Concessive *sui*

Sui is often translated as ‘although’, ‘in spite of the fact that’. Let us call this sort of *sui* ‘concessive *sui*’.

In section 1.1 examples (4)–(23) we have seen that pre-verbal *fei* in a non-subordinate clause means something like ‘it isn’t as if’ and suggests that there is another main point to come. I now propose to demonstrate that *sui* in a non-hypothetical clause has a corresponding modal force as indicated in the following translation:

(33) 夫韓雖臣於秦未嘗不為秦病

Han *may* have been subservient to Qin, *but* it has always been a pain in the neck for Qin. HF 2 (10.15).

Note that Li Si, the author of (33), is not here presupposing that Han *really* has been subservient. I shall try to argue in general that concessive *sui* makes sentences structurally closer to (C) than to (D):

(C) Bob may be offensive, but he is warm-hearted.

(D) Although Bob is offensive, he is warm-hearted.

Most of the time, of course, it does not matter very much whether you use the pattern (C) or (D), but nonetheless there is a marked semantic difference between the two: (C) presupposes that Bob is offensive, while (D) only non-committally concedes (grants) that he may count as offensive.

Note that the non-committal modal force of *sui* connects naturally with the ‘basic’ *hypothetical* sense of the word *sui*.

The difference between hypothetical *sui* and concessive *sui* is not always clear:

(34) 雖曰未學吾必謂之學矣

A. Even if they say he is not quite learned, I am bound to call him learned.

B. They *may* say he is not quite learned, *but* I am bound to call him learned. LY 1.7. Cf. LY 13.6.

And we have fascinating borderline cases like:

(35) 雖克與否無以避罪

You *may* conquer or not, *but* there will be no way of escaping criminal involvement. GY 7.5698.

It is in symptomatic cases like these that the peculiar modal force of *sui* becomes ‘virulent’. *Neither* the reading ‘even if you conquer or not . . .’, *nor* the reading ‘although you conquer or not . . .’ capture anything like the peculiar force of *sui* in sentences like (35). On the other hand my modal idiom ‘may . . . but’ sounds entirely natural.

Concessive *sui* is notoriously common in polite idioms like:

(36) 我雖不敏請嘗試之

I may not be clever, *but* please try to explain. Meng 1A7.20. Cf. LY 12.1; 12.2; HF 33 (222.10); GY 7.5455 etc. etc.

It seems curiously wrong-headed to maintain that the speaker in (36) strictly *presupposes* that he is not clever. Keeping this observation in mind, consider:

(37) 雖知之未能自勝

I may understand that, *but* I still cannot conquer myself. Zhuang 28.57 Cf. Zhuang 16.6.

By using *sui* the speaker leaves a lingering doubt, whether he *really* understands.

(38) 其口雖言其心未嘗言

His mouth may speak, *but* his mind never speaks. Zhuang 25.34.

Zhuang Zi’s point is *not* that ‘even when speaking with his mouth, he does not speak with his mind’. And he does not strictly *presuppose* that the man speaks: ‘In spite of that fact that his mouth speaks . . .’. The

crux is that *no matter* whether his mouth speaks or not, his mind never speaks. My modal translation captures this nuance.

We can now turn to another notorious context for concessive *sui*, the combination *sui ran* 雖然 ‘that may be so, but . . .’:

(39) 善則善矣雖然其馬將失

He may be good all right! But his horses will get lost! Xun 31.37. Cf. Xun 31.40.

From the context it is clear that the speaker, Yan Yuan, does not *really* think that the man in question *is* a good charioteer!

In the book *Mo Zi* the formula *sui ran* is used four times by someone who is acknowledging his opponent’s conclusions. (Mo 16.22; 16.46; 15.16; 15.29). The idiomatic force of this is clearly something like ‘this may indeed be so, but surely . . .’ rather than ‘in spite of the fact that this is so, surely . . .’. There are plenty of other cases where the modal interpretation of *sui ran* makes an important difference for the correct interpretation of AC texts.

The well-known cases where *sui ran* refers to an obvious and generally acknowledged fact do not begin to show that the modal interpretation of *sui* is wrong. After all, we say things like ‘Gold may be expensive, but it is pretty useless.’ There is nothing sinister or odd about referring in a non-committal way to an obvious fact. And even with obvious facts my modal interpretation of *sui* often has its clear advantages:

(40) 今晉與荆雖強而齊近

Now Jin and Chu may be strong, but Qi is close. HF 22 (130.14). Two examples.

Note that there isn’t the slightest incompatibility between the strength of Jin and Chu on the one hand and the vicinity of Qi on the other. The point is that *no matter* how strong Jin and Chu may be, *the important thing is* that Qi is close by. Remember that we often translate pre-verbal *fei* 非 on the lines of ‘it is not as if . . ., the important point is . . .’.

(41) 雖天地之大，万物之多，而唯蜩翼之知。

Heaven and Earth may be large, and the 10,000 things may be many, but I only know cicada’s wings. Zhuang 19.20.

Here the important point is that the speaker is *not interested* whether the universe is large and things are many.

The basic modal force of *sui* accounts very naturally both for the

hypothetical and for the concessive uses of the word. It now remains to demonstrate the close logical and grammatical connection between hypothetical and pre-nominal *sui*.

4. Pre-nominal *sui*

We have seen a remarkable parallelism between pre-verbal *fei* and hypothetical as well as concessive *sui*. We now turn to the no less striking parallelism between pre-nominal *fei* and pre-nominal *sui*. My account of pre-nominal *sui* is essentially independent of my ‘modal’ analysis of *sui*.

The current Western explanation of *sui* is in terms of a clear-cut ambiguity between two grammatically absolutely distinct functions of the word. The entry on *sui* in Shadick 1968:235 is typical: “SUB CONJ (following the subject of an adjunct clause) although. ADNOUN even.” (Cf. however Cikoski 1976:102–104).

We have seen that *sui* in fact frequently precedes ‘the subject of an adjunct clause’. We have also seen that the gloss ‘although’ is profoundly misleading. I now propose to show that the meaning ‘even’ for *sui* is systematically redundant.

Consider for a moment two English sentences:

(E) Even if someone is in his eighties he may still fall in love.

(F) Even an octogenarian may still fall in love.

Understanding a sentence like (F) involves understanding a relation between propositions which is roughly that designated by ‘even if’. Logically and semantically (F) is closely related to (E). Moreover it would be more natural to say that (E) is an explanation of (F) than vice versa, that (F) is an explanation of (E).

I wish to argue that the noun phrase after prenominal *sui* is the predicate nominal of a subjectless subordinate sentence. An example will make clear what I mean:

(42) 雖王公士大夫之子孫 (也) 不能屬於禮義則歸之庶人
雖庶人之子孫也積文學正身行能屬於禮義則歸之鄉相
士大夫。

A. Even the descendants of kings, dukes, knights and grandees, if they are unable to keep in accordance with ritual and righteousness, then they become commoners again. Even the descendants of commoners, if

they consistently apply themselves to cultural study, correct their persons and actions, then they become prime ministers, knights or grandees.

B. Even if someone is a descendant of kings . . . Even if someone is a descendant of commoners . . . Xun 9.2.

The hesitation about *ye* 也 seems significant to me. I find it quite implausible to accept that in the *textus receptus* which lacks the *ye* in the first sentence we have to take the first *sui* as 'even' and the second as 'even if'. By setting up such a sharp structural alternative we are imposing our English grammatical categories on AC. I feel there is no basis for such a sharp distinction in AC syntax. The alternative translations A and B do *not* represent a structural ambiguity in AC. They are just two alternative ways of verbalizing one single AC proposition. There is no need to assume that *sui* in (42) is anything but a subordinating conjunction. The purported meaning 'even' can be explained in terms of the well-established original meaning 'even if'. Similarly for:

(43) 自反而不縮雖褐寬博吾不慄焉
自反而縮雖千萬人吾往矣

A. If upon turning in on myself I find that I am not straight, then I am bound to fear even a common man coarsely dressed. If upon turning in on myself I find that I am straight, then I go forward even against a thousand or ten thousand people.

B. If upon turning in on myself I find that I am not straight, then even if someone is a common man coarsely dressed, I am bound to fear him. If upon turning in on myself I find that I am straight, then even if the adversary numbers thousands or ten thousands of people, I shall go forward against them. Meng 2A2.

(44) 非天時雖十堯不能冬生一穗

If it is against the seasons of Nature, then even if there were ten Yao's, they cannot in winter grow a single ear of grain. HF 28 (155.1).

Liao 1939:275 naturally translates: "...even ten Yaos cannot in winter grow a single ear of grain." I have no objection to his translation. But mine tries to show up the construction in AC: I take *sui* to be equivalent to *sui you* 雖有 in the very common construction:

(45) 法不立而誅不必，雖有十左氏，無益也。

When laws are not established and executions not certain, then even if there were ten Zuos, that would not help. HF 30 (170.10).

There are altogether five exactly parallel passages in Han Fei Zi, where we have *sui you shi* PROPER NAME, 雖有十 X meaning even 'if there were ten Xs'. (HF 234.5; 299.9; 299.10; 314.13).

Essentially, I take sentences of this sort to be counterfactuals: they assume the impossible, namely, that there should be 10 copies of the same individual. They are closely related to the 'rhetorical counterfactuals' introduced above.

(46) 雖有神禹且不能知

Even the spiritual Yu is unable to understand this. Zhuang 2.23 Cf. ZGC 473 (II.126).

(47) 雖有惡人齋戒沐浴則可以祀上帝

Even an ugly person, if he fasts and cleans himself through the bathing ritual, can sacrifice to the highest god. Meng 4B25.

(48) 雖有天下易生之物也
一日暴之十日寒之未有能生者也

"Even a plant that grows readily will not survive if it is placed in the sun for one day and exposed to the cold for ten." Meng 6A8 tr. Lao 1970:165.

(49) 雖有智者不能善其後矣

Even a wise person cannot make the outcome good. Sun 2.4.

I have no objection to translations that use 'even' for *sui* in sentences of this sort. But surely the presence of *you* 有 suggests that the syntax of the original is something like 'even if there was X', where X is then picked up again either as a subject or as an object.

Incidentally, if *sui* was a copula in any ordinary sense of that term, then it should have no place in an existential clause of this sort. *Sui* appears nonetheless to have important links with *wei* 唯. I suspect that these links are basically etymological. They fall outside the scope of this book.

The predicative nature of proper names after *sui* is well illustrated by the following:

(50) 夫適人之適而不自適其適
雖盜跖與伯夷是同為淫僻也。

If someone suits others and does not suit himself, then whether he be (a) Robber Zhi or (a) Bo Yi, he is (in both cases) equally deluded. Zhuang 8.32.

(51) 夫欲得力士而聽其自言
雖庸人與烏獲不可別也

If you desire to get strong knights and listen to what they say about themselves, then even if they are (as different as) an ordinary chap and (a) Wu Huo, they cannot be distinguished. HF 46 (324:5). Cf. Guan 32 (2.40).

(52) 雖堯舜不能去民之欲利

A. Even Yao or Shun cannot abolish people's desire for profit.
B. Even if someone is a Yao or a Shun he cannot abolish people's desire for profit. Xun 27.65.

Nothing prevents us from taking *Yao* and *Shun* as proper names and still get away with 'even if':

C. Even if someone is (identical with) Yao or Shun he cannot abolish people's desire for profit.

(53) 雖堯舜之智不敢取也

Even if he had the wisdom of Yao or Shun, Qi would not dare take his advice. ZGC 446 (II.102); SBCK 9.4b.

Not: 'Even the wisdom of Yao or Shun ...'.

(54) 雖大男子裁如嬰兒

Even when people are adult men they behave like infants. ZGC 454 (II.104); SBCK 9.14b.

(55) 安陵君受地於先王雖千里不敢易也

The ruler of An-ling has received his territory from the former king. Even if it was a matter of a thousand square *li*, he would not dare to barter his territory away (for it). ZGC 381 (II.67).

One might have thought that the *yi* 亦 after pre-nominal *sui* suggests that we are not dealing with a sentential *sui* 'even if'. But in view of examples like the following this argument has no force:

(56) 有此臣亦不事足下矣

If there was such a minister, he (too) still would not serve you. ZGC 446 (II.101).

Symptomatically, pre-nominal *sui* can also combine with the sentence connective *shi* as in:

(57) 雖使下愚之人必曰

Even if someone was a most stupid person, he would be bound to say ... Mo 19.3. Cf. Zhuang 25.14.

Mei 1927:107 translates innocuously “Even the stupid would say ...” But what on earth is the *shi* 使 doing in this construction if we are not to construe it literally as in my translation? In any case, *suishi* 雖使 is a regular sentence connective in Mo Zi:

(58) 雖使鬼神請(誠)亡，此猶可以合驩聚衆。

Even if in fact the ghosts and spirits did not exist people could take pleasure together and gather in large numbers on these occasions of sacrifice. Mo 31.101. Cf. Mo 48.78.

The case of *suishi* 雖使 provides strong support for my case. Those who want to still insist on taking *sui* preceding the subject as ‘even’ and not as ‘even if’ would also have to line up *suishi* 雖使 in their dictionary of AC as meaning ‘even’. But that seems a very implausible thing to do.

Again, consider difficult cases like:

(59) 雖禹誓卽亦猶是也

Even if you take the Yu Shi, (then) it is like this. Mo 15.62. Cf. Mo 16.56.

The presence of *ji* 卽 seems to suggest that the construction should be taken literally as in my translation.

Of course, isolated sentences like (59) do not prove much. But there is in fact a much more general syntactic argument in favour of my analysis of pre-nominal *sui*. Consider an English sentence like ‘She would try to make love even to the pope’. Supposing for a moment that pre-nominal *sui* means ‘even’, why could one never imagine it in object position? The most we get are sentences like:

(60) 楚人知雖殺宋公猶不得宋國

The people of Chu knew that even if they killed the Duke of Song they would still not be able to win over the state of Song. Gong Yang, Xi 21.6.

Cf. Mo 49.49, where *sui* introduces concessive conditionals that are embedded. And if you wanted to say that they killed even the duke

of Song, you would have to prepose the object and say something like:
 雖宋公亦殺之。

Now if one takes *sui* before nouns to mean just ‘even’ then one has no natural explanation for the fact that the scope of this ‘even’ is restricted to subjects and topics. If on the other hand one assumes that pre-nominal *sui* is essentially our old ‘even if’, then the restriction of *sui* to ‘subjects’ or ‘topics’ turns out to be a special case of the fundamental rule of AC syntax which says that subordinate clauses precede superordinate ones. If one follows my interpretation of pre-nominal *sui* one never begins to expect *sui* in object position in the first place.

Fortified by considerations like those of the preceding paragraphs we can now turn to the much more problematic cases of *sui* preceding personal pronouns. We commonly find sentences like:

(61) 雖我亦成也

Then even if someone was (like) me he would be perfect. Zhuang 2.46. Cf. Guan 19 (1.97–1).

I suppose adherents of the traditional Western view of *sui* will find my translation hopelessly contrived and suggest instead the plain: ‘Then even I, (too,) would be perfect.’ As another good instance they may point to:

(62) 用而不可雖我亦將非之

If something is useful but not allowed, then even if you take me, I should argue against it. Mo 16.22.

I can only hope that the arguments that I have presented in this section will convince the reader that my literal translations of (61) and (62) are not as wrongheaded as they may appear to be at first sight. If we adopt them we achieve a unified account of *sui*.

A brief note on *ruo* 若

Now *sui* is not the only subordinating sentence-connective with a logically closely related use as a subject-marker. Another notable case in point is *ruo* 若. I believe that it will be important to provide a parallel account for both these words:

sui 雖 SENTENCE: ‘even if’

sui 雖 SUBJECT NP: ‘even if you take’

ruo 若 SENTENCE: ‘if’

ruo 若 SUBJECT NP: ‘if you take’

Let us consider a few examples involving pre-nominal *ruo*:

(63) 若聖與仁則吾豈敢

“As to being a divine sage or even a good man, far be it from me to make any such claim.” LY 7.34. (Compare *sui* in Zhuang 8.32 and in HF 46 (324.5)).

The difference between *sui* and *ruo* in contexts like these seems to be as between ‘if it comes to . . .’ and ‘even if it comes to . . .’ in English.

(64) 若民則無恆產，因無恆心。

If you take the common people, then they lack an assured livelihood, and as a result they lack an assured frame of mind. Meng 1A7.

If we had *sui* instead of *ruo* here, we would be tempted to translate ‘even if you take the common people, they . . .’.

4.2 Conditional *ruo* 若, *ru* 如 and *ze* 則

The commonest AC word for ‘if’ is *ruo* 若 and the commonest word for the corresponding ‘then’ is *ze* 則. It seems to be commonly assumed that the patterns:

- (A) 其親死則委之
 (B) 若其親死委之

are roughly equivalent and both translatable in terms of ‘if ... then’. Of course, experienced readers of AC texts know that we are sometimes tempted to translate clauses followed by *ze* using the English ‘when ... then’, but after all a sentence like ‘When you have no money you have no friends’ is very close in meaning to ‘If you have no money you have no friends.’ Surely, ‘when’ is often used in English to make conditional sentences.

In this section I shall try to explain some systematic and quite elementary differences between the patterns (A) and (B). The distinction seems to me to be basic to a proper understanding of conditional sentences in AC.

A little logical reflection will perhaps be helpful for an analysis of the main contrast between *ruo* and *ze* that I am concerned with. Compare:

- (C) If this boy loses his parents, then he will despair.
 (D) If a boy loses his parents, then he will despair.

For obvious reasons I call (C) a *specific* conditional and (D) a *general* conditional. The deep logical difference between the two is roughly that the logical form of the specific conditional can be given simply as ‘If P then Q’, while the logical form of the general conditional involves quantification.

Now I hasten to add that the distinction between (A) and (B) is *not* simply like that between (C) and (D). Nonetheless it will be useful to keep the latter distinction in mind as we are trying to sort out the former. For in the end I do believe there tends to be something general, pattern-like, about conditionals with *ze*, so that one can very often translate *ze* as ‘then *as a rule*’. By contrast, we shall find that there tends

to be something specific and concrete about conditionals with *ruo* so that we can often paraphrase *ruo* as ‘in the event that, if it turns out that’. I shall argue that the patterns (A) and (B) are rarely interchangeable, but that obviously does not mean that *ruo* and *ze* cannot occur in the same conditional. Conditionals of the type:

(E) 若其親死則委之

are in fact quite common and I shall suggest that they are vague in respect to the distinction between (A) and (B).

Non-conditional *ze*

Ze and *ruo* have strikingly parallel uses as subject markers, and here, for once, it looks as if *ruo* could not be replaced by its dialect variant *ru*:

(1) 若曾子則可謂養志也

As for Zeng Zi, he can be said to have ‘nourished the will’. Meng 4A20. But by and large *ze* has much wider non-conditional uses than *ruo*. For example in non-conditional when-clauses:

(2) 比至則已斬之矣

When he arrived, the man had already executed them. HF 36 (270.16). Cf. Meng 1B6.

The parallel passage in Zuo Cheng 2.4 omits the *bi* 比, and this does not seem to have any effect on our interpretation of the Zuo passage.

The logically crucial observation is that in spite of the ‘when’ in the translation, (2) is in no way a conditional sentence: *both* clauses are asserted to be true. We have, logically speaking, a conjunction:

(3) 三國之兵果至
至則乘晉陽之城

...The armies of the three states actually arrived.

And when they had arrived the defenders mounted the city walls of Jin Yang. HF 10 (47.3). For closely similar examples see Zuo Zhao 10.6, Zuo Min 2.7, and LY 18.7.

There certainly is no ‘temporal *ruo*’ corresponding to this temporal *ze*. And it is important to realize that temporal *ze* is quite common:

(4) 是故文武興則民好善

When, therefore, Wen and Wu rose the people loved goodness. Meng 6A6. Cf. Xun 4.59, Mo 35.11.

I suppose one could construe this as ‘When a Wen or a Wu rose to power, then the people loved goodness’, but normally I don’t think this sentence would be used to express the idea that ‘if Wen and Wu manage to rise to power, then the people are going to love goodness.’

(5) 其子趨而往視之苗則槁矣

At the point of time when the son ran out to look at them the sprouts were withered. Meng 2A2.16.

(6) 寇 則 曰

When the robbers had gone he said . . . Meng 4B31. Cf. Meng 1B9.

We have common idioms like:

(7) 今則不然

Now things aren’t like that. Zhuang 25.48 *et saepe*.
and also:

(8) 夏則休乎山樊

When it is summer he is resting in the mountains. Zhuang 25.2. Cf. Zhuang 29.29, Guan (3.64–4).

(9) 居則曰

After a while he said . . . LY 11.24 *et saepe*.

With temporal topics of this sort *ruo* is apparently impossible.

There are other uses of *ze* where *ruo* would be quite impossible:

(10) 此繆公非欲敗於殽也，智不至也
智不至則不信

It was not as if Duke Mu wanted to die at Xiao. It was just that his knowledge was imperfect. And because his knowledge was imperfect he did not believe. LSCQ 16.4.

(11) 西子蒙不潔則人皆掩鼻而過之

If a Xi Shi were covered with filth, everyone would cover their noses as they passed her. Meng 4B25. Cf. section 4.4 below.

‘Conditional’ *ze* 則 and *ruo* 若

Temporal and conditional *ze* may be logically distinct, but in practise the line is often hard to draw:

(12) 且父母之於子也產男則相賀產女則殺之

Moreover, as to the relation of parents to children: when they produce a boy they congratulate each other. When they produce a girl they kill her. HF 56 (319.9).

Contrast with this a typical sentence with *ruo*:

(13) 若背其言臣死

If they go back on their word I will die. Zuo Wen 13 fu 2.

One begins to suspect that if we had read

(14) 若產男則相賀…

we would have translated: ‘if she gets a son there will be mutual congratulations . . .’, but it is very hard to be sure at this stage. What we need are neat contrasting pairs where the use of *ruo* versus *ze* seems to make a difference. Well, how about the following:

(15) 若入君必失國

If they enter you are bound to lose the state. Zuo Xiang 18.4.

Keep in mind that in Zuo Zhao 13.3 and Zuo Zhao 21 fu 2 *ruo ru* 若入 also means ‘if (the definite subject) enters’.¹

And now look at this:

(16) 弟子入則孝出則悌

“A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful to his elders.” LY 1.6, tr. Legge p. 140.

1. Of course, the use of *ru* 入 in (15) and (16) is somewhat unusual. One might suspect that when *ru* 入 has its ordinary meaning ‘to enter’, then *ru ze* 入則 may well come to mean ‘if he enters’. But the evidence is that under these circumstances *ru ze* means ‘when one enters’:

天子入大廟祭先聖則齒

When an emperor enters the Great Temple and sacrifices to the former sages, then the order of age applies. LSCQ 4.3.

Not: ‘If the present emperor turns out to enter the Great Temple (tomorrow) . . .’. Incidentally, the first five books of LSCQ are full of general conditionals like this. Specific conditionals are very hard to find.

Note that *ru ze* 入則 also means ‘when the subject is inside’ in LY 9.16, Mo 35.31, Meng 3B4, all without *ruo* or *ru*!

It looks as if we also have a systematic contrast between *li ze* 立則 and *ruo li* 若立:

(17) 立則見其參於前也

Whenever you are standing up (in court) see these principles ranged before you. LY 15.6. Cf. Waley 1938:194.

(18) 若果立之必為季氏憂

If it turns out that you really establish him, then that is bound to give trouble to the Ji clan. Zuo Xiang 31.4.

Note, incidentally, that in Zuo Ding 1.5 we have a close parallel to (18) with the pattern (E) *ruo* . . . *ze*. The pattern (E) *can* work like (B), but it is important to remember that it can also work like (A).

Consider the contrast between *si ze* 死則 and *ruo si* 若死 in the following examples:

(19) 其親死則舉而委之於壑

When their parents had died they would lift them up and throw them into the gutter. Meng 3B5.

(20) 人死則曰非我也歲也

When people die you say: “It is not my fault! It is the harvest!” Meng 1A3.5. Cf. LCSQ 4.3.

(21) 若趙孟死為政者其韓子乎

If it turns out that Zhao Meng dies (now), then presumably Han Zi will be the one to look after the government. Zuo Xiang 31 fu 1. Cf. Zuo Xiang 23.11 and examples (61), (49) below.

Generalizing *ze*

Now against the background of these pairs, look at:

(22) 事親則慈孝

When one is serving one’s parents one (naturally) feels affection and filial piety. Zhuang 31.35.

There are four exactly parallel sentences in the context. None of them

have *ruo* or *ru*. My suggestion is that the pattern (B) would have been inappropriate here.

It is as if *ruo* is inappropriate with iterative or durative verbs:

(23) 君子居則貴左，用兵則貴右。

When at home the gentleman honours the left, when at war he honours the right. Lao 31.

(24) 河內凶則移其民於河東

When there is a bad year in Henei then I move the people to Hedong. Meng 1A3.

I am suggesting that if we had *ru* and no *ze* in (24) the sentence would begin to look as if it was referring to a particular year: ‘if this turns out to be a bad year, then I am going to move the people’. If we assume that *ze* in the pattern (A) has something like the force of ‘then as a rule’, contrasts like this would be only natural.

By current grammatical accounts of AC a passage like:

(25) 遠之則怨

should be naturally translatable as ‘if you keep at a distance from him he will get angry’. It is of practical importance to know whether we are normally entitled to take the passage in this way. Now I find it significant this is not the way we take (25) in its context:

(26) 唯女子與小人為難養也
近之則不孫，遠之則怨。

Only women, children and little men are hard to deal with: when you get close to them they will become disobedient, and when you keep at a distance from them they will get offended. LY 17.23.

Similarly we have *vague* conditionals about the future like:

(27) 賜之則不受

Supposing a ruler would give it to you, then you would not accept it. Meng 5B6.

Not: ‘If you give it as a present, he will not accept’, or anything along this line.

Consider now an isolated saying like this:

(28) 狐突曰：國君好內則天子危好外則相室危。

Hu Tu said: “If the ruler of a state prefers his harem then his heir is in

jeopardy. If he prefers outsiders then his ministers are in jeopardy.” HF 31 (191.8).

It seems to me that although we do not know the context of this saying we know from a grammatical point of view that Hu Tu is not likely to have referred directly to one specific historical constellation. He was referring to a general pattern. That is why the pattern (A) is appropriate.

Further illustrations of this are easy to find:

(29) 禹聞善言則拜

When Yu heard good words he bowed. Meng 2A8.

I have not found *ruo* without *ze* in sentences of this sort. The next example is even clearer:

(30) 海運則將徙於南冥

When the sea moves he is about to set out for the Southern Darkness. Zhuang 1.2. Cf. Zhuang 1.7.

Ruo would be most emphatically out of the question in sentences like these. Look at some more:

(31) 作則万竄怒號

When it arises, then the 10,000 caves shout furiously. Zhuang 2.4. Cf. Zhuang 2.7.

(32) 臥則居居起則于于

When they slept they went *juju*, when they got up they went *yuyu*. Zhuang 29.29.

I am not sure how one ‘goes *juju* or *yuyu*’, but I am sure that there is nothing conditional about *ze* 則 in this sentence. We seem to have a clear temporal clause.

Let me quote another saying of Confucius that illustrates my grammatical point but is of more than just grammatical interest:

(33) 仕而優則學，學而優則仕。

If one excels as an official one should devote oneself to studying. If one excels in one’s study one should get employment in an official position. LY 19.13. Cf. LY 1.6.

My point is that we would not naturally understand this on the lines of ‘If it turns out that this man excels as an official, then he should devote himself to studying . . .’.

Here is a more trivial but grammatically even more revealing case:

(34) 子於是日哭則不歌

When on a certain day the master had cried, then he would refuse to sing (on that day). LY 7.10.

Definitely *not*: 'If it turns out that the master cries on this day, then he won't sing.'

The generality of *ze* does not have to be temporal:

(35) 天下之言不歸楊則歸墨

Take any speech of the world, if it does not belong to the Yang school it will belong to the Mo school. Meng 3B9.

This sentence could *never* begin to mean 'If (all) the speeches of the world fail to belong to the Yang school then they belong to the Mo school'. It is sentences of this sort that show the relevance of the logical distinction between patterns (C) and (D). The two clauses in (35) are not simply two independent propositions. They are bound together by quantification. The topic *tianxia zhi yan* 天下之言 indicates the domain of objects over which one quantifies. But as we have seen the generality of *ze* is not normally of this straightforward kind.

Surveying the examples I have provided one may note that conditional *ze* very often invites the paraphrase 'then *as a rule*'. Now I do not in general have much faith in etymological arguments in semantic analyses, but it is a pleasing thought that the lexical meaning of *ze* 則 in AC is indeed 'rule, law, pattern', so that the grammaticalized meaning of *ze* seems clearly connected with its lexical meaning. And obviously it would be easy to provide a host of further examples where *ze* has something like the force of 'then as a rule'. But this would not really help. For the important issue now is whether this general nuance is a *constant* feature of the semantics of conditional *ze*. In order to decide on this very important question one would ideally need to check on all the instances of conditional *ze* in AC literature. Since *ze* is far too common for this to be practicable I have first concentrated on one particular book, the Analects, and I have carefully examined *all* the cases of conditional *ze* in that book. I was certainly prepared for marginal examples, but in this instance I simply have not been able to find any. In the Analects *ze* is perfectly consistently used in accordance with the analysis of the particle I have argued for in this section.

Limitations of our analysis

The case of the Analects is interesting but it is not representative for AC texts. A careful study of the Mencius shows that there are circumstances under which the contrast between *ru* and *ze* is neutralized. Firstly in orders:

(36) 取之而燕民悅則取之

If, when you take it the people of Yan rejoice, then take it! Meng 1B10. Cf. Meng 1A7.23, 1B5.

Secondly in questions:

(37) 有復於王者曰…則王許之乎

If someone reported to you saying . . . would you allow that? Meng 1A7.10. Contrast LY 6.30, LY 12.19, LY 12.12.

In view of the frequency of non-conditional *ze* in front of question words the second exception is not very worrying. And in the case of advice or orders – the first exception – the use of *ze* introduces no ordinary conditional with a declarative apodosis.

The third group of exceptions is of special interest. For it appears that our pattern (A) with simple *ze* can also be used in tenseless, abstract ratiocination or logic-chopping, i.e. the ‘pattern’ may be *logical*:

(38) 前日之不受是則今日之受非也
今日之受是則前日之不受非也
夫子必居一於此

If yesterday’s non-acceptance was right, then today’s acceptance is wrong. If today’s acceptance is right then yesterday’s non-acceptance was wrong. Master, surely you cannot have it both ways. Meng 2B3.5. We seem to have a lesson, here, in logical consistency. The logical form of this argument does not seem to involve quantification.

I found an even more remarkable piece of logic-chopping in the Guan Zi. Here we have a lesson in *reductio ad absurdum*. Those who still have doubts whether the Chinese were capable of strict and formal logical argumentation will do well to study the following:

(39) 天或維之，地或載之
天莫之維則天以墜矣
地莫之載則地以沈矣
夫天不墜地不沈夫或維而載之也夫

There is something that holds Heaven together. There is something that supports Earth. If there was nothing that holds Heaven together then Heaven would fall down. If there was nothing that supported the Earth then the Earth would submerge. Now since Heaven does not fall down and the Earth does not submerge, there must be something that holds together and supports these things, respectively. Guan 38 (2.71–8).

The logical form of this argument is perfectly transparent: P and Q are true. For: if P were not true then R would be true, and if Q were not true then S would be true. But neither R nor S are true. Therefore surely P and Q must be true. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

My claim is that the force of *ze* in this passage corresponds precisely to the familiar formal notion of ‘if . . . then’ in formal logic.

The last group of exceptions are counterfactuals:

(40) 告則不得娶

If he had told his parents he would not have got to marry his wife. Meng 5A2. Cf. LSCQ 23.4, Zhuang 17.5.

Here one might have expected a *ru*, and it looks almost as if Mencius had the same feeling, for he continues in the same breath:

(41) 如告則廢人之大倫

If he had told his parents then he would have discarded the greatest moral principle of man . . . *Ibidem*.

But counterfactuals marked only by *ze* do occasionally occur elsewhere. One such example is preserved in Shuo Yuan:

(42) 今桓公在此則車下之臣盡管仲

If Duke Huan was here, then the ministers surrounding your carriage would all be Guan Zhongs. Shuo Yuan 8.248.

Example (11) above may be another case in point. (Cf. Section 4.4.).

The contrast with *ruo*

I hope I have argued persuasively that there often is something temporal and general in the meaning of *ze*, but I am painfully aware that I have not so far been able to demonstrate or prove that *ruo* really is as fundamentally different in its semantic force as I have repeatedly suggested. How can we be sure that with sufficient patience one could

not line up a few dozen examples where *ruo* edges towards a temporal meaning like ‘while’? I can only submit that I have looked for temporal *ruo* and I have not been able to come up with a convincing set of examples. On the other hand the sentence connective *ruo* is so common that it is difficult to be sure that others may not be luckier. Since *ruo* operates across phrase boundaries the indices are not much use in this connection.

Keeping the question of ‘general’ *ruo* in the backs of our minds, let us now turn to a specific syntactic problem connected with *ruo*, the problem of the position of *ruo* vis-a-vis the subject of the clause it subordinates. It turns out that *ruo* can occur both before and after this subject. The conditions under which this happens have so far not been understood.

The position of *ruo* before and after the subject

I shall try to demonstrate that *ruo* precedes the subject only if there is a change of subject in the main clause. I say ‘only if there is a change of subject’ and not ‘whenever there is a change of subject’. So I am not committed to the mistaken view that when *ruo* comes after the subject of the clause it subordinates, there has to be the same subject in the main clause.

It would be nice to find that also *sui* 雖 ‘even if’ can only precede the subject when there is a different subject in the main clause. For eight out of the ten examples of pre-subject *sui* 雖 I have found, our principles do apply, but not to all:

(43) 雖聖人能生法，不能廢法而治國。

The sage may be able to create laws, but he cannot abandon the laws and (still) govern the state. Guan 16(1.76).

Perhaps in the case of *ruo*, too, we are not so much dealing with a rigid principle as with a strong tendency for *ruo* to precede the subject only when there is a change of subject in the main clause.

I shall first consider examples of the pattern (B) and after that compare relevant examples of pattern (E).

Two parallel examples from the Zuo Zhuan illustrate what I am getting at:

(44) 寡人若朝于薛不敢與諸任齒

If I went to court at Xue, I would not dare to rank myself equal with the Ren. Zuo Yin 11.

- (45) 若寡人得没于地
天其以禮悔禍于許

If I live out my life in my territory, then *Heaven* might on account of this act of propriety regret having harmed Xu ... *Ibidem*.

- (46) 若晉君朝以入婢子夕以死

If the ruler of Jin enters in the morning I shall die that evening. Zuo Xi 15.14.

In the following example, comprehension becomes clearly easier if we observe our rule on *ruo*:

- (47) 若我出師必懼而歸

If I bring out the army, he will get afraid and turn back. Zuo Wen 16.6. The reading 'If I bring out the army, I will get afraid and turn back' is *grammatically* discouraged.

- (48) 若我伐宋諸侯之伐我必疾

If I were to attack Song the feudal lords' attack on me would certainly be quick. Zuo Xiang 11.3. Cf. Zuo Xiang 24 fu 1, Zuo Ding 1.5, Zuo Ai 6.8 etc.

- (49) 若子死將誰使代子

If you die, whom shall we order to replace you? HF 22 (131.3) Cf. HF 32 (197.6).

- (50) 若周衰其必興矣

If Zhou declines, she (*Chu*) is sure to rise to power. Guo Yu 16.11604. We cannot translate 'If Zhou declines, it is sure to rise (again)'. This reading is perhaps not quite ungrammatical, but strongly discouraged by the general rule we are discussing.

- (51) 若周衰諸姬其孰興

If Zhou declines, who of the various members of the Ji clan will rise to power? Guo Yu 16.11717.

(Only a line before this we have: 君若欲避其難其速規所矣 'If you want to avoid these difficulties, you must quickly survey the place.')

(52) 若家不亡身必不免

If *the family* is not ruined, then certainly *the person* will not escape. GY 2.1394.

(53) 若我往晉必患我

If *I* go, *Jin* will certainly cause me trouble. GY 5.3943. Cf. GY 4.3437, GY 1.396, GY 19.13370, etc.

Let me now turn to those sentences where we have both *ruo* and *ze*, i.e. examples of the pattern (E).

There are only few relevant examples in Zhuang Zi, but such as there are are in line with our expectations:

(54) 若父不能召其子，兄不能教其弟
則無貴父子兄弟之親矣。

“If a *father* cannot lay down the law to his son, and one who is an elder brother cannot teach his younger brother, then *the relationship between father and son and elder and younger brother* loses all value.” Zhuang 29.4 tr. Watson 1968: 323. Cf. Zhuang 29.6.

I have the impression that if the scope of *ruo* is more than one clause, it must precede the subject (if any) of the first clause in its scope. And I would not be surprised if this principle could occasionally overrule the more general principle of non-identity of subjects in conditionals with pre-subject *ruo*.

(55) 若民服而聽上則國富而兵勝

If the people are submissive and obey their superiors, then the state will be rich and the armed forces victorious. SJ 10.94. (There are two more illustrations of our principle on the same page).

Note that the definite article in ‘*the people*’ is logically misleading: we clearly have general conditionals in (54) and (55).

(56) 若國家治財用足則

When state and clan are well governed and supplies are sufficient, then ... Mo 27.17. Cf. Mo 48.5, Mo 25.69, Mo 31.106, Mo 27.43.

(57) 若鬼神無有則武王何祭分哉

If there are no spirits, why did King Wu sacrifice at Fen? Mo 31.48.

(58) 若鬼神無有則文王既死彼豈能在帝之左右哉

If the ghosts and spirits do not exist, then how can King Wen after his death be at the side of God? Mo 31.63.

(59) 若我不為天之所欲而為天之所不欲
則我率天下之百姓以從事於禍崇中也

If I do not do what Heaven wants but what Heaven does not want, then I lead the people of the world to work in the midst of disaster. Mo 26.11.

At first sight this may look like counterevidence to my thesis. But in fact the presence of the second *wo* 我 strongly suggests that it was *necessary* to make the identity of subjects explicit, because without such explicit identity one would – as my rule predicts – expect a different subject.

The closest I have got to finding a pre-subject *ruo* 若 without a change of subject in the main clause are the following examples:

(60) 若君欲奪之則近賢而遠不肖

If your majesty wishes to take away his power, then keep close to the talented men and keep the worthless people at a distance . . . HF 34 (234.3).

Now it is not entirely clear what has to count as the subject of an imperative. But the following is a straightforward exception to our generalization:

(61) 若君不死必失諸侯

If you do not die, you will certainly lose (the confidence of) the feudal lords. Guo Yu 8.10706.

Thus the parallelism between *ruo* and *sui* 雖 seems fairly close also in this respect.

The nature of *ruo*

The preceding examples must suffice to illustrate the conditions under which *ruo* can precede the subject of the clause it subordinates. They also illustrate that conditionals with *ruo* . . . *ze* (pattern (E)) are quite different from conditionals with simple *ruo* (pattern (B)). We find that none of the instances of the pattern (B) invite a general interpretation on the lines of ‘when’, whereas many of the instances of pattern (E) do invite such a general interpretation.

We have provided some evidence to show that *ruo* in the pattern (B) is very often translatable by something like ‘if it turns out that’. But the crucial question is whether we have thus discovered a constant and quite general feature of the pattern (B). In the rest of this section I shall try to argue for a positive answer to this question.

Consider first some remarkable facts about the relative distribution of the patterns (A) and (B) in AC literature. We find a remarkable abundance of sentences like (B) in books like Zuo Zhuan, Guo Yu and Zhan Guo Ce, a sprinkling of cases in Han Fei Zi and only a few isolated instances in books like Lun Yu, Mencius and Xun Zi. A natural explanation is that the historical books Zuo Zhuan, Guo Yu and Zhan Guo Ce are mainly concerned with concrete, specific reasoning while the philosophical books Lun Yu, Mencius, and Xun Zi are mainly concerned with general, philosophical reasoning.

Of course, in historical books there is also a fair amount of general discussion, and correspondingly the pattern (A) is not at all rare in books like the Guo Yu and the Zhan Guo Ce. Since the Zuo Zhuan is less argumentative and more straightforwardly historical one might expect the pattern (A) to be relatively rarer in that book, and indeed a look through the concordance shows that this is the case. (There are a higher proportion of cases in the Gong Yang and Gu Liang commentaries than in Zuo Zhuan.)

In the philosophical texts the pattern (A) seems simply ubiquitous, it is almost tediously common. And this is again as predicted.

Now it would be grotesquely insensitive to try to explain these manifest irregularities of distribution in terms of different grammatical principles operative in these different kinds of texts. The account provided in this section seems much more plausible.

However, the sceptic might still object that the plausibility of my account depends crucially on the question whether for example the very large number of sentences like (B) in Guo Yu *do* involve specific conditionals. I found the issue important enough to check on many dozens of sentences like (B) in Guo Yu, and the resulting picture is surprisingly clear. The following florilegium is representative of what I found.

The Guo Yu is simply replete with specific conditionals involving *ruo*:

(62) 君若來將待刑以快君志

If the ruler comes I will await my punishment to gladden the ruler's mind. GY 9.7300.

(63) 君若不還寡人將無所避

If you do not turn back I have nowhere to take refuge. GY 9.7090. Cf. GY 8.6003; GY 20.14472, etc.

(64) 無乃不可乎若不可必為諸侯笑

Surely that was not right! If it turns out that this was not right I will certainly be laughed at by the feudal lords. GY 9.7176.

(Note that this is *not* a counterfactual!)

(65) 若以蠻夷之故棄之
其無乃得蠻夷而失諸侯之信乎

If you discard Lu for the sake of the barbarians, then surely you will win over the barbarians but lose the confidence of the feudal lords. GY 5.3988.

(66) 後若有事吾與子圖之

If something happens later I shall consult with you. GY 19.14132.

(67) 若加之以德可以大啓

If you treat them with generosity you can greatly expand (your territory). GY 16.11808.

(68) 榮公若用周必敗

If the Duke of Rong gets employed, then the Zhou will be defeated. GY 1.230.

(69) 若召而近之死無日矣

If you summon him and have close relations with him it will not be long before you die. GY 18.13240.

(70) 若合而函吾中吾上下必敗其左右

If there is a clash and they turn on our centre, then our first and second army will defeat their left and right wings. GY 16.12070.

(71) 若在卿位內外必平

If *he* holds the office of a prime minister there will be peace inside and outside (the palace). GY 13.9988.

(72) 若有天吾必勝之

If such a thing as Heaven exists we must win. GY 9.7120.

One would, of course, expect to find a few marginal cases, and when I first saw the following I thought I had found one. But it turned out to be a false alarm:

(73) 若子方壯能經營百事
倚相將奔走承序

If it turns out that you are currently going strong and able to look after everything, then I, your minister, will hurry away and do as behoves his station. GY 17.12329.

Here are two examples from Han Fei Zi:

(74) 彼如出之可以得荆

If they let him out, then we can gain favour with Jing. HF 23 (145.6).

(75) 必不敢禁城壺丘，若禁之我曰…

They will certainly not dare to forbid me to fortify Hu Qiu. But if it turns out that they do I will say . . . HF 23 (145.5). Cf. HF 10 (48.7).

Note that swearing that a sentence is not true is not at all the same as presupposing that it is not true. Thus there is nothing strange in the fact that we have *ruo* in the following:

(76) 是師必有疵
若無疵吾不復言道矣

This army is bound to run into trouble. If it does not run into trouble I will not speak of the Way again. LSCQ 16.4.

I would not be surprised if the idiomatic force of this was like ‘If it does not run into trouble I am a Dutchman’. I do not have any qualms about calling this a specific conditional.

Now as in the case of *ze* orders and questions provide occasional counterexamples. But these do not have to worry us too much. Even special marginal cases like:

(77) 夫天地之氣不失其序
若失其序民亂之也

The ether of Heaven and Earth changes according to season. If it turns out not to change in this way, this is because the people disturb the ether. GY 1.468.

do not seriously weaken the force of our generalization. The nasty – and fortunately rare – cases for my analysis are passages like this:

(78) 彼來請地而弗與則移兵於韓必矣
如弗予其措兵於魏必矣。

If he comes asking for territory and you do not give it to him, then he is sure to move his troops against Han . . .

If you do not give it to him, he is sure to employ his troops against Wei. HF 10 (45.7).²

I would not be surprised if it was possible to find a few further instances of this sort in AC literature. But I hope the gentle reader will by now agree that examples of this sort are not typical AC usage.

2. Note incidentally that *bi* 必 ‘then necessarily’ occurs freely both in general and in specific conditionals. In fact it can make a specific conditional even without *ruo*:

若先犯之必奔
王卒顧之必亂

If we attack them first they are bound to run away. If the king’s soldiers see this they are bound to riot. Zuo Huan 5.6.

4.3 Conditional *gou* 苟

The current view of *gou* is that it is synonymous with AC *ru* 如, *ruo* 若 or modern Chinese *ruguo* 如果 and simply means ‘if’.¹ I am quite certain that something is wrong with this view.

Now the gloss for *gou* in the earliest commentators is consistently *cheng* 誠 ‘really’. I propose to demonstrate that this gloss, when properly understood, does in fact capture the basic meaning of *gou*. I shall first show that *cheng* 誠 and some semantically related words are regularly used in subordinate sentences where they can be conveniently translated as ‘if really’. I shall then go on to document more fully my basic contention that *gou* consistently means something like ‘if really’ in AC.

As usual, I avoid polemic criticism of current standard translations of the examples quoted. The patient reader must see for himself what he thinks the original means, and whether he thinks my new – and old! – interpretation of *gou* makes an important difference.

Subordinating *cheng* 誠, *guo* 果 and *xin* 信

(1) 誠如是也民歸之由水之就下

If someone really is like this the people will turn to him like water flowing downwards. Meng 1A6.

(2) 上誠好知而無道，則天下大亂矣。

1. There is a tradition from Legge 1861 down to Dobson 1959 to gloss *gou* as ‘if indeed, if in fact’. Wisely, Legge forgets about his dictionary gloss most of the time, while Dobson 1959:132 mechanically translates our example (35) as “If in fact you were to put profit first, relegating justice to a second place, then . . .” But what semantic difference does it make that we have ‘if in fact’ instead of ‘if in this context’? What semantic contribution does the ‘in fact’ make to the English translation? We could paraphrase ‘if in fact’ for example by ‘if, as I suggested’ or ‘if, as you were considering to do’ etc . . . But *gou* does not express nuances of that sort at all. The translation is quite misleading. Similar considerations apply to ‘if indeed’. A close look at my examples will show, that these two glosses do not capture the force of *gou* in these contexts. Legge was indeed wise to forget about them in practice.

If those above really are fond of knowledge and lack the true Way, then the world will be in great turmoil. Zhuang 10.34.

- (3) 王曰：然誠有百姓者，
齊國雖褊小吾何愛一牛？

The King said: 'Right! If I am really in control of my people, then why should I be stingy with a buffalo even though Qi is a tiny little state?' Meng 1A7.6.

- (4) 是故誠有功則雖疏賤必賞
誠有過則雖近愛必誅

Thus if someone really has merit then he is sure to be rewarded even though he may be distantly related to the ruler or of lowly status. If someone really has committed a mistake he is sure to be punished even though he may be close to the ruler and loved by him. HF 5 (20.14).

- (5) 為人主者誠明於臣之所言則別賢不肖如黑白矣

As for a ruler of men: if he really understands what ministers will say, then he will be able to tell talented men from useless men like black from white. HF 44 (307.10). Cf. HF 44 (312.10).

- (6) 誠得如此臣免死罪矣

If one really achieves something like this, the ministers will fail to be punished for capital crimes. HF 30 (164.12).

- (7) 彼誠喜則能利己

If that man is really pleased then he can profit us. HF 44 (310.15). (Note this characteristic use of *ji* 己!)

- (8) 大王誠能聽臣六國從親

If your majesty are able really to listen to me, the six states will be close in their vertical solidarity. ZGC II.30. (SBCK 7.12a).

- (9) 誠聽臣之計可不攻而城降

If you really listen to my advice the city may surrender without an attack. Shi Ji 89.9.

Like conditional particles, *cheng* 誠 occurs together with particles such as *ruo*:

- (10) 若誠不便，雖封鬕於王何損。

If an attack would really be profitless, then even though they would enfeoff me, what harm would that do to you? ZGC 129 (II.53) SBCK 4.11b.

Compare also:

- (11) 信如君不君，臣不臣，父不父
子不子，雖有粟吾豈得而食諸。

If the ruler really does not behave as a ruler should, and the ministers did not behave as a minister should, and fathers not as fathers should, and sons not as sons should, then even if there was grain, how would I get to eat it? Shi Ji 47.18.

- (12) 信能行此五者則鄰國之民仰之若父母

If one really can do these five things, then the peoples of the neighbouring states will look up to one as to a father or mother. Meng 2A5.

- (13) 果能此道矣雖愚必明雖柔必強

If you really are capable of this way, then though you may be stupid you are sure to be enlightened, though you may be weak you are sure to become strong. Zhong Yong.

(It would, incidentally, be interesting to find out whether the modern *ruguo* 如果 retains something of this *guo* in its meaning.)

Conditional *gou* 苟

- (14) 苟中心圖民智雖不及必將至焉

If from the bottom of your heart you really plan for your people, then even if your knowledge is not up to the standard you will achieve perfection. GY 4.2913.

The old commentary is obligingly clear:

苟誠也言誠以中心圖慮民事
智雖有所不及必將至於道也。

‘*Gou* means ‘really’. This says that if you really in your heart plan for the people, then even if there are limitations to your knowledge you will attain to the Way.’ I suggest that it is worth keeping this gloss in mind as we look at the peculiar force of conditional *gou* in AC literature.

There are six occurrences of *gou* in Lun Yu. All of them make much better sense when *gou* is taken to mean ‘if really’ rather than the current simple ‘if’:

(15) 苟志於仁矣，無惡也。

If your will is *really* bent on humaneness, then there will be nothing evil in you. LY 4.4.

(16) 丘也幸，苟有過人必知之。

I am fortunate! If I *do* make a mistake, people are sure to realize. LY 7.31.

(17) 苟子不欲雖賞之不竊

If you *really* were free from (greedy) desires, you could pay them for it and they still would not steal. LY 12.18.

(18) 苟有用我者期月而已可也

If someone *really* were to use me, then things would already be alright after a month. LY 13.10.

(19) 苟正其身矣，於從政乎何有，不能正其身如正人何。

If someone *really* puts his person in order he will have no problem in running a government. And if he cannot put his own person in order, how can he put other people right? LY 13.13.

The absence of *gou* in the second conditional is surely significant.

(20) 其未得之也患得之，既得之患失之。

苟患失之無所不至矣

Before he has made it he worries about making it. When he *has* made it, he worries about losing out. If he is *really* worried about losing out, there is no length to which he will not go. LY 17.13.

The four relevant examples of *gou* in Chu Ci are most instructive:

(21) 不吾知其亦已兮

苟余情其信芳

Never mind that no one understands me,
So long as my mind is truly fragrant.

Chu Ci, Li Sao 59. (Cf. Hawkes 1959:25).

For our purposes Li Sao 35 (Hawkes 1959:24) is no different from the couplet just quoted.

- (22) 苟余心其端直兮
雖避遠之何傷

As long as my mind is *really* straight and true
Even if I live far away from him, what does it matter?
Chu Ci, Jiu Zhang, 221 (tr. Hawkes 1959:64).

- (23) 苟中情其好修兮
又何必用夫行媒

If your soul within is really beautiful and cultivated,
Why should you need a matchmaker any more?
Chu Ci, Li Sao 146 (Cf. Hawkes 1959:32).

Not once, incidentally, does David Hawkes translate *gou* just as 'if' in these passages. So far as I know he is the only translator of AC-texts that has been consistently sensitive towards the nuances expressed by *gou*. The commentator Wang Yi glosses *gou* as *cheng* 誠.

Again, the occurrences of *gou* in Han Fei Zi are so few that they can be conveniently lined up before the reader so that he can make up his own mind on the peculiar force of *gou* in that text:

- (24) 苟成其私利不顧國患

As long as he *does* achieve his private profit he will not think about disasters for the state. HF 31 (179.13). Cf. Guan 11 (1.50).

- (25) 法刑苟信虎化為人

If laws and punishments are *really* predictable then tigers will turn into men. HF 8 (34.4).

- (26) 苟得一說於主
雖破國殺衆不難為也

If for once he can *really* win favour with the ruler, then even destroying the state and murdering the masses will be no problem for him. HF 44 (309.13).

- (27) 苟慎其道天下可有也

If you are *really* careful about this way you can control the whole world. HF 1 (7.6).

- (28) 苟極盡則費神多

If you *really* exert yourself to the utmost and exhaust yourself, you will use up a lot of mental energy. HF 20 (101.13).

A selection of examples from Mo Zi must suffice:

(29) 苟不用仁義何以非夷人食其子也

If one really does not practise goodness and righteousness (at all), how could one criticise the barbarians for eating their children? Mo 49.29.

(30) 苟能使子墨子至於越而教寡人
請裂故吳之地方五百里以封子

If you really can get Mo Zi to come to Yue and teach me, then let me carve out 500 square *li* of the former territory of Wu and enfeoff you there. Mo 49.57.

(31) 天苟兼而有食之
夫奚說以不欲人之相愛相利也

If Heaven really gives some food to everyone, then how can one argue that it does not want men to love and to profit each other? Mo 4.15.

(32) 此天下百姓之所皆難也
苟君說之則士衆能為之

The peoples of the world all object to this. But if the ruler really takes pleasure in it, then crowds of knights can do it. Mo 15.17. Cf. Mo 16.82.

(33) 苟其飢約又若此矣

If they really are exposed to famine and dearth they will again be in this sort of condition. Mo 25.34.

(34) 以此知兼而食之也
苟兼而食焉，必兼而愛之。

Thus we know that it gives them all food. But if it really gives them all food then it must love them all. Mo 28.20.

Again, plenty of examples in Mencius work better if we take *gou* to mean 'if really':

(35) 苟為後義而先利不奪不廢

But if they really put righteousness last and give priority to profit, then they will not be satisfied without snatching from others. Meng 1A1. Mencius is suggesting that the ruler has not thought this business about *li*

and *yi* through properly. He is warning that if the landowners really give full priority to profit there will be chaos. (Incidentally, the combination *gou wei* is frequent and idiomatic.)

Often, *gou* picks up as a protasis a preceding sentence, inviting the reader to consider: ‘and if that really were so . . .’.

- (36) 無恆產者無恆心
苟無恆心放肆邪侈無不為已

If they have no constant production they will have no constant mind. And if they really have no constant mind, they will indulge in all sorts of extravagant wickedness, depravity and license. Meng 3A3. Cf. Meng 1A7.

In Meng 1B14, 3B5, 4A10, 6B13 the conditions introduced by *gou* involve commendable moral actions. Such passages work extremely well on our hypothesis:

- (37) 苟為善後世子孫必有王者矣

If you really practise goodness, then there is sure to be a king among your later descendants. Meng 1B14.

There is no need to go through all the examples in Mencius that behave as they should. But it may be useful to look at a rather special instance:

- (38) 苟為無本七八月之閒雨集
溝澮皆盈其涸也可立而待也

If something really has no source, it is (like) the massive rainfalls in the seventh and eighth months: all the gutters are full, but they dry up in no time at all. Meng 4B18.

The force of *gou* seems to be ‘if contrary to appearances’ here. ‘If in fact’ would probably be a better translation.

- (39) 苟有利焉不顧親戚兄弟若禽獸

If there really is profit in something, they disregard parents and relatives, elder and younger brothers just as birds and beasts do. ZGC 363 (II.54). SBCK 2.52a.

The point in this passage is *not* that Qin (or the birds and beasts) are completely oblivious of family relations, if my interpretation is correct. The point is that profit easily becomes the dominant consideration.

(40) 君苟有信諸侯不貳

If you really are trustworthy, the feudal lords will not be double-faced. Zuo Zhao 3.5.

(41) 苟毋適衛吾出子

If you really do not go to Wei, we'll let you off. Shi Ji 47.45.

Clearly, the assumption in this passage is that Confucius is on his way to Wei. The people of Pu want a promise from him: 'if you *really* do not go ...?'

We have seen that in a number of AC texts it makes consistently good sense to understand *gou* as equivalent to *cheng* 誠. But already in Mo Zi there are cases where the nuance 'if *really*' makes little difference to the interpretation of *gou*. The Mohist logicians in the Da Qu chapter use the word apparently without any special nuance being intended. Also elsewhere we sometimes find a 'loose' use of *gou*, for example in Zhan Guo Ce and Guo Yu. But I do not think that the existence of such a 'loose' usage invalidates the observations I have made in this chapter. It is always worth looking for the peculiar force of *gou*:

(42) 不遇其時雖賢其能行乎
苟遇其時何難之有

If he does not come at the right time, then even an outstanding man surely cannot do anything. But if he really does come at the right time, then surely he finds no difficulties. Xun 28.40.

One might feel that in this instance *gou* was filled in to make a four-character clause. But in that case why use the rare *gou* and not the more common *ru* 如 or *ruo* 若? I believe my interpretation provides a natural answer to this question.

The difference between 'if' and 'if really' clearly matters for the interpretation of the following crucial passage from Shangjun Shu:

(43) 是以聖人苟可以強國不法其故
苟可以利民不循其禮

Thus a sage will not model himself on precedents if thereby he can *really* strengthen the state. He will not follow ritual if thereby he can *really* profit the people. SY 1.15.

If, like Duyvendak 1928:170 we take *gou* simply as 'if', Shang Yang becomes more of an anti-traditionalist than on the present reading. On

my reading of this passage, Shang Yang implies that there has to be a strong case for it before one goes against precedents, etc. He *does not* say: as soon as there is the slightest chance of strengthening the state . . . To me, this interpretation seems historically plausible. But of course in contemporary China it is unfashionable. The *Huoye wenxuan* 29.2 translates absurdly: 如果要強盛國家就不能效法老規矩 . . . and even Gao Heng 1974:15 translates – in my view wrongly –: 所以聖人治國只要能使國家強盛 . . . My interpretation of *gou* may be mistaken, but it does make a very substantial difference to our interpretation of AC-texts involving *gou*.

4.4 Counterfactual *shi* 使

The ability to imagine the world to be different from what it happens to be like is crucial for the emergence of any creative philosophy. Consider for a moment some thoughts of pre-Socratic philosophers and their articulation in Greek:

(1) ἀλλ' εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες (ἵπποι τ') ἢ ἐλέοντες ἢ γράψαι χεῖροσσε καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄπερ ἄνδρες, ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας καὶ (κε) θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ποιοῦν τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον (ἔκαστοι).

But if oxen and horses and lions had hands or could draw or make things with their hands like men, then the horses would draw horse-like gods and the oxen ox-like gods, just such bodies they would make as each species itself has. Xenophanes B 15 (Diels 1964:132).

It seems to me that this sort of flight of the imagination is made easier by the presence of the so-called '*irrealis*' in Greek. Xenophanes made proficient use of this form to articulate his views. (For example, also in fragment B 2 (Diels 1964: I.128)).

The same is very much true of the great and 'obscure' Herakleitos:

(2) εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν.

If all things became smoke, noses would presumably distinguish them. Herakleitos B 7 (Diels 1964:I.152). Cf. also B 15; 40; 99; 23.

Now there is no problem about articulating thoughts of this sort unambiguously in Latin, as the following fragment of Herakleitos, preserved only in Latin, demonstrates:

(3) *Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus, cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum.*

If happiness consisted in delights of the body, one would have to call the oxen happy, when they find the bitter vetch to eat. Herakleitos B 4 (Diels 1964: I.151).

But what about the Chinese? Did they have anything equivalent to an *irrealis*? Could they unambiguously articulate a counterfactual

proposition? What sorts of counterfactual arguments did they use? And what did they use them for?

Questions of this sort are of more than narrowly grammatical interest. They deserve a much fuller treatment than they can receive in this section. Here I shall only present some grammatical preliminaries to an essentially *anthropological* study of the emergence of counterfactual reasoning in ancient China. But in the process I hope to illustrate some of the range of the speculative imagination characteristic for ancient Chinese writers.

A comparative study of the emergence of counterfactual reasoning in various cultures seems to me to be an important task for those who are interested in the relations between science, culture and language.¹

To my knowledge, it has not been noticed so far by grammarians of ancient Chinese that the language does make a clear distinction between ordinary conditionals and counterfactuals. Compare the following:

(4a) 吾若言則死矣

If I speak up, I shall die.

(4b) 使吾言則死矣

Supposing I had spoken up, I would have died.

*Not:*² 'Supposing I speak up, I shall die.'

Apparently, *ruo* 若 or *ru* 如 cannot replace *shi* in counterfactuals like:

(5) 使吾言則死久矣

If I had spoken up, I would have died a long time ago! Xin Xu 5.23.

(6) 使武安侯在者族矣

If the Lord of Wu-an was alive, I would exterminate him and his family. Shi Ji 107.29.

Not: 'Supposing he turns out to be alive, I shall exterminate him with his family!'

The counterfactual nature of *shi* is conveniently explicit in:

1. Any child that learns to speak Russian has to focus on the distinction between counterfactuals and other conditionals if it wants to use the Russian word *by* in the right places. A child that learns, say, Malay, does not, so far as I know, *have to* focus on this distinction in order to learn to make good Malay sentences. For the case of modern Chinese, see Bloom 1979.
2. Except, perhaps, in contexts like (10).

(7) 使寡人治信若是則民雖不治寡人弗怨，意者未至然乎。

If I really did govern in this way, then I could not be angry even if the people were unruly. But for all I know things have not got to this point. LSQ 16.8.

Here again, *ruo* 若 cannot be used for *shi*.

Now one might at first sight be tempted to consider the following passage as a counterexample to my view on hypothetical *shi*:

(8) 使我德能覆之 則天下納其貢職者迴也
 使我有暴亂之行則天下之伐我難矣

If through generosity I was able to hold my hand over them, then everybody would find it difficult to offer his ritual presents (there). If I were to indulge in cruel or outrageous behaviour then all the people would find it difficult to attack me (there). HNT 13.14b.

Note that in this passage the Duke of Zhou speaks on the proposal to fortify a palace on a certain mountain. He *rejects* the proposal: the palace is not going to be fortified. We are dealing with a kind of future counterfactual: as far as the Duke of Zhou is concerned, he is not going to reside on the mountain so that the question what would happen if he acted with generosity or with outrageous cruelty is entirely theoretical.

Here are two more passages that might look like counterevidence to my view on the contrast between *shi* and *ruo* 若. But they turn out to be nothing of the kind.

(9) 使吾無此三者，與何補於子？
 若吾有此三者，終不從子矣。

If I did not have these three qualities, what help would my collaboration be to you? If I have them, I will not ever join you. Xin Xu 8.2.

Shi, by contrast with *ruo* in the second sentence, seems to mark a counterfactual assumption. My claim is that *ruo* and *shi* could not have swapped places here without affecting the semantics of these sentences. The context of (9) bristles with defiant self-confidence of the speaker: he clearly assumes that he does possess wisdom, goodness and courage, the three qualities referred to in that passage.

By contrast, the following passage is from an abjectly humble letter by someone requesting an audience with the King of Qin:

(10) 使以臣之言為可願行而益利其道
 若將弗行則久留臣無為也

If you approved my words, I would hope you would put them into practise to the greatest possible advantage. If you are not going to practise them, then no purpose is served by keeping me (in Qin) for a long time. ZGC 93 (I.60).

Out of politeness the writer presents the possibility of his words being accepted as a remote, unrealistic possibility.

Examples like (10) are extremely rare, and they clearly do not show that *shi* ever is synonymous with *ru*. But what they do show is this: There are some marginal uses of *shi*, where it marks not counterfactual conditionals but ‘remote’ assumptions. Moreover it seems that the concrete assumption that a certain future event will occur can only be marked by *shi* in hypothetical pairs as in (10). (For more abstract non-counterfactual *shi* see examples (54)–(56).)

There is a delightfully colloquial passage involving this sort of *shi* in Mencius:

(11) 如使予欲富，辭十萬而受萬，是為欲富乎。

Suppose I wanted wealth: refusing 100,000 and accepting 10,000, would that be ‘wanting to be wealthy’? Meng 2B10.

The combination *ru shi* 如使 comes three times in Meng Zi, always with counterfactuals. (Cf. also HSWZ 2.11).

One of the other examples involves the legendary cook Yi Ya:

(12) 如使口之於味也其性與人殊，若犬馬之與我不同類也則天下何者皆從易牙於味也。

“Suppose that his mouth in its relish for flavours differed from that of other men, as is the case with dogs or horses which are not the same in kind with us, why should all men be found following Yi-ya in their relishes?” Meng 6A7 tr. Legge 412.

Again, a fictitious story about the legendary chess-player Chess Qiu is introduced by *shi* 使 and could never have been introduced by *ru* 如:

(13) 使奕秋誨二人奕…

If Chess Qiu was teaching two people to play chess, and if . . . Meng 6A9.

When the famous musician Shi Kuang is accused of over-subtlety in tuning a bell, he replies:

(14) 使後世無知音者則已
若有知音者必知鐘之不調

Suppose in later generations everyone was tone-deaf, then that would be the end of the matter. If on the other hand there are people with an ear for tones, then they are bound to realize that the bell is not properly tuned. HNT 19.19b.

Clearly, *shi* and *ruo* 若 are not interchangeable here. By using *shi* Shi Kuang strongly implies that not everybody will be tone-deaf in future times. He is just considering that logical possibility. *Shi* marks here not a straightforward counterfactual but rather a remote, unrealistic hypothesis. By contrast *ruo* 若 could here be translated as ‘in the very likely event that ...’.

In the following passage about the legendary strong men Wu Huo and Ji Fan there is an even clearer contrast between *shi* and *ruo*:

- (15) 今使烏獲藉蕃從後牽牛尾，尾絕而不從者，逆也
若指之桑條以貫其鼻則五尺童子牽而周四海者順也。

Now if Wu Huo or Ji Fan were to pull the tail of a water buffalo from the back, the tail would be torn off but the beast would not follow. That is because they would be going against the animal’s nature. If on the other hand you pierce his nose with a mulberry twig, then even a toddler could pull him and travel with him all over the world. That is because one would be following the animal’s nature. HNT 9.25.

Here *shi* marks a counterfactual and *ruo* an ordinary conditional.

There is a similar contrast between subordinating *zhi* 之 and *shi*:

- (16) 使曹沐釋其三尺之劍而操鋤鑿
與農夫居溝畝之中，則不若農夫。

When Cao Mo wields his three feet long sword, even a whole army cannot stand up to him. But if he laid aside his three feet long sword, took hold of agricultural tools and found himself (fighting) with a peasant in a ditch, then he would not be as good as the peasant. ZGC I.114.

Again the assumption that the legendary Carpenter Stone lived to the age of one thousand years could not be introduced by *ruo* ‘if’:

- (17) 使匠石以千歲之壽操鉤，視規矩，舉繩墨而正太山
若帶干將而齊萬民
雖盡力於巧極威於壽，太山不正，民不能齊。

“Supposing Carpenter Stone kept the longevity of one thousand years, had his scythes, watched his compasses and squares, and stretched his inked string, for the purpose of rectifying Mountain T’ai and supposing

“Pen and Yü girdled the Kan-chiang Sword to unify the myriad people, then though skill is exerted to the utmost extent and though longevity is prolonged to the utmost limit, Mountain T'ai would not be rectified and the people would not be united.” HF 29 (157.1) tr. Liao.

Apart from culture heroes like Shi Kuang and the Carpenter Stone, the great emperors of antiquity are favoured subjects of speculations involving hypothetical *shi*:

(18) 使舜無其志雖口辯而戶說之不能化一人

If Shun had not had his willpower we would not have converted a soul to goodness, even if he had eloquently argued his case, and even if he had gone from door to door to convince people. HNT 1.14a.

(19) 使舜趨天下之利而忘修己之道
身猶弗能保何尺地之有。

If Shun had run after profit for the world and had forgotten the Way of cultivating the Self, he would not even have been able to keep his person intact, and there would have been no question of controlling any territory whatever. HNT

(20) 使堯度舜則可，使桀度堯
是猶以升度石也。

If Yao were to examine Shun that would be all right, but if Jie were to examine Yao that would be like measuring a gallon of something in a container that only has room for a pint. HNT 10.3a.

Already in Han Shi Wai Zhuan we have *shi* reinforced by *jia* 假 to form a complex sentence connective:

(21) 假使禹為君舜為臣亦如此而已矣

If Yu had been the ruler and Shun the minister, the situation would also have been simply like this. HSWZ 3.23.

Older and more common is the combination *ruo shi* 若使：

(22) 若使湯武不遇桀紂未必王也
湯武不王雖賢顯未至於此

If Tang and Wu had not been faced by Jie and Zhou they would not necessarily have become kings. And if Tang and Wu had not become kings, then in spite of their talent their fame would not have reached down to this time. LSCQ 14.5.

Notice how the *ruo shi* 若使 marking a counterfactual here seems to

cover two subordinate clauses. On the other hand we might also think of the second counterfactual as an unmarked clause. Counterfactuals may occasionally be unmarked, but they cannot normally be marked by *ruo* 若. But cf. (65) below.

The following is a particularly interesting unmarked example:

(23) 舜雖賢不遇堯也 不得為天子。

Shun may have been talented, but if he had not met Yao, he would not have managed to become emperor. ZGC I, 58.

But again the most common pattern involves only *shi*:

(24) 使文王疏呂望而弗與深言
是周無天子之德而文武無與 (以) 成王也。

If King Wen had kept Lü Wang at a distance and had not engaged in deep conversation with him, then the Zhou would not have achieved the virtuous position of emperors and the kings Wen and Wu would not have had the means to become kings. ZGC 94 (I.63).

(24a) 使堯在上咎繇為理，安有取人之駒者乎
若有見暴如是叟者又必不與也
公知獄訟之不正故與之耳。

If Yao had been in charge and Gao Yao (sic!) had been minister of justice, how should anyone have taken anyone else's colt? When one is faced with the sort of cruelty the old man was faced with, then again one must not give (what is demanded of one). But the old man knew that the system of criminal justice was not correct, and therefore he simply gave the colt away. Shuo Yuan 7.197.

At the beginning of this passage the writer had to use *shi* and could not have used *ruo* because Yao and Gao Yao were long dead at the time of his writing, i.e. because he was making a counterfactual assumption. On the other hand, the assumption that someone should suffer injustice is quite realistic: therefore *ruo* is appropriate.

Not surprisingly, the abominable tyrants of antiquity come in for similar speculations:

(25) 使夏桀殷紂有害於民而立被其患
不至於為炮烙。

If Jie of the Xia and Zhou of the Yin had immediately suffered disaster when they harmed the people, it would never have come to (excesses like) the walking torches. HNT 15.2a.

Sometimes the complex sentence connective *ruo ling* 若令 is used to introduce such a counterfactual:

- (26) 使夏桀殷紂無道至於此者幸也…
 若令桀知必國亡身死殄無後類
 吾未知其屬無道之至於此也。

That which brought it about that Jie of the Xia and Zhou of the Yin offended morality to this extent, was that they were lucky. . . . If Jia and Zhou had known that their state was bound to be ruined and that they themselves would be destroyed and without posterity, who knows whether they would have carried their immorality to this point. LSCQ 7.4.

I think *ruo ling* 若令 is used here instead of the much commoner *ruo shi* 若使 in order to avoid confusion with the first *shi* 使 'cause'.

Here is again an unmarked counterfactual of this group:

- (27) 其斃通則比于不死矣

If Zhou had had any sense at all, Bi Gan would not have died. LSCQ 23.4.

But clearly most common are counterfactuals like this:

- (28) 使桀紂為匹夫未始行一而身在刑戮矣

If Jie and Zhou had been commoners, they would have found themselves executed before they could begin to do one of these things. HF 40 (298.11).

We have similar arguments about philosophers:

- (29) 鄉使宋人不聞孔子之言
 則年穀未豐而國家未寧。

If, before, the Prince of Song had not heard (listened to) Confucius' words, then the harvest would not have been abundant and the state would not have been peaceful. HSWZ 3.17. Cf. Xin Shu 1.45.

Huai Nan Zi reflects on what would have happened if they had occupied the throne:

- (30) 使居天子之位則天下徧為儒墨

If they had occupied the throne of the emperor, everyone in the world would have become Confucian or Mohist, respectively. HNT

- (31) 使鄭簡魯哀當民之誹訾也而因弗遂用則
國必無功矣，子產，孔子必無能矣。

If Duke Jian of Zheng or Duke Ai of Lu had reacted to the people's slander by not employing the (slandered) men any more, then their states would certainly not have achieved their successes, and Zi Chan and Confucius would certainly have been unable to achieve anything. LSCQ 16.5. For a splendid unmarked counterfactual of this sort see HF 39 (291.9).

The lawyer and logician Hui Shi defends himself against the charge that his words and theories are as useless as a sacrificial tripod is for cooking rice, by playing with the comparison made:

- (32) 使三軍饑而居鼎旁適為之甑則莫宜之此鼎矣

If the three battalions of an army were famished and resting near a tripod, and if one made temporary use of the tripod as a frying pan, then this tripod would make a perfect frying pan. LSCQ 18.7.

When the Taoist Lie Zi hears that a craftsman (from Song, of course) is able to make ivory leaves indistinguishable from real leaves but takes three years to finish a plant, he remains unimpressed and comments:

- (33) 使天地三年而成一葉則物之有葉者寡矣

If Heaven and Earth produced a single leaf every three years, then there would be few leafy things. HF 21 (122.2). Cf. HNT 20.2b.

Typically, the Chinese like to argue for a philosophy of life by suggesting what its effect *would have* been in given historical situations:

- (34) 使此五君者適情辭餘，以己為度，不隨物而動
豈有此大患哉？

If these five rulers had seen to their real nature and had rejected all the rest, if they had taken themselves as their standard instead of running after things, how could these great disasters have occurred? HNT 7.17a.

Comparable speculations about the future are somewhat rarer; but it seems important for the development of Chinese thought, that Confucius' disciple Zi Lu could put a hypothetical question like the following to his fellow disciple Wu-ma Qi:

- (35) 使子無忘子之所知，亦無進子之所能
得此富終身無復見夫子¹，子為之乎？

“If, without forgetting what you (now) know, but also without advancing any in what you (now) are capable of, you attained to such wealth as this, provided you would never get to go back and see the Master again, would you do it?” HSWZ 2.26 tr. Hightower 66.

The ancient Chinese liked to philosophize about historical situations by imagining them to have been different:

(36) 使俗人不得其君形者而效其容，必為人笑。

If a commoner who has not got the exterior of a ruler had imitated this appearance he would surely have become the laughing stock of the world. HNT 6.3a.

We are told about someone leaving the ruler's court in all decorum after having given mortal offence to the ruler, and then the story goes on:

(37) 使被衣不暇帶冠不及正，蒲伏而走，上車而馳
必不能自免於千步之中矣。

If he had carried his clothes without loosening the belt properly, if his hat had not been straightened out, if he had crawled off, mounted his carriage and rushed away, he would certainly not have got further than a thousand steps. HNT 18.19a.

Most examples of this are self-explanatory:

(38) 使百里奚雖賢無得繆公必無此名矣

If Bai Li Xi, in spite of his talents, had not won recognition with Duke Mu, he would surely not have become as famous as in fact he did. LSCQ 14.6.

(Note the embedded *sui* 雖 .)

(39) 使曹子計不顧後足，不旋踵刎頸於陳中
則終身為破軍擒將矣

If Cao Zi in his planning had not taken posterity into account, he would not have turned his footsteps but would have cut his throat in the battle line, and he would forever have remained a defeated, captured general. HNT 13.18b.

(Note the glorious use of *zhong shen* 終身 in this passage!)

(40) 子能得車者必遭其睡也
使宋王而寤子為齋粉夫

Since you were able to get the carriages as presents, you must have found him asleep. If the King of Song had been awake, you would have found yourself torn to pieces, would you not? Zhuang 32.46.

Occasionally, such historical counterfactuals are introduced by *ruo shi*:

- (41) 若使此四國者得意於天下
此皆十倍其國之衆而未能食其地也。

If these four states were to get their will in the world, they would all be unable to consume (the revenues from) their territories, even if their populations increased tenfold. Mo 19.29. Cf. Mo 48.26.

And here is an unmarked example:

- (42) 且精郭君聽辨而為之也必無今日之患也

Moreover, if the ruler of Jing Guo had listened to me and acted accordingly, he certainly would not have got himself into the trouble he is in now. LSCQ 9.3.

- (43) 使宋殤蚤任孔父，魯莊素用季子
乃將靖鄰國而況自存乎。

If Duke Shang of Song originally had used Kong Fu, and if Duke Zhuang of Lu originally had used Ji Zi, they could have given peace to their neighbours, let alone survive themselves. Shuo Yuan 8.232.

(Incidentally it seems beautifully appropriate to take *zi cun* 自存 literally as 'cause oneself to survive'!)

Occasionally *she* 設 is used to introduce assumptions known to be wrong:

- (44) 設秦得人如何

Supposing Qin had got the right sort of man, what would have happened? Fa Yan 10.

Similarly *jia she* 假設:

- (45) 假設陛下君齊桓之處將不合諸侯匡天下乎

If you had ruled in place of Huan of Qi, would you not have brought together the feudal lords and united the world? Xin Shu 1.79.

However, I have not found earlier examples of this.

We also find free speculations about animals:

- (46) 如使馬能言，彼將必曰：樂哉今日之驕也。

If horses could speak, that one would certainly have said: 'What a pleasure today's gallop is!' HSWZ 2.11.

- (47) 使狐瞋目植蹙，見必殺之勢
雉亦知，驚憚遠飛以避其怒矣。

If a fox stared unswervingly and showed that he was in a position to be sure to kill, then the pheasant would also notice, get scared and fly far away in order to avoid the fox's anger. HNT 18.31b.

- (48) 使虎釋爪牙而使狗用之，則虎反服於狗矣。

If the tiger got rid of his claws and teeth, and if the dog were to use them, then conversely the tiger would submit to the dog. HF 7 (27.5).

Very popular are, of course, general political speculations:

- (49) 使人不欲生不惡死則不可得而制也

If people did not desire to live and hate to die, it would be impossible to achieve control over them. Guan 67 (3.52).

- (50) 使民無欲上雖賢猶不能用

If the people had no desires, then even if their superiors were talented, they could not employ the people. LSCQ 19.6.

- (51) 使無貴者，則民不能自理。

If there were no nobles, the people would not be able to govern themselves. Guan 5 (1.18–2).

- (52) 使工女化而為絲，不能治絲。
使大匠化而為木，不能治木。
使聖人化而為農，不能治農夫。

If a weaver-woman turned into silk, she would not be able to work on the silk. If a carpenter turned into timber, he would not be able to work on the timber. If a sage turned into a peasant, he would not be able to work on the peasants. LSCQ 18.6.

Now compare the following moralist reflection:

- (53) 如使人之所惡莫甚於死者
則凡可以避患者，何不為也？

"If among the things which man dislikes there were nothing which he

disliked more than death, why should he not do everything by which he could avoid danger?" Meng 6A10 tr. Legge 412.

Some editions lack the *ru* 如 at the beginning, but all editions retain the crucial counterfactual *shi*.

(54) 使天下兩天子，天下不可理也。

If there were two emperors in the world, the world would be impossible to govern. Guan 23 (2.7–14).

I suspect that the use of *shi* 使 in the following sensitive remark is motivated by political considerations. The possibility that a ruler might misbehave is put forward as theoretical and remote.

(55) 使君為藏姦者不可不去也
臣違君命者，亦不可不殺也。

Suppose a ruler failed to prosecute evil and was wicked, then he would have to be got rid of, just as a minister who goes against the ruler's orders must be killed. Guo Yu 4.3441.

(56) 今使人君行逆不修道…則不能毋侵奪

Now suppose a ruler did wrong and failed to cultivate the Way . . . then the people would have no alternative but to go on robbing expeditions. Guan 47 (2.95).

In sentences like (54), (55) and (56) we could have *ruo* 若 instead of *shi*: the protasis would then appear to be more likely to be true. Obviously, we are not here dealing with counterfactual conditionals.

(57) 今使楚人長乎戎，戎人長乎楚
則楚人戎言，戎人楚言矣。

Now if someone from Chu had grown up among the Rong, or someone of Rong descent in Chu, then the Chu-man would be speaking the Rong language and the Rong-man would be speaking the Chu language. LSCQ 4.5.

Of course, it is quite feasible that a child from Chu should come to grow up among the Rong and vice versa. But in the context, these are counterfactual assumptions: the Chu-man would not really have been a Chu-man if he had grown up among the Rong. If parents were talking about the possibility of bringing their son up in Qi they would – on my understanding of *shi* 使 – never use *shi* to introduce a phrase like 'suppose we bring him up in Qi he will get a Qi accent'. (Note, inci-

dentially, that *jin* 今 regularly introduces arbitrary examples. This use of *jin* is especially common in Mo but also regularly found elsewhere.)

General human reflections of the following sort are considerably rarer:

(58) 使失路者而肯聽能問知，即不成迷也。

Supposing someone who has gone astray was willing to listen and able to ask people who know the way, then he would not be quite lost. HF 20 (100.12).

Such reflections tend to have a political perspective. This applies to (58), but even more to:

(59) 使人之相去若玉之與石美之與惡則論人易矣。

If men were as far from each other as gems are from ordinary stones, or as beauty is from ugliness, then it would be easy to discuss personalities. HNT 13.21b.

I found one example of this involving the rare combination *bi shi* 譬使:

(60) 譬使仁者而必信，安有伯夷叔齊。

If a good person was bound to be trusted, how could there have been figures like Bo Yi and Shu Qi? Shi Ji 47.59.

(61) 使道而可獻則人莫不獻之於其君
使道而可進則人莫不進之於其親
使道而可以告人則人莫不告其兄弟
使道而可以與人則人莫不與其子孫
然而不可者無佗也

If the Way could be handed in, everyone would hand it in to his ruler. If the Way could be presented everyone would present it to his parents. If the Way could be reported, everyone would report it to his brother. If the Way could be bequeathed, everyone would bequeathe it to his descendants. But it is impossible to do any of these things, and the reason is this: ... Zhuang 14.47.

Eternal life and resurrection are assumed in sentences introduced by *shi*:

(62) 使古而無死者，則太公至今猶存。

If from antiquity there had been no such thing as death, Tai Gong would still be alive. HSWZ 10.11.

(63) 若使死者起也，吾將誰與歸乎？

If the dead came to life again, with whom would I return home? Xin Xu 4.22.

Significantly, consciousness after death is discussed in conditionals introduced by *ru* 如 or *ruo* 若：

(64) 若死者有知，我何面目以見仲父。

If the dead have consciousness, how am I to face up to Guan Zhong? LSCQ 16.3. For a parallel with *ru* 如 see LSCQ 23.3.

(65) 若死者有知先王積怒之日久矣

If the dead have knowledge, then the former kings have been hoarding up anger in their minds for many a day. ZGC 98 (I.56).

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that unmarked counterfactuals are commoner than my survey suggests:

(66) 上有道，是人亡矣。

If the Way prevailed among the leadership, such a man would not have existed. Shuo Yuan 7.198.

Such unmarked historical counterfactuals can be quite complex:

(67) 此七士者不遇明君聖主幾行乞丐
枯死於中野，譬猶絲絲之葛矣。

If these seven men (famous ministers) had not met enlightened and sage rulers, they might have gone begging or rotted away in the open countryside like the twisted creepers *ge*. Shuo Yuan 8.235.

Occasionally, such counterfactuals are introduced just by *jin* 今：

(68) 今桓公在此，則車下之臣盡管仲。

If a Duke Huan was here, then the ministers surrounding your carriage would all be Guan Zhongs. Shuo Yuan 8.248.

Sometimes the context seems to make hypothetical *shi* not only unnecessary but even inappropriate although we do have a counterfactual:

(69) 國無士耳，有則寡人亦說之。

There simply are no (true) knights in the country. If there were any, I would also enjoy their company. Shuo Yuan 8.250.

Unmarked counterfactuals are also common in earlier texts:

(70) 天下無人子墨子之言也猶存

If there were no humans in the world, Master Mo's words would still stand. Mo 44.25.

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(The brackets identify the editions normally quoted in this book. For the indexed literature these are those editions on which the indices were based. See the bibliography for other editions consulted).

- AC: Ancient Chinese
AM: Asia Major, London.
AO: Archiv Orientalni, Prague.
BMFEA: Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm.
BSOAS: Bulletin of SOAS, London.
CC: Chu Ci (Cf. Takishi Sengen 1972).
DX: Da Xue (Cf. Legge 1861).
GL: Gu Liang Zhuan (Cf. HYISIS).
Gong Yang: Gong Yang Zhuan (Cf. HYISIS).
GSL: Gongsun Long Zi (Cf. SBBY).
Guan: Guan Zi (Cf. Dai Wang and for the dating Luo 1966).
GY: Guo Yu (Cf. Bauer 1973).
HF: Han Fei Zi (Cf. Wang Xian-shen 1974).
HJAS: Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
HNT: Huai Nan Zi (Cf. Liu Wen-dian 1970).
HSWZ: Han Shi Wai Zhuan (Cf. Lai 1973).
HYISIS: Harvard Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Peking.
JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society.
Lao: Lao Zi (Cf. SBBY).
LH: Lun Heng (Cf. Wang Chong 1974).
Li Ji: Li Ji (Cf. Couvreur 1899).
LSCQ: Lü Shi Chun Qiu (Cf. Xu Wei-yu 1955).
LY: Lun Yu (Cf. HYISIS).
Meng: Mencius (Cf. HYISIS).
Mo: Mo Zi (Cf. HYISIS).
RO: Rocznik Orientalistyczny, Warsaw.
SBBY: Si bu bei yao.
SBCK: Si bu cong kan.
Shen: Shen Zi (Cf. Thompson 1979).
Shi: Shi Jing (Cf. HYISIS).
Shi Ji: Shi Ji (Cf. Takigawa 1934).
Shu: Shu Jing (Cf. Gu Jie-gang 1936, HYISIS).
Shuo Yuan: Shuo Yuan (Cf. Lu Yuan-jun 1977).
SJ: Shangjun Shu (Cf. Gao Heng 1974).
Sun: Sun Zi (Cf. Giles 1910).
TP: T'oung Pao, Leiden.

- Wen Zi: Wen Zi (Cf. SBBY edition).
Xin Shu: Xin Shu (Cf. Qi Yu-zhang 1975).
Xin Xu: Xin Xu (Cf. Lu Yuan-jun 1975).
XJ: Xiao Jing (Cf. HYISIS).
Xun: Xun Zi (Cf. HYISIS).
Yi: Yi Jing (Cf. HYISIS).
ZGC: Zhanguo Ce (Cf. Ye Yu-lin).
ZGZHJS: Zhanguo zonghengjia shu.
Zhuang: Zhuang Zi (Cf. HYISIS).
Zuo: Zuo Zhuan (Cf. HYISIS).
ZWDCCD: Zhongwen da cidian, vol 1–40, Taipei 1962–68.

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Danish Summary

Det oldkinesiske sprog har spillet en dominerende rolle i Kina indtil det tyvende århundrede. Det har også spillet en afgørende rolle i Østasien i al almindelighed. Oldkinesisk er uden tvivl et af verdens største kultursprog. Siden det er et ekstremt isolerende sprog, er det af særlig betydning for sprogtypologi og for sprogfilosofi.

I bogen *Zur philosophischen Grammatik des Altchinesischen* har jeg, med udgangspunkt i den engelske analytiske filosofi, prøvet at påvise, at en detaljeret analyse af det oldkinesiske sprog har betydelige konsekvenser for generel lingvistik og for sprogfilosofi, især indenfor områder som forholdene imellem pragmatik og semantik i interpretationen af sætninger, mellem morfologi og syntaks, mellem grammatiske og leksikalske enheder, mellem ordklasser og funktioner i sætningen, såvel som mellem underordnede sætninger og nominalisering i naturlige sprog. Jeg argumenterer for, at sprogfilosoffer og lingvister tager særlige hensyn til oldkinesisk, fordi sproget tilsyneladende afviger på centrale punkter fra det billede af naturlige sprog, som vores generelle sprogfilosofiske og lingvistiske teorier forudsætter.

Men sinologerne og lingvisterne er langt fra de eneste, der er nødt til at tage særlig hensyn til det oldkinesiske sprog. Enhver, som alvorligt ønsker en universel forståelse af fænomener som rationalitet, historiografi, filosofi, videnskabshistorie, en forståelse der ikke skal være begrænset af den indoeuropæiske kulturhorisont, har god grund til at tage nøje hensyn til den overordentlig varierede og særprægede oldkinesiske litteratur.

En alvorlig hindring for en videnskabelig beskæftigelse med den oldkinesiske litteratur er desværre vor helt utilstrækkelige viden om oldkinesisk grammatik. En betydelig præcisering af vort grammatiske kendskab til det oldkinesiske sprog er en uundværlig forudsætning for en virkelig ansvarlig og nuanceret interpretation af Kinas store litterære og videnskabelige arv. A. C. Grahams monumentale nye bog *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* illustrerer forholdene. Grahams afgørende nye resultater indenfor det videnskabshistoriske område er blevet mulige på grundlag af detaljerede grammatiske forstudier.

Hvis vi virkelig vil forstå den kinesiske kultur, må vi først gøre en

grundig indsats for en præcis forståelse af det sprog, som fundamentene for den kinesiske kultur blev artikuleret på.

Med udgangspunkt i den analytiske sprogfilosofi har jeg valgt at koncentrere mig om fire logisk centrale emner: negation, kvantifikation, pronominalisering og konditionalsætninger. Disse sproglige områder er centrale i den forstand, at de er uundværlige til enhver kompleks videnskabelig argumentation og til artikulation af enhver kompleks tankegang.

Indenfor området NEGATION giver jeg en ny analyse af forholdet mellem den verbale negation *bu* og den 'nominale' negation *fei*. Det viser sig, at det 'nominale' *fei* faktisk meget tit er fulgt af verber, og at den traditionelle påstand om, at *fei* er en nominal negation, er dybt vildledende. Jeg viser, at *fei* fungerer som en kontrastiv sætnings-negation i modsætning til den verbale negation *bu*, og at *fei* foran verber skal forstås som 'det er ikke som om ...'.

Fænomenet *neg-raising* forekommer med forskellige verber i forskellige sprog. På dansk siger vi gerne: 'Jeg håber ikke, han slår sig', når vi mener, at vi håber, han *ikke* slår sig. Det viser sig på oldkinesisk, at verber som *shi* 'sørge for at', *ling* 'beordre' og *jiao* 'få nogen til at gøre noget' fungerer som *neg-raisers*, men ikke verber som 'mene' (*yi* ... *wei*) eller 'håbe'. Jeg undersøger også, om man skal opfatte verbet *yu* 'ønske' som en *neg-raiser*.

Den oldkinesiske negation *wei* anses generelt som en temporal negation, der skal oversættes med ord som 'ikke endnu', 'aldrig'. Jeg viser, at ordet tit har en *logisk* snarere end temporal betydning 'ikke helt'. Det viser sig iøvrigt af finalpartiklen *yi*, som alternerer med *wei*, ligeledes har en logisk anvendelse ved siden af den velkendte temporale (hvor den svarer til det moderne kinesiske *le*). *Wei* og *yi* er nogle af de hyppigste ord i oldkinesiske tekster. Min nyinterpretation af ordene har vidtrækkende følger for vor forståelse af oldkinesisk litteratur.

KVANTIFIKATION er overvejende adverbial på oldkinesisk. Man siger ikke: 'Alle svaner er sorte' men noget i retning af: 'Svaner er alle sorte'. Den afgørende forskel blandt de universelle oldkinesiske kvantifikatorer, som hidtil ikke har været klar, er imellem adverbiale objekt-kvantifikatorer og adverbiale subjekt-kvantifikatorer.

Jeg viser for det første, at *jian* er en sådan objekt-kvantifikator, og for det andet, at den har en individualiserende nuance, sådan at man skal forstå ordet som: 'Alle objekter hver for sig'.

Jeg viser, at *bian* også er en objekt-kvantifikator, og at den har en rummelig nuance: 'Alle objekter over det hele'.

Jeg viser, at *zhou* er en objekt-kvantifikator oprindelig af samme nuance som *bian*: 'Alle objekter på alle sider'. Jeg viser også logikernes formaliserede brug af kvantifikatoren.

Jeg viser, at *fan* er objekt-kvantifikator med nuancen 'alle objekter over det hele'.

Jeg viser, at *xi* er en neutral objekt-kvantifikator med betydningen 'Alle objekter'.

Jeg viser, at ordet *liang* 'to' regelmæssigt bliver brugt som objekt-kvantifikator: 'Begge disse objekter'.

Jeg viser, at *jie* kan fungere som individualiserende objekt-kvantifikator: 'Alle de (enkelte) objekter', men kun når subjektet ikke kan kvantificeres, f.eks. fordi det er et personalpronomen 'jeg'.

Jeg viser, at *jie* som subjekt-kvantifikator står i klar kontrast med *jin*. *Jin* kan kun under ganske bestemte omstændigheder kvantificere subjektet og betyder normalt 'hele mængden af objekter'. *Jie*, i modsætning til *jin*, kan kun kvantificere *individuelle* subjekter, ikke mængder af ting.

Jeg analyserer kontrasten mellem *jie* 'alle subjekter på lige måde' og *ge* 'hvert af subjekterne på dets egen måde . . . (dets eget objekt)', og jeg analyserer de præcise syntaktiske forhold, hvor *ge* ikke kan erstatte *jie* og omvendt.

Jeg prøver at vise, at der i det oldkinesiske sprog er en fundamental kontrast mellem specifik eksistentiel kvantifikation og generel eksistentiel kvantifikation. På oldkinesisk bruger man konstruktionen *you* . . . *zhe* i sætninger som 'nogen (jeg ved selvfølgelig hvem det var, men det er ikke vigtigt nu) ville gifte sig med mig igår' og man bruger simpelt *huo* i sætninger som 'nogen (jeg ved ikke hvem) er ude på at ødelægge Danmark'.

Jeg viser, hvordan relative kvantifikatorer ('mange', 'få') fungerer på oldkinesisk. Samtidigt argumenterer jeg for, at den grammatiske kategori 'komparativ' er systematisk redundant i den oldkinesiske grammatik. 'A er større end B' udtrykkes oftest som 'A er stor i forhold til B' eller som 'Af A og B, er A det store'. Kategoriens overflødighed har ikke hidtil været analyseret.

Jeg viser, at der er en skarp kontrast mellem de to oldkinesiske ord, der opfattes som udtryk for 'superlativ' *zui* og *zhi*. *Zui da* betyder 'den største af de givne', mens *zhi da* betyder 'den største af de tænkelige'. Grunden til, at *zui* forekommer så sjældent i oldkinesiske sætninger, er, at 'superlativet' gerne udtrykkes perifrastisk på oldkinesisk.

'A er den største B' udtrykkes oftest som 'af B'erne er A den store'. 'I am the greatest' ville nemmest udtrykkes som 'i verden er jeg den store'.

Jeg viser, at der blandt de restriktive kvantifikatorer er en afgørende kontrast mellem subjekt-orienterede (*The best only will satisfy him*) og prædikat-orienterede (*She merely said she was disgusted*).

Jeg argumenterer for, at ordet *wei* 'kun', som fungerer i sætninger som '*Wei* (kun) en logiker kan forstå det', skal analyseres som en underordnet kopula, således at den strukturelt korrekte fortolkning er: 'Kun hvis man er en logiker, kan man forstå det'.

Jeg viser, at der er en vigtig kontrast mellem *yi* 'også subjektet' og *you* 'også prædikatet eller objektet', således at man på oldkinesisk skal bruge *yi* i en sætning som 'Også du, Brutus, har svigtet mig', og *you* i en sætning som 'Brutus myrdede derudover også Cæsar'. *Yi* er altså subjekt-orienteret, og *you* er prædikat-orienteret.

Jeg viser, at *fan* ikke som hidtil antaget er en adjektivisk kvantifikator 'alle'. Det viser sig, at *fan* altid har som *scope* det hele tema af en sætning, sådan at hvis man på oldkinesisk bruger *fan* i en konstruktion som '*fan* filosofers fejl', så er der af grammatiske grunde aldrig tale om fejl, som alle filosoffer har begået. Der er generelt tale om de fejl, som filosoffer begår, eller som nogle filosoffer har begået.

Jeg viser, at *fan* regelmæssigt betyder 'altid når', når det bruges ikke med nominale temaer men med underordnede sætninger, ligesom *yi* 'også', når det ikke følger efter nomina men sætninger, kommer til at betyde 'også i det tilfælde'. Forbindelserne mellem underordnede sætninger og temaer viser sig mange andre steder indenfor den oldkinesiske syntaks.

Jeg viser, at *zhu*, *qun* og *zhong* involverer semantisk noget, der svarer til en bestemt artikel: '*de* forskellige', '*den* store gruppe af', '*de* mange'.

Indenfor området PRONOMINALISERING viser jeg, at reflexiv-pronomenet *ji* er kontrastivt i simple sætninger (ikke 'sig' men 'sig selv'), og at det i objekt-sætninger ikke kan gøre verbet reflexivt, således at en oldkinesisk sætning som 'jeg synes, at han snyder *ji* (selv)' af grammatiske grunde kun kan betyde 'jeg synes, han snyder mig'. Der skal skelnes omhyggeligt mellem pronominet *ji* og det homonyme *men ji* 'selvet'.

Jeg viser, at det refleksive *zi* under bestemte syntaktiske forhold kan referere til subjektet, og at ordets specielle funktion 'af sig selv, natur-

ligt' i virkeligheden bare er kausativ: 'jeg *zi* (af mig selv) går' skal således ordret forstås som 'jeg får mig selv til at gå'. Jeg analyserer adskillige vendinger med *zi*, som ikke hidtil har været forståelige.

Jeg viser, at der blandt oldkinesiske interrogativpronomina er en afgørende forskel mellem *shui* 'hvem' og *shu* 'hvem'. I sætninger som 'hvem er klogere?' kan kun *shu* bruges. Jeg viser derudover, at der blandt interrogativpronomina er en fundamental forskel mellem subjektpronomina og objektpronomina.

Jeg viser, at det såkaldte pronomen *zhe* markerer underordnede sætninger såvel som temaer. En oldkinesisk sætning som 'den gode husbond *zhe* elsker sin hustru' kan således opfattes som 'hvis nogen er en god husbond, så elsker han sin hustru'.

Jeg viser, at det hyppige pronomen *suo* 'objektet som' har nogle afslørende anvendelser som sætningsunderordnet partikel, især i formaliseret rituelt sprog.

Indenfor området KONDITIONALSÆTNINGER viser jeg, at der er en skarp kontrast mellem *sui* 'selv hvis' og *zong* 'uanset at'. Kontrasten har ikke hidtil været forstået.

Jeg viser, at *suis* grundbetydning må anses at være modal: 'maybe X, but . . .'. Der påvises en vigtig parallel med det etymologisk beslægtede *fei* 'it isn't as if X, but . . .'. De syntaktiske paralleler mellem *sui* og *fei* analyseres nærmere.

Jeg viser, at *sui* 'sågar' foran nomina er bedst analyseret på linie med det hypotetiske *sui*. En sætning som '*sui* ('sågar') en pave kan begå en fejl' skal således forstås om 'Selv hvis man er en pave, kan man begå en fejl'.

Jeg viser, at der er en fundamental forskel mellem konditionalsætninger som '*ruo* (hvis) hun bliver sur, stikker jeg af' og 'angriber man mig, *ze* (så) svarer jeg igen'. Sætninger med *ruo* (uden *ze*) udtrykker oftest specifikke konditionale forhold, mens *ze* (uden *ruo*) oftest kan oversættes som 'så, som regel'.

Jeg viser, at den gamle glose *cheng* 'oprigtigt, ærligt, virkeligt' for ordet *gou* 'hvis' giver nøglen til en korrekt interpretation af konditionalsætningerne med *gou*. Den gamle glose var blevet glemt i den nyere litteratur om oldkinesisk grammatik.

Jeg giver et overblik over konditionalsætninger 'i irrealis' og viser, at ordet *shi* typisk finder anvendelse i disse *counterfactuals*. Forskellen mellem 'hvis hun bliver sur, stikker jeg af' og 'hvis hun var blevet sur, var jeg stukket af' udtrykkes således på oldkinesisk gennem brug af forskellige ord for 'hvis'.

Hovedtesen i den foreliggende afhandling er, at det grammatiske system i det oldkinesiske sprog på fundamentale og afgørende punkter er logisk meget mere nuanceret og præcist, end det fremgår af den omfangsrige faglitteratur om emnet.

De her opsummerede præciseringer af oldkinesisk syntaks er frem for alt af praktisk betydning for en ansvarlig og grundig interpretation af den oldkinesiske litteratur. Selvfølgelig mener jeg også, at de er vigtige for det mere teoretiske arbejde med kinesisk lingvistik. Endelig håber jeg, at mine resultater kan vinde interesse hos de sprogfilosoffer og lingvister, som ikke vil lukke sig af fra den 'naturlige logik', der gemmer sig i de såkaldte eksotiske sprog.